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ABSTRACT 
The social ecosystem approach explores the individuals and organizations that help effect a 
particular social outcome and the factors within their environment that contribute to or hinder their 
success. When applied to the particular housing and community development challenge facing 2-4 
unit properties in the Chicago neighborhood of Woodlawn, the standard social ecosystem model is 
augmented by an explicit incorporation of a development process to emphasize the importance of 
the entrepreneurial, financial, technical and undeniably social aspects of real estate in revitalizing 
urban communities. The research sets out to explore the historical causes and processes that led to 
vacancy and market decline; the current condition of the market and neighborhood; lessons learned 
from previous efforts; and the parameters of action imposed by important stakeholder interests. 
This analysis reveals how population loss, speculation fueled by unrealized hopes of gentrification 
and accumulated property-level delinquencies combine to sustain high vacancies in Woodlawn. 
Recent declines in homeownership, depressed property values, a shortage of local amenities and 
structural barriers lowering investor margins also inhibit sustainable building uses in favor of 
landlords who “milk” properties and target Housing Choice Voucher Recipients. Due to the lack of 
social capital, the neighborhood struggles to control violence and maintain the public realm. The 
consequence is a diminished ability to attract prospective residents despite considerable local assets. 
The proposed response advances five strategic outcomes: stabilization of the market; advocacy for 
both better policy and internal structure; expansion of loans and financial assistance for 
homeowners; expansion of technical assistance and counseling for homeowners; and the 
prioritization of local development approaches that spread benefits more equitably than is typical of 
gentrification. The associated recommendations, which broadly consider policy, planning and 
community development, seek to create a synergy capable of addressing the challenges identified by 
the social ecosystem framework and build on existing strengths and opportunities in Woodlawn. 
Thesis Supervisor: Karl F. Seidman 
Title: Senior Lecturer in Economic Development 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis analyzes a range of market, policy, and neighborhood challenges associated with a 
particular housing typology—the two- to four-unit buildings in the Chicago neighborhood of 
Woodlawn—with the hope of developing a credible plan for contributing to the neighborhood’s 
health. This is accomplished through a descriptive case study of the real estate development process 
and supporting social ecosystem. The thesis then formulates a set of strategic options for stabilizing 
the local market, pursuing specific policy and community development improvements, expanding 
access to financial resources, improving technical and professional services for homeowners, and 
investing in a manner consistent with promoting improved circumstances for the widest swatch of 
neighborhood residents and stakeholders. 
Smaller buildings in Chicago are a very important part of the housing stock, with two- to four-unit 
properties accounting for approximately one-third of the entire stock in Cook County (IHS, 2012a). 
In Woodlawn, the proportion of rental housing units in this building typology is slightly higher(IHS, 
2012b). Much of this housing was negatively impacted by Great Recession, with 41% of the 2-4 
buildings in Woodlawn having been impacted by foreclosure in 2005-2011(IHS, 2012a). Because of 
both their ubiquitous and dispersed presence in the neighborhood, these buildings are critical to the 
health of the neighborhood. 
Since 2007, an exciting revitalization endeavor has been taking place in Woodlawn. As the lead 
grantee in the $30.5 million Woodlawn Choice Neighborhoods, non-profit developer Preservation 
of Affordable Housing (POAH), has undertaken an ambitious plan centered on redeveloping a large, 
distressed apartment complex in the center of the neighborhood. Under the Choice Neighborhoods 
initiative, POAH has been partnering with stakeholders to take on broader neighborhood-level 
improvements and formulate a Small Building Initiative since 2012. This research and planning 
endeavor is directly motivated by this Initiative, yet it intends to identify generalizable challenges, 
lessons, and insights that can be valuable to a range of neighborhood planners and actors.  
Woodlawn 
Located on the Chicago’s South Side, Woodlawn is a neighborhood with a rich cultural and 
historical legacy. Lorraine Hansberry’s play “A Raisin in the Sun” depicts the Younger Family 
struggling to break the walls of entrenched racial segregation in Chicago. Hansberry based based the 
play on her family’s own personal and legal struggle to purchase a home in Washington Park, known 
then as West Woodlawn, in 1937. Woodlawn was a neighborhood where racial covenants would 
have legally prevented them from purchasing a home. Yet, by the premiere of the play in 1959, 
Woodlawn had essentially undergone the process of racial and socioeconomic upheaval (Taub, 1988). 
Just across the Midway from the University of Chicago, Woodlawn has a strong legacy of 
community organizations such as The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). Unfortunately, it has 
become an unfortunate tragic tale of racial change in South Side Chicago. For several decades, much 
of Woodlawn has been plagued by social duress. 
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The recent push to improve smaller buildings in Woodlawn has grown out of efforts to redevelop 
Grove Parc, one of the neighborhood’s Section 8-assisted properties that was notorious for its state 
of deterioration for several years.  Having grown out of the efforts to organize against University of 
Chicago’s Urban Renewal project, it has provided long-term affordable housing for low-income 
residents and an informal commitment from the University to forego expansion opportunities below 
61st Street that is still in effect today. Grove Parc is the center of the Choice Neighborhoods 
revitalization initiative in Woodlawn. 
Choice Neighborhoods 
The Choice Neighborhoods program is a centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s Neighborhood 
Revitalization Initiative. Conceived as a replacement of the two-decade HOPE VI program, the 
program focuses is on redeveloping both public and privately-owned affordable housing and has 
four goals as stipulated by the 2010 Notice of Funding (HUD, 2010): 
1. Neighborhoods. Transforming neighborhoods with concentrated poverty and distressed 
housing into mixed-income neighborhoods with greater economic opportunity and better 
public amenities; 
2. People. Resident-focused improvements in education achievements and economic self-
sufficiency;  
3. Housing. Providing current residents a choice between (redeveloped) affordable housing in 
the community as well as the opportunity to move to affordable housing in other 
neighborhood of opportunity; and 
4. Use of concentration, leverage and coordination of various types of funding for community 
and metropolitan growth. 
The program reflects the all-too-often binary goals of balancing people and placed-based policies, 
supporting locality-based initiatives while ensuring that outcomes for current residents are just as 
important. It actively encourages grantees to leverage the public funds with other public funds 
(notably the Promise Neighborhoods Grants and Byrne Justice Innovation Grants) as well as private 
and philanthropic sources. 
Preservation of Affordable Housing 
Preservation of Affordable Housing (POAH), a 10-year old national non-profit developer 
specializing in housing preservation, became active in the City of Chicago in 2007 at the request of 
tenants of Grove Parc Plaza housing development in the Woodlawn neighborhood. Taking over the 
financially troubled complex, POAH initiated a multi-phase project for housing redevelopment and 
formulated a plan for comprehensive neighborhood revitalization. After the redevelopment process 
was underway, POAH received a Choice Neighborhoods grant of $30 million from HUD that is 
associated with a total direct investment of $272 million (which excludes some of the first phase’s 
investment due to timing).  
Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, POAH and the City committed not only to improving housing 
outcomes for the existing residents, but also to implementing case management and addressing 
broader neighborhood needs. Part of the “Neighborhood” component calls for the creation of a 
Small Building Fund to promote home-ownership and address the stock of vacant buildings in the 
neighborhood. 
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Research Questions 
The motivation for this research project stems from the fact that vacant buildings pose a risk to the 
ability of POAH and its partners to maximize the benefits of the $30.5 million in Choice funding 
and the various other financial and non-financial resources. 
Despite its close proximity to the University of Chicago, Woodlawn shows many signs of a 
distressed neighborhood. The presence of vacant housing was noticeably high before the recession, 
and even more foreclosures have come about due to the onset of housing crisis. Housing demand is 
weak in Woodlawn, in part because of safety issues and other quality of life factors. While existing 
efforts have sought to rehabilitate smaller buildings, either through investment from community 
development financial institutions, Neighborhood Stabilization Program and other governmental 
funds, they have not solved all the problems and, indeed, may serve as focal points for opposition 
from homeowners concerned about the amount of tenants with housing vouchers in the 
neighborhood. Though POAH owns and manages over 8,000 multifamily units, their portfolio 
consists of larger (50+ unit) properties and they have neither the capacity (nor the desire) to add 
scattered site rental housing to its portfolio. A smaller building is a noticeably different development 
endeavor than 5+ unit properties, much less a large multifamily property. Smaller buildings provide 
much better opportunities to smaller entrepreneurs who are vertically integrated, performing 
construction management in-house. In addition, two- to four-unit buildings can be sold to 
homeowners to occupy the property and rent out additional units, just as they can be maintained 
entirely as investment properties.  
This thesis analyzes the community and economic context around two- to four-unit properties and 
recommends a series of strategies to revitalization that will credibly reduce building vacancies and 
complement the larger investment in the neighborhood. It is the hope that this will yield helpful 
analysis and recommendations for POAH and other stakeholders in their long-term efforts at 
improving the neighborhood. In this spirit, the following questions have guided this research 
endeavor: 
1. What are the causes of vacancy in smaller buildings in Woodlawn? 
2. What challenges face the market for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn? 
3. What existing efforts to address vacancy have existed and how have they fared? 
4. What community goals and most promising recommendations should be factored as a 
part of the Small Building Initiative to advance broader neighborhood improvement? 
Methodology 
Framework 
Overall, the methodological approach employed included the development of a qualitative case 
study and a conceptual framework that explores the social ecosystem surrounding real estate 
development.  In many respects, it borrows from the approach of grounded theory inferring 
conclusions from the accumulation of data, rather than seeking to validate specific pre-set 
hypotheses (Creswell, 2007). The research questions are addressed from the findings of the 
descriptive case study, and a planning strategy is formulated that attempts to improve the market for 
two- to four-unit properties in light of the findings. That strategy provides a deliberate set of actions, 
directly related objectives that are believed to contribute to a set of outcomes that are both beneficial 
for a stronger two- to four-unit market in Woodlawn and derived directly from my research.  
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I will employ a methodology consisting of several core functions: collect mostly qualitative data on 
the contextual environment, analyze the context using the social ecosystem and two- to four-unit 
building development framework, identify a set of strategic outcomes, and describe specific actions 
that can effectively achieve the outcomes.  
The methodological framework employed is illustrated visually below 
 
Data Collection 
Interviews 
During January 2013, I conducted over 12 hours of formal and informal interviews with 
approximately 20 persons over the course of three weeks in Chicago. Using prior contacts and 
contextual knowledge during my time as an intern at POAH, I developed a list of approximately 50 
individuals and organizations that I contacted through a combination of emails and phone calls.  My 
intended goal was to create a list of informants that included residents (home-owners and tenants), 
advocates, developers, government officials, landlords, non-profits program officers and executive 
staff and various types of community leaders. Unless I encountered them inadvertently in another 
capacity, I did not directly interview a tenant. However many of their concerns surfaced indirectly, 
confirming that my list of informants was fairly representative and consistent with my initial goals. 1 
                                                 
1 It deserves noting that I was intentional in finding advocates for low-income tenants to include this 
important perspective in my research. 
Data Collection 
•Conducting interviews 
with key neighborhood 
informants 
•Converting individual 
interviews into discrete 
data points pre-
organized for analytical 
framework. 
•Collecting  background 
quantitative data and 
other 
primary/secondary 
materials 
Analysis of Data 
Grounded in 
Conceptual 
Framework 
•Classification of 
qualitative data across 
interviews according to 
social ecosystem and 
development process. 
•Open-coding of 
qualitative data and 
development of major 
observations through 
"memoing"  
•Iterative re-organization 
of data into categories 
to clarify frameworks,  
minimize overlap, and 
improving the 
qualitative approach. 
Key Findings 
•Maintaining and 
compiling a running list 
of major implications 
encountered in data 
collection and 
application of 
conceptual framwork. 
•Revisiting original 
research questions 
 
Strategy 
•Brainstorming actions 
consistent with 
addressing key findings. 
•Organizing preliminary 
actions into strategic 
outcomes and 
intermediate objectives. 
•Revising recommended 
actions in order to 
directly address 
strategic outcomes and 
objectives. 
•Developing 
implementation plan 
with prioritization of 
recommendations, 
implementating entities 
and resources. 
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The interviews were 30 to 60 minute semi-structured interviews; I developed a fixed set of questions 
that covered the topics of interest, but with the help of audio-recording technology, I was able to let 
the interviews take a natural progression, revisit my original topics and questions in the moment, 
follow up on additional topics as needed and then rely on recordings for getting sufficient detail 
afterwards. 
Thematic Approach to Interview Questions  
In developing questions for the interviews, I began with questions based on an informant’s general 
relationship to the research topic (developer, resident, government official, etc.), customizing those 
questions to fit the particular background of each informant. For example, developers with direct 
experience renovating two- to four-unit buildings were asked questions about smaller units which 
were different from those put to developers of larger multifamily properties. 
There were 6 particular themes that guided both the questions and the list of informants I sought: 
Component Approach/Research Objectives  
Historical 
Context 
Using interviews and primarily secondary sources, to develop a historical 
narrative of the circumstances that create the existing environment in Woodlawn. 
Neighborhood 
Politics 
 Through interview questions about political engagement, identify the political 
climate in which the Small Building Initiative enters. What political issues are 
linked to the issue of Small Buildings? What is perceived as feasible and not, and 
why is this the case?  
Housing Stock Assess the housing stock in two parts: (1) stakeholder interviews with developers, 
residents, and government officials for qualitative information; and 2) analyze 
data on vacant buildings (which are easily available), rental and for-sale listings 
(available with subscriptions) and tax and parcel data (much more difficult to 
compile, but possibly available from secondary sources). This also involves 
systematically dividing up the housing into categories of occupancy, foreclosure 
status, sale/rental price, building condition and number of household units.  
Housing 
Demand 
Use secondary information from a market study commission by POAH in 
addition to conversations with developers and brokers to understand market 
prices for sale and for rent. 
Capital 
Availability 
Through interviews with private/non-profit lenders, developers and government 
officials; assess whether there are identifiable limitations in capital availability for 
small building redevelopment, explanations, the particular loan products needed 
and the primary sources of capital in the neighborhood. 
Renovation & 
Management 
Gather information on other aspects of the housing delivery system that might 
include renovation of small building, obtaining a title, general landlord issues and 
scattered site rental management.  
 
Additional Sources 
For the purpose of generating additional insights for the case study, I relied on both primary and 
secondary sources to assist the interviews. Newspapers and news radio coverage were helpful for 
gaining information on historic context, and online websites such as the (now defunct) site 
Everyblock.com and Facebook served as a way of aggregating attitudes and opinions of residents. I 
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also relied on administrative data from the City of Chicago, Decennial Census, American 
Community Survey, and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council for background and 
additional evidence on the neighborhood, social and economic changes and physical features. 
Analytical Framework: Social Ecosystem and Development Process 
The workhorse of this research thesis has been an analytical framework that analyzes the social 
ecosystem and development process of two- to four-unit buildings. The framework was inspired by 
Bloom and Dees whose work on community development financial institution Self-Help Credit 
Unions effectively analyzed its social ecosystem and re-shaped the home mortgage market and 
prospects for low-wealth borrowers and clients (Bloom & Dees, 2008). The first component of the 
social ecosystem are the “players” (individuals and organizations): a web of interrelated individuals 
and organizations who are capable of exhibiting some form of agency that is pertinent to two- to 
four-unit building market, including resource providers, partners, alternative providers of housing, 
customers, problem makers and bystanders. The environmental conditions represent a second 
component that shapes which players can exist and their relationship with each other, including the 
economy, laws and regulations, demographics, culture and geography. I augmented this framework 
by explicitly incorporating the process components of real estate development: the acquisition, 
renovation, disposition and management of two- to four-unit properties. 
The analytical process transformed many qualitative insights into a detailed examination of the social 
ecosystem. Though I recorded (with permission) all but a few of my interviews, I opted not to 
transcribe the majority of the interviews. I developed a 35-column database to organize the 
following background information for each informant, including detailed notes from the interview, 
and to perform a quick check about the important implications. 
Category Informant Database Columns 
Source 
Background 
Information Type 
Name of Source 
Stakeholder Category 
Date Conducted 
Title & Affiliation 
Contact Information 
Permissions Granted 
General Causes of Vacancy 
Choice Neighborhoods Efforts 
Environmental 
Conditions 
 
Economics and Markets 
Politics 
Public Policy and Administrative Structures 
Geography and Infrastructure 
Social and Cultural Factors 
Historical Factors 
Players 
 
 
Resource Providers 
Competitors 
Complementary Organizations and allies 
Beneficiaries and customers 
Opponents and problem makers 
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Affected and influential bystanders 
Development 
Processes 
 
Acquisition 
Renovation 
Sales, Leasing and Disposition of Buildings & Property Management 
Capital Availability 
Preliminary 
Analysis 
What people, event or situations were involved? 
What were the main themes or issues in the contact? 
Which research questions and which variables in the initial framework did the 
contact bear on most centrally? 
What new hypotheses, speculations, or hunches about the field situations were 
suggested by the contact? 
Where should the field-worker place most energy during the next contact, and 
what kinds of information should be sought? 
 
The primary reason for constructing a database was to translate hours of interviews into passages of 
written text (short of transcription) that could be re-organized and sorted by question as opposed to 
informant. Generating summaries of each question allowed them to be coded for the themes, 
conflicts, anecdotes and patterns. The classification scheme was employed through the discretion of 
the author according to criteria based on social ecosystem literature. Through an iterative process, I 
clarified the meaning of the categories, whether information was pertinent and where it falls in the 
analytical frame. 
Development of Key Findings 
The next stage of my research was identifying the most important findings and implications of the 
data collected and analyzed along the analytical frame. First, using a traditional strategy of qualitative 
research, I kept a journal of emerging patterns throughout the process. This journal was most active 
throughout the several months of translating interviews into the detailed a case study using the 
aforementioned analytical frame. When each interview was entered in the database, I often 
summarized emerging themes that would only become more prominent. These preliminary findings 
were grouped in evolving categories of real estate development, community development and public 
policy. My intention was to recognize the multi-faceted nature of two- to four-unit properties and 
consider different approaches in developing recommendations. To systematically uncover additional 
findings not readily apparently during earlier parts of the research process, I performed a SWOT 
analysis within these categories, considering existing “strengths” and “weaknesses” specific to 
Woodlawn or two- to four-unit properties, as well as “opportunities” and “threats” originating 
elsewhere. With a comprehensive list of important findings, the last two steps were revisiting the 
four research questions as a means for selecting the findings that were relevant, organizing them, 
and isolating each finding into an observation and its implication. 
Development of Strategic Plan 
The final part of the research process was developing a strategic plan for two- to four-unit buildings, 
addressing the challenges identified in the key findings and building on the opportunities. The 
strategic plan was created through a fairly informal process. Many of the recommendations were 
recorded in a journal during various parts of the research process. Juxtaposing both the key findings 
and the recommendations, strategic outcomes were selected that met the criteria as visions. The 
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recommendations were organized into more direct and measurable objectives. Final implementation 
steps revolved around prioritizing each recommendation by the perceived amount of effort required 
and a grouping of general priority attached to each. 
The Strategic Outcomes are listed below: 
I. Stabilization - A stabilized, well-functioning property market for two- to four-unit 
properties 
II. Advocacy - Policies and organizational infrastructures better aligned for addressing the 
unique challenges of two- to four-unit properties 
III. Loan Fund and Financial Assistance - Interested and current homeowners in Woodlawn 
have adequate financial resources to invest into two- to four-unit properties 
IV. Assistance and Counseling - Interested and current homeowners in Woodlawn have 
adequate technical assistance and counseling to invest into two- to four-unit properties 
V. Responsible Development - Current residents have pathways to build wealth through 
local economic development and pathways to homeownership, while diverse rental products 
and necessary amenities attract newer (moderate income) residents. 
Literature Review 
My research, while centered on the development of a case study, is not without its hypotheses. 
Urban neighborhoods such as Woodlawn are often beset with a myriad of challenges, and the 
particular improvement of single-family properties (one- to four-unit) is part of the broader effort to 
revitalize them. 
Methodological Concerns 
This thesis doesn’t test a particular hypothesis, yet the literature review is an important aspect of any 
process. At times incidentally and other times explicitly, my research has been motivated by the 
methodological approach of grounded theory. Grounded theory requires a researcher to develop 
categories from empirical data, identifies additional data along the categories and tells a story around 
a “central phenomenon” being investigated (Creswell, 2007). As described by Dunne (2011), there is 
a robust debate over the role of literature among researchers who employ grounded theory. In this 
approach, theories generated from empirical data are privileged over existing theoretical frameworks, 
and such a literature review can prevent an unfettered discovery process (Glaser & Strauss, 2012). In 
conducting my research, I have continued to review literature after the initial research proposal. This 
allows my research to have a non-trivial degree of breadth, and the expectation of 
comprehensiveness when conducting research in community development where economics, public 
policy, psychology, building systems and demography may all bear on the subject at hand. 
Causes of Neighborhood Decline 
I consider, next, the historical circumstances that led to the conditions that exist in communities like 
Woodlawn. Many authors attribute neighborhood decline to factors external to the boundaries, as 
opposed to those that are purely self-contained. In addition, the role of race is always explicitly or 
implicitly a factor. Hirsch’s (1998) striking examination of further concentration of urban renewal in 
Chicago highlights the extent of segregated housing markets in the 1950-1960s, which subjected 
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rural black Southerners often to higher-cost, sub-divided housing in Chicago and white residents to 
block-busting and social and economic pressures to move to the suburbs. Hirsch’s work stops 
decade before the start of this research, but conditions he described in his work continued into the 
1980s as described by Taub (1988) in the case of South Shore. Gangs took over Woodlawn, as they 
did in several neighborhoods, putting further pressure on middle-class residents to move. 
Further, as many home-owning and middle-class (and white) families left inner-city communities, so 
did the commercial retailer on whom all families depended (Bright, 2000). The disappearance of 
employment opportunities in the city and the movement of many households away from inner black 
neighborhoods left black communities racially and economically isolated (Wilson, 1996). Beyond 
these social and economic pressures, public policy had a significant role in causing neighborhood 
decline:  FHA and VA codification of racial bias. locational bias in mortgage lenders, federal tax 
deductions that privileged homeowners rather than renters, and highway construction that fueled the 
suburbanization of job opportunities (Massey & Denton, 1993). 
Neighborhood Revitalization 
After neighborhood decline has set in, whether complete or still in process, much of the existing 
literature defines and refines how the revitalization will take place. Though external factors are to 
blame for decline, revitalization will not take place without the alignment of a supporting internal 
environment.  
There is a significant role for strong local institutions in mitigating revitalization. The examples of 
the Chicago neighborhoods of North Lawndale and Englewood show that while both 
neighborhoods suffered because of increasing competition for residents from suburban 
neighborhoods with greater amenities, West Lawndale has gained noticeably because as a direct 
result of various local institutions and influential organizations that remained committed to 
redeveloping the area (Zielenbach, 2000). 
Increasingly, there is consensus around the need for public actors who can improve demand in 
revitalizing neighborhoods. A series of successful efforts to create Healthy Neighborhoods have 
relied on resident-led and demand-focused. This approach views the revitalizing challenge as a loss 
of resident and investor confidence, and demands the involvement of homeowner groups and the 
creation of a positive image of the community in order to compete for residents (Boehlke, 2010). 
Suggesting another set of players that contribute to neighborhood improvements, the series of 
successful efforts to create Healthy Neighborhoods have relied on resident-led leadership that 
focuses on the neighborhood’s residential demand, noticeably among homeowners. Under such 
terms, it would be hard to imagine a successful revitalization effort in Woodlawn that was not fully 
supported by the residents (Boehlke, 2010). In Woodlawn, there is a practical source of tension 
between the notion of focusing on residential demand and enhancing supply for low-income 
residents. Opponents of gentrification make normative claims in favor of using public funds to 
improve the outcomes of low-income residents as opposed to appealing to higher-income residents, 
who may eventually price current residents out. 
The Role of Housing 
Particularly with the onset of the Great Recession, housing foreclosures began to contribute to 
neighborhood decline. Mortgage brokers and banks targeted high-minority neighborhoods like 
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Woodlawn with a considerable amount of single-family and multifamily homes for sub-prime loans 
and home equity loans in the high-risk boom leading up to the Crisis (Immergluck, 2011). 
Immergluck and Smith’s analysis of Chicago foreclosures demonstrates not only that each additional 
single-family (one- to four-unit) foreclosure decreases surrounding property values, but that 
properties in low to moderate income communities experience an even more dramatic fall in 
property values when they are in proximity to a foreclosure (2005). Lastly, when property values fall, 
obtaining financing for surrounding properties becomes more difficult given the loan to value ratios 
of lenders and the lower rental income in low to moderate income communities (Seidman, 2005). 
The filtering hypothesis posits that older housing structures provide a source of housing for newer 
migrants, as well as great value in understanding that neighborhoods do not have static populations 
(Kennedy, 1987). However, it assumes a much simpler housing market than one impacted by racial 
discrimination, school quality and a different bundle of services across municipalities. It also begs 
the question of how the filtering of black neighborhoods—when residents are bound by a similar 
ethnicity and solidarity that often cuts across economic lines—will impact these sociopolitical 
identities if they “filter up” to a newer housing stock. In other words, what about when residents 
resist mobility in favor or stability. The “natural” filtering process thus poses great challenge for 
acknowledging but refusing to accept the inevitable consequences of a subpar housing stock. 
Though mixed-income development, the explicit attempt to use housing to create communities with 
more economic diversity has been advanced as the solution to concentrated poverty. Its primary 
empirical advantages revolve around the benefits of informal social control and higher quality 
services that are associated with higher-income residents. The former happens through strong social 
capital and participation in voluntary neighborhood organizations, whereas the latter happens 
through the greater political leverage that more affluent residents are able to exert on city services 
(Joseph, Chaskin, & Webber, 2007). 
Many argue that subsidized housing is another cause of neighborhood distress, but there is sufficient 
evidence to cast doubt on many of these assertions. Through the rigorous use of neighborhood-level 
data, Ellen et al make a compelling case that the introduction of housing vouchers recipients into 
neighborhoods does not lead itself to additional crime. Growth in housing vouchers may in fact be a 
consequence of increasing crime, as landlords turn to the voucher program as other challenges arise 
(Ellen, Lens, & O’Regan, 2011). In Woodlawn, the observation that voucher holders track crime 
would suggest that the Housing Choice Voucher Program is less than effective in expanding housing 
choice; voucher recipients should be moving to “opportunity areas” not declining neighborhoods. 
Susin (2002) demonstrates that formula-allocated housing choice vouchers increase the price of 
housing for non-subsidized housing as much as 16%, both for low-income, middle and upper-
income residents. This also conflicts with the hypothesis of vouchers as leading to decline for 
neighborhoods, since across the board increases in housing revenues should support more 
production. This, however, does not fully consider the question of quality versus quantity. 
Pendall’s (2000) study of why Section 8 participants live in more distressed area suggests a 
neighborhood like Woodlawn will be in high demand because it has so much available rental units 
yet it is not as distressed as other neighborhoods. The implication of this literature would be to 
acknowledge the reality of voucher concentration, to dispel the causal relationship with 
neighborhood decline and raise the prospect of ensuring housing and neighborhood quality amidst a 
seemingly market-driven (though government-assisted) phenomenon. 
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Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is composed of six chapters. The first, the introduction, provides an overview of the 
research topic and the literature. The next chapter presents the findings pertaining to the 
development process that stretches from acquisition, renovation to leasing/sale of two- to four-unit 
buildings (or parts within), and includes the availability of financing. The next two chapters present 
the social ecosystem that surrounds the development process. The third chapter focuses on the web 
of interrelated individuals and organizations that are capable of exhibiting agency with respect to the 
two- to four-unit building market, including the resource providers, partners, alternative providers of 
housing, customers, problem makers and bystanders The fourth chapter focuses on the 
environmental conditions that shape what players can exist and their relationship with each other, 
including the economy, laws & regulations, demographics, culture and geography. The fifth chapter 
presents key findings and their implications. The final chapter presents the strategic plan that was 
developed in line with the findings. 
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Chapter 2: Development Process 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first component of a three-part presentation of the results of a qualitative case 
study of the market for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn, including both the numerous 
vacant buildings as well as the occupied buildings. Here I focus on the development process 
stretching from acquisition, renovation to leasing & sale of two- to four-unit buildings (or parts 
within), and also including the availability of financing and other forms of capital. The next two 
chapters present the social ecosystem surrounding the development process inspired by the work of 
Bloom and Dees (2008) who demonstrated how community development financial institution Self-
Help Credit Union effectively cultivated its social ecosystem in re-shaping the home mortgage 
market. Chapter 2 focuses on the web interrelated individuals and organizations that are involved in 
the two- to four- market, including the resource providers, partners, alternative providers of housing, 
customers, problem makers and bystanders. Chapter 3 focuses on the environmental conditions that 
shape what players can do and their relationship with each other, including the economy, laws & 
regulations, demographics, culture and geography. 
Framework  
The first chapter, in presenting the findings associated with the real estate development process, 
serves as the setting for the remaining presentation of the case study that forms a social ecosystem 
around the development of two- to four-unit buildings. 
As it applies to this chapter, the process of real estate development of existing two- to four-unit 
buildings involves acquisition of the assets, renovation, sale or leasing to another, property 
management and financing. The sections of this chapter are organized into these process elements. 
The first section presents the collection of findings concerning the acquisition of two- to four-unit 
buildings in the neighborhood. The second section presents the collection of findings about the 
rehabilitation of buildings in Woodlawn, particularly the properties that have lay vacant for a 
significant period of time. The third section organizes the findings concerning the sale, leasing and 
ongoing property management of the entire property or individual units. The final section addresses 
the availability of capital, a critical part of the entire process. 
Acquisition 
This section presents observations concerning the acquisition of two- to four-unit buildings in 
Woodlawn. There are a significant number of vacant properties, especially two- to four-unit 
buildings. Relevant to all efforts to alleviate building vacancies, there are particular idiosyncrasies in a 
one’s ability to legally obtain smaller buildings and doing so is often cost prohibitive. 
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In the neighborhood, vacant one- to four-unit buildings are estimated at 200-300.1 Vacant units in a 
study of Chicago neighborhoods similar to and including Woodlawn are overwhelmingly located in 
two- to four-unit buildings, reportedly as high as 95%.2 
Despite the quantity, actual availability of the buildings depends on the ability to purchase them. The 
process for acquiring small buildings is considered to be particularly laborious.3  Many properties are 
in “foreclosure limbo status,” such that the home may be vacant but because the foreclosure process 
has started the home could not be purchased through the city’s Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP) efforts. Homes could be tracked for several months, but it would still be uncertain 
as to when they might become available for purchase.4 
In addition, information on available REO properties is often neither available publicly nor through 
the common databases of property listings. There is a tendency for REO properties to be listed on 
proprietary databases, not the Mortgage Listing Service that is the industry standard for realtors.5  
Many buildings become difficult to acquire because of the amount of research required to determine 
official ownership of the property as well as potentially special legal action to needed to resolve these 
complexities. This is an issue with REO properties where ownership is complicated by the 
secondary market and derivatives.6  
From a financial standpoint, unpaid property taxes and payments for municipal services pose 
another significant barrier to the purchase of smaller buildings for potential developers. They must 
be settled or removed (the latter is rare) before they can be sold or else they transfer to the new 
owner. One six-unit apartment building, for example, had $130,000 worth of back-taxes.7 
Renovation 
This section presents observations about the rehabilitation of buildings in Woodlawn, which is 
particularly relevant for properties that lay vacant for a significant period of time.  Faced with the 
existing building conditions and the market demand, developers face several renovation options and 
limitations in Woodlawn. 
Current Building Conditions and Renovation Costs 
There is significant variation in the building conditions and associated construction costs for vacant 
smaller buildings in Woodlawn. Some have more neglect, deterioration and expensive roof repairs 
that need to be addressed; others have attracted squatters who have created additional damage.8 The 
nature of these repairs (plumbing, roof repairs and seepage) requires a significant amount of 
                                                 
1 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013 
2 Interview with Informant #8, 1/22/2013 
3 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
4 Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013 
5 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
6 Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013; Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
7 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
8 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
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construction expertise that is generally greater than that of typical homeowners who might buy and 
upgrade their future home.9 
Many two- to four- properties require $100,000 to $150,000 to renovate excluding the cost of paying 
back taxes and water bills.10 For a homeowner, there are additional costs (and risk) associated with 
managing a contracting process and waiting for the project to be completed before move-in.11 Not 
only is there imperfect information in assessing the renovation costs, but these overall cost outlays 
are also comparable to the cost of completed homes in other communities (Greenline Development, 
Inc., 2011). 
An additional cost factor is labor, with a split between development with union labor and/or 
prevailing wages and development with lower costs.12 The requirement of prevailing wages 
effectively eliminates the possibility of renovating smaller buildings without excessive financial 
cost.13 This shapes the strategies with which developers consider the use of public subsidies that may 
invoke this requirement.14  
Renovation Options 
Developers may consider a range of renovation approaches for two- to four- properties. These do 
not represent the extent of renovation schemes, but the distinctions speak to a number of implied 
business strategies outlined below.  
Subpar Renovations 
Before and after the onset of the financial crisis, inadequate renovations had already taken place in 
two- to four-unit buildings. Investors in Woodlawn and surrounding communities often completed 
minor renovations very quickly without permits and with little concern for quality in order to meet 
the market demand (for condominiums mainly).15 When such homes went into foreclosure and 
banks realized how insufficient the renovations were, sometimes they just tore the buildings down.16 
This practice did not stop with the recession, as landlords still may take shortcuts in renovation or 
deliberately under-renovate properties with a rental strategy in mind.17 
Upscale Finish 
On the other side of the spectrum, many rental housing developers consistently pursue high-quality 
renovations with finishes that are marketed as “condo-quality” given their resemblance to the 
                                                 
9 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
10 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013; Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
11 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
12 Prevailing wages are minimum wages that are set by local regulatory agencies, in this case the 
Illinois Department of Labor, that seek to prevent public expenditures from going to contractors 
that pay less than mandated. They may become attached to a development project with the 
provision of public funds, and are often highly consistent with the wages paid to a unionized 
workforce. 
13 Interview with Informant #7, 1/22/2013 
14 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
15 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
16 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
17 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013; Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
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amenities and level of finish found in condominiums. In addition to a general high-quality of 
construction, this scheme includes a consistent set of architectural features and amenities: hardwood 
floors; nicer cabinets, windows that provide more sunlight, expanded unit footprints, in-unit washer 
and dryer, granite or natural stone kitchen counters, kitchens overlooking larger dining/common 
rooms with bedrooms in back of the unit, higher-quality light fixtures, more expensive bathroom 
finishes, enforced HVAC controlled within unit and other utilities that are also controlled by 
tenants.18 This was put in contrast to units that have one-color paint, carpeted, have less cabinet 
space and (subsequently) cost less.19 
Though much of the so-called “condo-style” approach focuses on amenities, it also emphasizes 
construction quality. In addition, there is an apparent middle ground that foregoes marble 
countertops, premium bathrooms, but still emphasizes a commitment to quality that appeals to 
more selective tenants. 
Conversion to/from Single-Family Housing 
Conversion between one- to four-unit and two- to four- properties has a long history in Woodlawn. 
Subdividing single-family units began in 1930s, which was considered a significant downgrade in the 
quality of the housing stock. The Chicago Fact Book Consortium (1984) notes that this “began an 
era of substandard housing in in Woodlawn.” Buildings that were originally constructed as single-
family homes were converted to multifamily buildings after their wealthier inhabitants moved out 
and numerous, less wealthy inhabitants replaced them. Chicago saw “thousands of illegal 
conversions of dwelling units” during post-WWII era (ASPO, 1949). As a potential reversal of trend, 
planners have considered the viability of converting two-unit buildings into larger single-family 
homes.20  
Professional and Building Services 
While many developers are vertically integrated and have the necessary construction experience, 
smaller-scale investors and homeowners generally do not. They must rely on various forms of 
professional and building services in dealing with renovation of buildings.  
Construction Contractors 
When dealing with general contractors, it is important to appropriately structure incentives given the 
appearance of a principal-agent problem. Providing all the funds to contractors upfront is not 
advised as the contractor will “get lazy with it” and presumably complete the work in more time and 
with less precision leading to a greater probability of cost overruns.21 However, smaller contractors 
will often not have the working capital to pre-pay the cost of labor and materials and are, thus, 
unable to get the job done without upfront payment.22 Thus, the ability of smaller entrepreneurs to 
compete for construction contracts depends on finding this balance.  
                                                 
18 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
19 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
20 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
21 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
22 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
29 | The Social Ecosystem for Revitalizing Two- to Four-Unit Buildings in Woodlawn 
 
Design Services 
Architectural services are necessary because the homebuyers and smaller investors generally do not 
have the capacity to draft work scopes that general contractors will follow without an architect or 
the benefit of interior designers. These services have presented an acute need for smaller buildings 
that contractors have responded to.23 
Local Economic Development 
In several respects, small building development was described as an opportunity to promote local 
economic development. If contracting is put out for bid, local developers have the opportunity to 
compete.24 Small building redevelopment could serve as an opportunity to hire young, unemployed 
and under-employed workers who, consequently, are the same group associated with the 
neighborhood’s public safety challenges.25 In the eyes of sum, this would represent an improvement 
on the on-going Grove Parc redevelopment where there is a perception that few residents (of both 
the neighborhood and the development) have been involved in this work.26  
Role of Scale in Renovation 
Issues of scale for the multifamily building with two to four units are significant when compared to 
the 5+ unit building. Larger projects are considered a more impactful use of resources, both in the 
case of public resources such as the design of NSP and also with developers who are deploying 
institutional capital.27 The process of renovating both is similar, but depending on the mix of fixed 
costs (wiring, roofing) and variable costs (labor, other basic materials), the buildings may cost very 
similar despite how much more revenue larger buildings will generate.28 For investors, larger 
buildings spread fix costs across more units.29 To complicate the matter further, properties with a 
third and fourth unit (because they translate to additional floors), can add extensive construction 
costs when compared to a two-flat and were described as less desirous unless acquired at a 
considerably below-market price.30  
Sale, Leasing and Management 
This section offers observations concerning both the disposition of properties and units through 
sale and leasing and their ongoing property management. Properties may be sold prior to (or 
without) renovation, they may be sold as finished buildings, and they may be sold individually as 
condominium units. Property management is required for both investor properties and for owner-
occupied homes with one to three additional rental units. 
                                                 
23 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
24 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013 
25 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
26 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
27 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
28 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
29 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
30 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
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Rental Properties 
The combination of families who have exited foreclosure and cannot obtain bank financing has 
been causally associated with a generally stronger rental market.31 There is some precedent for 
professionally managed rental housing in two- to four-unit buildings, with one property 
management provider describing a conscious effort to increase such buildings in their portfolio.32 
Portfolios of scattered site properties are associated with higher maintenance costs given the 
challenge of geography, but also the diversity of building types of fixtures.33 Condos are also rented 
out with professional management, either as a cash flow strategy while an entire portfolio is being 
sold in a difficult market, or while a private owner holds on to a unit and waits for property values to 
increase.34 
In spite of the challenges, there are two- to four-unit buildings maintained as rental properties, they 
are just not considered ideal candidates for this type of investment. The margins are low when 
compared to buildings with 6 or more units. Moreover, owner-occupants generally depend on self-
management and subsidized mortgages.35 
Tenant Selection 
Methods of tenant selection further uncover varying philosophies and business strategies with 
different implications for neighborhood considerations, which I will address in later chapters. Many 
successful, mid-range, developers rely on active property management and the previously detailed 
high-quality amenities in order to maintain a desired tenant base. Both the reputation of a landlord 
and the intangible, outward signals of property management style were important in tenant 
selection.36 For those interviewed, wanting “good” tenants did not imply being dubious about 
Housing Choice Voucher recipients and discriminating against poor people, but recognizing that 
having clear and consistent expectations that apply to all tenants would deter the subset of tenants 
who move often, are relatively destructive to the property and consistently disruptive.37  
Both the quality of property management and physical renovation were instruments of a value-
driven business strategy. Informants believed getting a “better tenant make-up” was valuable for 
maintaining (and increasing) the value of the real estate asset.38 Performing management internally 
was also important for quality management.39 These strategies (combining the amenities with 
particular property management philosophies) were associated with mid-range or larger investors 
and not as common among the smaller “mom and pop” operators of housing.40 
Though other developers consider Woodlawn unable to compete off the basis of amenities, local 
developers are confident that property management is the key to doing just that:  “If you've got a 
                                                 
31 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013; Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
32 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
33 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
34 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
35 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013 
36 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
37 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
38 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
39 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
40 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
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quality rental unit that people find attractive, meaning the construction is well done, the finishes are 
very nice and you are priced competitively then I think you're going to be ok,” one informant 
noted. 41 
Management of Housing Choice Voucher Recipients 
The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is a demand-side subsidy for low-income persons, 
who can use them to secure housing in the private market. As part of the program, CHA enters a 
contract with the landlord and serves an intermediary between the landlord and tenant. While there 
are greater maintenance costs associated with HCV tenants, the underlying factors for this 
phenomenon appeared to be disproportionate representation of families with children, incentives 
for utility usage and the troubling effects of social networks (chosen and not).42 In particular, 
instability was not a uniform characteristic of all participants in the program.43 
Some are doubtful that pursuing voucher holders is a prevalent business strategy given the 
perception of higher management costs and hassles associated with the program; however, landlords 
do charge housing choice voucher tenants higher rents than those they could collect from the 
average market-rent tenants.44 Additionally, the Metropolitan Planning Council (2013) describes how 
HCV recipients factor into the rental strategy for one- to four-unit buildings, with an emphasis on 
their ability to counteract high neighborhood vacancies: 
Single-family rental owner-operators are using housing vouchers to achieve adequate cash 
flow on properties where rental vacancies may be higher. Many CDCs, such as nationally 
recognized Beyond Housing in St. Louis, rely on HCV payments to effectively manage their 
single-family rental home portfolio. (p. 12) 
This strategy seems to be most applicable to West Woodlawn. Building landlords on the other side 
of the neighborhood are especially un-interested in voucher holders, showing a preference for young 
professionals who are looking for higher amenity buildings that subsequently cost more.45 
For Sale Properties 
Entire two- to four-unit buildings were sold primarily to homeowners, but also occasionally to 
investors. Identifying potential buyers includes reaching through existing organizational 
infrastructures because these connections demonstrate an existing investment in the 
neighborhood.46 When found, it was likely that buyers would need technical assistance on the 
construction process (in the case of buying homes in need of renovation) and also homeownership 
counseling.47 The particular case for two- to four-unit properties for homeowners is their 
supplemental income that can make homeownership possible at the margin or support a more 
                                                 
41 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
42 Interview with Informant #7, 1/22/2013; Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
43 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
44 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013; Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
45 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
46 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
47 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
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expensive home; that is, assuming that the added responsibilities of being a landlord are not overly 
burdensome. 48 
Buildings are not only sold to homeowners. Two- to four-unit properties may also be developed and 
sold to other landlords looking to maintain the property as rental housing.49 Portions of Woodlawn 
have had an active market for condominiums in smaller buildings. Yet, selling condominiums in 
two- to four-unit buildings pose unique challenges because of the smaller number of owners 
involved in a fundamentally collaborative venture. The stability of condominiums in two- to four-
unit buildings is jeopardized once a single unit becomes vacant due to foreclosure.  The chain effect 
of vacant condo units in smaller buildings has proven to be a critical challenge citywide. As 
described by one informant, “When half the units are vacant, then it's a real mess. Hard to sustain a 
condo when nobody is paying the bills.”50One or two foreclosures would leave a large portion of the 
condominium fees, such as insurance, unpaid. This can and has often led to foreclosure for 
remaining payments as well. 51  
Furthermore, the legal structure of a foreclosed building consisting of condominiums cannot be sold 
to a single homeowner or another entity without costly legal work to re-assemble the property. The 
City of Chicago has had to develop a special program to do so, as part of the Troubled Building 
Initiative that will be described in later chapter.  
Financing Two-to-Four Unit Buildings  
This section describes the general structure and availability of capital for various parts of the 
development and management of two- to four-unit buildings. The use of permanent financing, if 
sought, is split unevenly between owner-occupants and investors. There are also financing needs for 
rehabilitation, which are typically different in the commercial real estate world. Capital availability 
has decreased as a result of the appraisal process and the reaction of banks to the large-scale fraud 
during the height of the housing boom. 
To consider the availability of financing for two- to four-unit buildings, one must consider the 
prevalence of cash purchases. There were 76 recorded sales of two- to four-unit buildings in 
Woodlawn in 2011, approximately 63.2% of which were purchased with cash, slightly higher than 
the citywide average of 56.5%. Just less than half of the buildings were purchased out of REO status 
(IHS, 2012a). Cash buyers have an easier time acquiring properties compared to those investors who 
must gather financing.52 They also have a much easier time participating in business strategies that 
are not in the best interests of the neighborhood’s revitalization. 
Investment Properties 
Investor financing for two- to four-unit buildings is rare and difficult to achieve, but not entirely 
impossible.  There is a growing consensus among community and policy leaders that inadequate 
funding exists for investor owners of smaller buildings. Even in the case of someone wanting to 
purchase more than a single two-flat on the same block, developers have great difficulty obtaining 
                                                 
48 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
49 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
50 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
51 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
52 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
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loans from the banks that purportedly engage in this type of lending.53 Those developers who 
successfully obtain this type of financing have consciously cultivated a relationship with a bank that 
understands their business model, have self-financed much of their earlier projects and seek 
mortgages on portfolios of at least 6 or more properties.54 Barriers for developers include the 
requirement for personal guarantees for loans or the 25% down payment, general tightening of 
lending by banks for new developers, and bank failures (such as Shore Bank who was once a major 
lender in this niche).55 
Recent changes in the lending environment include the discontinuation of more lenient down 
payment requirements and loans to ordinary working professionals for up to 110% loan-to-value of 
the property.56 Appraised values were much higher prior to the recession, which raises the possibility 
that terms are similar and that appraised values are the primary reason for differences in the 
availability of capital. 
Another prominent reason for difficulty in financing individual two- to four-unit rental properties is 
the volatility of the associated revenue stream. Banks find it difficult to “justify” lending $100,000 
for a two-flat, given how much of a percentage of the monthly revenue is lost with just a single 
vacancy. The same bank would be much more apt to loan $110,000 for a six-unit apartment 
building.57  
One alternative source of financing for two- to four-unit buildings is the working capital loan. These 
business loans may need to be settled every 6 months and also require personal guarantees, but can 
be easier to obtain from banks than permanent financing. They allow the ease of purchasing 
properties with cash, paying for construction and also building a fruitful business relationship with a 
lender. 58 
There is also the possibility of raising equity for portfolios of smaller buildings, specifically 
diversified portfolios of both two- to four-unit and larger properties. In one example, investors do 
not have guaranteed returns, get back the majority of their investment during the construction and 
lease-up phase, and then share ongoing revenues.59 
Owner-Occupants 
Although financing for homeowners is so limited in low to moderate-income communities like 
Woodlawn, it remains the predominant type of financing available for two- to four- properties. The 
former is attributed to skepticism on the part of banks given concerns about the future of home 
                                                 
53 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
54 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
55 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013; Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013; Interview with 
Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
56 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
57 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
58 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
59 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
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values.60  The prospect of falling home values, presumably, raises the specter of additional 
foreclosures.  
Informants provided countless examples of the difficulties prospective homeowners experience in 
obtaining home mortgages. One particular NSP property saw a slew of potential buyers get denied 
for a loan.61 After the housing crisis, someone earning as high as 80% AMI is generally unable to 
qualify for a loan.62 
Federal Housing Administration-insured loans have the primary advantage of allowing a homeowner 
to put less money down (as low as 3.5%), and they are more flexible on credit scoring. There was at 
least one example of a homeowner of a two- to four-unit building who put down 20% to buy his 
property.63 
One lender acknowledged that his industry had utilized the discretion offered in FHA-guidelines to 
be more restrictive. The guidelines have not changed dramatically, such as qualifying ratios that 
compare income and debt. The FHA still allows a homeowner to have weaker credit and put less 
money down. However, while banks were previously allowed to exceed the guidelines, now they 
have been given authority to exceed the guidelines even further.64 
Sharing anecnotes about difficulties that consumers have, lenders will readily point out that that 
every loan is different, from the credit score, qualifying income to the actual home for sale. They 
may also point to the steps they take to expand homeownership opportunities, including allowing 
future homeowners to receive gifts that can go towards reducing their down payment.  For three- to 
four-unit buildings they require the homeowner to directly fund a 3-month reserve for payments, 
interest, taxes and insurance, as well as mortgage interest premium. 65 
Acquisition and Rehabilitation Financing 
Distinguished from the traditional home purchase loans, acquisition and rehabilitation financing 
allows an investor or a homeower to apply for permanent financing that incorporates yet-to-be-
completed renovations to the property. Once approved for the loan, a portion of the funds are 
disbursed in a similar manner as a construction loan to be used for the same purpose.  
Standard construction loans are also available for the purchase of two- to four-unit buildings, but 
they can be more difficult to access. Organizations like Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago 
are known to work with buyers to draw out the scope of work and manage the construction 
process.66 They also provide acquisition and rehabilitation loans through their lending arm. These 
type of loans are much more difficult for investors to obtain.67 
                                                 
60 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
61 Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013 
62 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
63 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
64 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
65 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
66 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
67 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
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For homeowners, the most advantageous opportunity for obtaining an acquisition and rehabilitation 
loan is through HUD’s 203(k) program. This FHA-backed loan lends on the post-renovated 
property. It allows a purchaser to submit construction plans to an appraiser, and take out financing 
on the property for the after-improved value. The program allows a bank to increase the loan value 
up to 110% of the appraised property value, which could give special consideration to 
neighborhoods where property values are low.  However, not all banks exercise this option.68 
Appraisal Processes 
Appraisals are central to the process for obtaining financing. Professional appraisers conduct a 
review of the comparable sales in a 1-mile radius over the past 12 months to determine a home’s 
appraised value. Banks use these appraised values rather strictly as the upper limit on the value of a 
loan.69  
Appraised values are considered by many to limit the availability of mortgage financing. As real 
estate declines, so will the amount of mortgage a bank will provide.70 In addition, sales of distressed 
properties that are foreclosed or sold through short sales are included in appraisals.  Banks use this 
practice, justifying it with arguments that such properties (of comparable condition) represent 
available properties on the market.71 
Many banks do not appear to be visibly proactive in their lending in low to moderate-income 
communities, but they do make some effort towards improving capital access. Unfortunately for 
Woodlawn, they do not take into consideration ongoing public investment that has yet to be 
observed in property values.72 However, on occasion a loan officer may react to an appraisal that is 
perceived as unfairly low and proactively fight for a higher value.73 As mentioned, the HUD 203(k) 
loan program allows banks to loan at up to 110% of the appraised value for acquisition and rehab 
loans.74 
Chapter Summary 
While there are a sizeable number of vacant two- to four-unit buildings that appear to be on the 
market, it is also difficult for developers to obtain access to them because of a combination of 
factors: the cost of information, foreclosure status, title issues and back taxes, and utility services 
that would have to be paid as well. 
The renovation of two- to four-unit buildings presents a scenario in Woodlawn, where the building 
condition is a significant unknown that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Renovation often 
requires assistance of a professional and can cost well over $100k. Labor costs are a major cost 
driver for renovations, one that can make or break a project. Beyond labor costs, developers can 
choose to pursue a more luxurious finish that helps in attracting higher-income tenants or pursue a 
less luxurious finish or even a subpar renovation. The market appears to tolerate lower quality 
                                                 
68 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
69 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
70 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013; Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
71 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
72 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
73 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
74 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
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renovations.  The history of the building stock reflects that two- to four-unit properties are often 
converted to single-family homes, and re-conversion presents a possible option in today’s climate. 
Renovating two- to four-unit buildings are difficult for investors because the fixed costs are 
considerable and are only spread across a few units. Ideally, the renovation activity presents a source 
of economic development for the neighborhood’s residents. 
As simple as it may be to name different steps in the real estate process, in reality they are interlinked 
from the perspective of its application to buildings. The sale and leasing of two- to four-unit 
buildings requires property management that both investors and homeowners alike (unless they 
purchased a condominium) must perform this task. Property management is, in many respects, the 
key to interventions in the two- to four-unit market, as there is much variation in approaches and 
business strategies with important implications for the market. There are both landlords providing 
high-quality rental units with impressive management standards (the “high-road”) as well as 
landlords that pursue a strategy of cost cutting (the “low-road”). Voucher holders can present an 
attractive strategy for bolstering revenues for all landlords and it would appear on the face of it to 
apply equally to  “low-road” landlords as it does to “high-road” landlords, though landlords in East 
Woodlawn seek to avoid many such tenants altogether. 
Scattered site rental is accompanied is by greater maintenance and renovation costs, however 
aggregating portfolios presents an opportunity for successfully vying for investor financing.  Other 
factors limiting the availability of capital include low property appraisals (for homeowners and 
investors alike), the requirement of 20-25% equity for investor financing and the difficulty of 
establishing relationships amid the transition and tightening of the financial industry. As with the 
entire single-family market, homeowners have a distinct advantage over investors with FHA loans 
that allow smaller down payments and easier access to acquisition and rehabilitation financing, yet 
other factors make it difficult to apply these lessons to Woodlawn. 
Conclusion 
The real estate process around two- to four-unit buildings raises important questions about the 
relationship between real estate and the larger social ecosystem.  Whether it is the unique 
circumstances of financing renovation for two- to four-unit buildings, the capital availability for 
homeownership, or the challenges of acquiring ready-to-develop properties, it is easy to begin to see 
how the environmental conditions in Woodlawn contribute to perpetuating vacancy in the 
neighborhood. In addition, one can also see how the transactions, decisions and relationships 
undertaken by various players in the real estate process, such as the tenant selection strategy, the 
renovation strategy, prior relationship with lenders, and others, all have implications for the well-
functioning of the two- to four-unit building market that would potential welcome additional 
housing stock in the form of renovated buildings. In the two chapters that follow, I turn to the 
discussion of the social ecosystem and its effects on the development process.  
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Chapter 3: The “Players”—Individuals and 
Organizations 
Introduction 
This chapter is the second component of a three-part presentation that reports the results of my 
findings in a qualitative case study of the market for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn, 
including both vacant and occupied buildings. Whereas Chapter 2—“The Development Process” —
focuses on the process stretching from acquisition, renovation to leasing & sale of two- to four-unit 
buildings (or parts within), including the availability of financing, Chapter 3 and 4 collectively 
present the social ecosystem surrounding the development process. They are inspired by the work of 
Bloom and Dees (2008) and how the community development financial institution Self-Help Credit 
Union effectively cultivated it’s social ecosystem in re-shaping the home mortgage market.  This 
chapter, in particular, focuses on the web of interrelated individuals and organizations that are 
involved in the two- to four-unit market, including the resource providers, partners, alternative 
providers of housing, customers, problem makers and bystanders. The following Chapter 4—
“Environmental Conditions”—focuses on the environmental conditions that shape what players can 
do and their relationship with each other, including the economy, laws & regulations, demographics, 
culture and geography. 
Framework  
This chapter presupposes six types of players within Woodlawn’s ecosystem—individuals and 
organizations that participate or simply influence the development and operation of two- to four-
unit buildings.  The categories are loosely anchored around the Small Building Initiative, a 
neighborhood planning initiative within the larger Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, but also include 
individuals and organizations generally involved in the neighborhood’s real estate market. 
The first category, resource providers, includes the range of individuals and organizations that 
provide resources to other individuals and organizations taking a direct role in the real estate 
development of two- to four-unit buildings. “Resources” is not simply a financial category, however. 
Bloom and Dees (2008) include “financial, human, knowledge, networking and technological 
resources” as the types of resources that can be provided. Thus, the providers of home mortgage 
finance as well as the Cook County Tax Assessor that provides details on tax delinquent properties 
are both included.  
The second category, complementary organizations and allies, includes players that facilitate the 
development and community processes surrounding two- to four-unit buildings. They do more than 
provide resources as they actively support the social cause or provide complementary services. 
Bloom and Dees (2008) describe this category as including “partners who perform critical steps in 
the social entrepreneur’s theory of change.” Given the framework I have selected to analyze a 
process in order to develop a theory of change and recommendations, I have included players that 
perform parts of the real estate development process and organizations whose advocacy is aligned 
with the outcome of reducing vacancy in the market. 
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The third category, beneficiaries and customers, extends beyond the development process. It 
includes the eventual homeowners, their tenants as well as tenants of investor-owned properties. 
However, I have also included the beneficiaries of the development activity created by market 
transactions, as well as investor owners of two- to four-unit buildings 
The fourth category, competitors, includes both players who compete for resources and those that 
compete to serve the same set of beneficiaries and customers. The former would include, for 
example, developers vying for investors while the latter would include single family housing outside 
of Chicago, larger multifamily apartments in Hyde Park and newer condominiums comparable to 
two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn. 
The fifth category, opponents and problem-makers, are players who directly cause negative aspects 
of the two- to four-unit ecosystem, indirectly undermine their revitalization and that generate 
political opposition. 
The final category, affected and influential bystanders, is a loose category for players who don’t 
appear to have an active involvement in the two- to four-unit ecosystem, those who are impacted 
and inactive or those who are capable of providing additional resources, assistance or other forms of 
support. 
Resource Providers 
This section includes players who provide different resources to those taking a direct role in the real 
estate development of two- to four-unit buildings. In addition to financial resources, those with 
information, technical skills and human capacity constitute resource providers. Important here, too 
are those intermediaries who serve to connect resource providers with resource users. 
For-Profit Financial Institutions 
Traditional for-profit lenders include Bank of America, Wells Fargo and PNC. They provide single 
family and multi-family loans, which will generally encompass two- to four-unit buildings. They also 
provide mortgages for investors, construction lending and working capital loans that can be used for 
acquisition and renovation. 
Lending to Investors 
In contrast to the single-family market, conventional loans are the only option for investor lending.1 
Lenders prefer portfolio-based loans with 6 or more properties with a personal guarantee for 
security.2 The loan to value ratio is likely to be around 70%, down from previous reports of 110% 
during the height of the housing bubble.3 To obtain mortgage financing from a bank, relationships 
are also important. Down payments of 25% apply to larger multifamily properties as well as 
investors of two- to four-unit properties. Other sources of funding include higher cost loans from 
“hard money” lenders who charge greater upfront costs and higher interest rates.4 
                                                 
1 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
2 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
3 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013; Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
4 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
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Prior to the financial crisis, mortgage fraud was understood to be the chief causal factor limiting the 
availability of loans from banks. Combined with the housing crash, fraud fueled major financial 
challenges for banks and led to changes in loan terms.5 Today, this requires developers to re-
establish many relationships with a seemingly different set of banks.6  Lines of credit were also 
considered opportunities for building these relationships, securing a source of working capital in the 
process. 
As an example of lenders treating rental income for commercial property , one bank would only 
consider rental income on an investor’s tax return for two-years prior. This effectively requires one 
to have a previous rental property or to have already stabilized a property prior to obtaining a 
mortgage.7 
Lending to Homeowners 
Lenders tend to be more favorable to owner-occupied two- to four-unit properties.8  Options 
include conventional mortgages with higher than 20% down payments and FHA-backed mortgage 
with a down payment as low as 3.5%. These loans also provide more flexibility on credit 
requirements. With additional units in the building, lenders will generally approximate the 
anticipated revenue subject to appraised market rents, adjust for vacancy and augment the income of 
the purchaser.9 As discussed in the previous chapter, lenders also allow a homeowner to use gifts to 
decrease the required down payment. 
Institutional Investors 
Institutional-class investors, those who pool together and manage money for others, are 
systematically and historically averse to investing in two- to four-unit buildings. The multifamily (5+ 
unit) capital market is considered more attractive to them given the proliferation of government-
backed products, investment from insurance companies and active support from traditional 
lenders.10 The reluctance also comes from the scale of capital that such investors need to place in 
service, which is well above the 100,000 or even $1 million that is appropriate for two- to four-unit 
properties (and even smaller portfolios).11   
Non-Institutional Investors 
A two- to four-unit developer may also mature, have portfolios of smaller (two- to four-unit) as well 
as larger properties, and become attractive to smaller equity investors based on the strength of their 
performance and delivery of financial returns above 15%. The investment is likened to a type of 
preferred stock, with no guarantee of any return, but with a partial repayment during the 
construction and lease-up period and then a negotiated share of ongoing revenues.12 
                                                 
5 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
6 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
7 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
8 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
9 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
10 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
11 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
12 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
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Another type of investor in two- to four-unit properties is the “turn-key” investor. Professional 
management firms attract these types of investors to purchase properties and provide 
comprehensive management expenses on their behalf for a fee. The company Profits From Rentals 
is a prototypical example (2010). Their website showcases models for two- to four-unit buildings 
based on a 25% down payment and bank financing that provide an initial return on investment 
above 23% (Profit From Rentals, 2010).  The company attracts investors from outside of Chicago to 
purchase two- to four-unit buildings in Chicago. It also specifically argues that the size of the 
Housing Choice Voucher program provides an opportunity for strengthening property cash flows of 
two- to four-unit buildings and receiving high financial returns (Profit From Rentals, 2010): 
Chicago has the second largest public housing program in the U.S. with the administration 
of over 36,000 Housing Choice Vouchers that allow low-income families to rent in the 
private market. HUD's Section 8 housing voucher program encourages the disadvantaged to 
seek safe, decent, affordable housing in the general community where they are from. 
The advantage to landlords with Section 8 tenants is that the rent subsidies are paid directly 
to the landlord, not to the tenant, so there is virtually no risk of non-payment of rent. There 
are certain unique HUD standards that properties must meet to qualify under Section 8. 
Some of PFR ’s properties have been leased to Section 8 tenants, and we can specifically 
seek such tenants upon request. PFR always ensures homes sold with or for HUD tenants 
have passed or will pass all HUD requirements. 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) 
Until recently there were four non-profit lenders of relevance to Woodlawn, with varying degrees of 
involvement in single-family, multifamily and commercial lending. Three of them are still active 
lenders: Community Investment Corporation, Chicago Community Loan Fund and Neighborhood 
Housing Services of Chicago (NHS). The fourth, ShoreBank, fell victim to the financial crisis.  
Neighborhood Lending Services is an affiliate of NHS and is state’s largest single-family lender 
(NHS of Chicago, 2013a). They are an active lender in the two- to four-unit building market across 
Chicago. From its downtown office, it offers home mortgages, renovation loans, acquisition and 
rehab loans and other lending services to all communities in Chicago. It is coordinating the 
CityLIFT program to provide Wells Fargo-funded down payment assistance as part of a foreclosure 
settlement (Podmolik, 2012). 
Community Investment Corporation is, in many respects, the most active CDFI operating in 
Woodlawn yet does not provide single-family loans. It is a community development loan fund, 
composed of investments from banks looking for Community Reinvestment Act credit, which lends 
primarily to commercial multifamily buildings with either 5+ or mixed-use units.13 As a consequence, 
they do not directly lend to two- to four-unit buildings. 
Chicago Community Loan Fund is also a community development loan fund that aggregates 
investments from many of the city’s private lenders. They lend for the purposes of affordable 
housing and community development.  Woodlawn is currently one of their four “focus” 
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communities, and as a result is promised “more intense concentration of effort and resources to see 
a measurable change over time” (CCLF, 2013). However, CCLF’s lending portfolio consists of 
multifamily rental housing and community facilities and would not naturally extend to two- to four-
unit properties (Fannie Mae Foundation, 2001).  
Along with CIC, CCLF was a participating lender in the Chicago Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP), financing and overseeing the construction process. On behalf of the city, they 
received reimbursements in exchange for allowing the city to fund the endeavor without having to 
serve as a direct lender.14 CCLF participated in NSP primarily for the buildings that were one to two 
units.15 
ShoreBank, for several decades, was among the most prominent community development lenders in 
the country, operating out of the South Shore neighborhood just beyond the southeast boundary of 
Woodlawn. During its growth period, its lending portfolio included other South Side communities, 
including Woodlawn (Taub, 1988). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency declared 
ShoreBank insolvent in 2010, and Urban Partnership acquired its assets. Its demise was attributed 
directly to the mortgage fraud discussed previously: large groups of developers received loans for 
multifamily buildings only to disappear once the money had been exchanged.16 Before it went 
bankrupt, Shore bank was a major source of lending for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn 
and other communities on the South Side, but Urban Partnership Bank was not expected to be 
anywhere near as prominent in the two- to four-unit market anytime soon.17 
Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD) 
At the federal level, the primary resource provider for two- to four-unit buildings and the larger 
revitalization of Woodlawn is the Department of Housing & Urban Development. By awarding 
grants, funding states and municipalities and providing mortgage insurance, the Department makes 
funding available that can be used for two- to four-unit buildings. 
Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) 
The Office of Public and Indian Housing oversees the bulk of HUD’s rental housing programs. 
They oversee the Choice Neighborhoods program, and as a result are the grant maker for the $30.5 
Choice Neighborhoods Implementation grant that was received by lead-grantee Preservation of 
Affordable Housing for revitalizing Woodlawn.  
PIH is also the original source of housing assistance vouchers administered by the Chicago Housing 
Authority, and as such issues the rules and regulations that govern these programs. The high 
concentration of subsidized vouchers in Woodlawn is an acknowledged fact—the Department 
receives calls for a moratorium on additional vouchers as well—but they are committed to abiding 
by Fair Housing laws and upholding housing “choice” that drives the Housing Choice Voucher 
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15 Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013 
16 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
17 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
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Program. In other words, HUD is not allowed to tell people with housing choice vouchers what 
neighborhoods they can and cannot go to.18 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
FHA administers the Department’s programs that promote homeownership, mainly through 
insuring loans provided by private (and non-profit) lenders. They insure loans that allow participants 
to purchase a home with a smaller down payment.  FHA administers the 203(b) Home Mortgage 
Loan and the 203(k) Rehabilitation Mortgage programs, which insures loans for homebuyers of one- 
to four-unit buildings (HUD, 2013a). The 203(k) program, in particular, is an ideal tool for 
homeowner acquisition and rehabilitation of two- to four-unit buildings.19 
By pairing a prospective owner with a 203(k) consultant and a 203(k) lender, that homeowner is able 
to identify a vacant property, design a home to their needs, manage the construction process (with 
assistance), receive construction disbursements and receive the agreed-upon mortgage at the 
conclusion of the construction period. Just as any other home mortgage, the success of this 
approach depends on the ability to find prospective homeowners who qualify for mortgages, are 
interested in investing in Woodlawn as well as the extent to which private lenders are committed to 
the loan program. 
Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD) 
The Office of Community Planning and Development provides HOME Investment Partnership 
formula grants and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) to state and local governments 
for affordable housing.  State and local governments use these grants in a variety of affordable 
housing programs, including rental and sale properties. Both programs are very flexible and allow 
states and localities to decide how they can be used (HUD, 2013b; HUD, 2013c). 
The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), the Obama Administration’s marquee initiative for 
addressing foreclosures, is administered through the CDBG program (HUD, 2013d). A combination 
of CDBG and HOME funds are often the source of funding for providing grants to first-time or 
income-qualified homeowners and subordinate lending in low to moderate income communities 
where low appraised values or low personal assets present barriers.20 
These grant monies, particularly NSP, are executed by local housing and economic development 
departments, and thus significant variation exists in how they are used. In Chicago, the NSP 
program, as discussed in the next chapter, shifted away from one- to four-unit buildings in favor of 
larger buildings. 
Local Government Agencies 
Chicago Department of Housing and Economic Development (DHED) 
The Department of Housing and Economic Development (DHED) is responsible not only for the 
implementation of the city’s housing, community and economic development policies and programs, 
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but also administers the city’s land use planning and zoning efforts. DHED’s Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program provided funding for vacant and foreclosed property in several target 
neighborhoods, including West Woodlawn during the first and second rounds of NSP. The program 
was funded by DHED, but administered by Mercy Portfolio Services as a contract partner. DHED 
also administers the Tax Increment Financing program, where there is funding available for 
neighborhood improvements for two- to four-unit buildings and serves as an official partner in the 
Choice Neighborhoods Initiatives. DHED’s outsized role blurs the boundary between resource 
provider and complementary organization/ally. 
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) 
The Chicago Housing Authority is the public housing authority for the City of Chicago, and 
provides homes to more than 50,000 families and individuals through maintaining rental housing, 
providing project-based vouchers and administering the Housing Choice Voucher Program. It also 
served as an NSP partner and provided additional funding and project-based vouchers to landlords 
in order to create long-term, affordable rental housing (Chicago DHED, 2009). Much of NSP’s 
activity in Woodlawn was multifamily development in West Woodlawn assisted by project-based 
vouchers.21  
Local Institutions 
University of Chicago 
The University of Chicago provides up to $7500 in forgivable loans to its employees who fall below 
120% of Area Median Income and who purchase housing in communities surrounding the campus. 
Woodlawn is considered a “primary area” and thus a family opting to live there can earn $3,000 
more and still qualify for the program (University of Chicago, 2013). Two-to-four unit buildings in 
Woodlawn would qualify for this program, and thus represent a population-specific resource for 
purchasing homes. 
Properties 
Because of the challenge associated with acquiring properties, organizations in possession of real 
estate owned (REO) two- to four-unit buildings and those that aggregate listings are also important 
resources providers. Among the primary sellers of foreclosed properties are lenders such as Wells 
Fargo, Chase and Bank of America. They often donate properties that can be renovated in the 
neighborhood, something that may be possible for two- to four-unit properties in Woodlawn.22 In 
addition, mortgage insurers and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) actively market their 
REO properties through online databases: Federal Housing Administration (HUDHomeStore.com), 
FannieMae (HomePath.com) and FreddieMac (HomeSteps.com). Mercy Portfolio Services, as the 
administrator of the NSP program, also markets properties on the program’s website 
(ChicagoNSP.org). 
The standard property listing service is the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), a collaborative network 
in which realtors offer up properties for sale or identify others to be purchased, in exchange for 
compensation from their clients (National Association of Realtors, 2013). Many REO properties, 
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however, don’t go through these channels it seems.23 An example of a proprietary source for 
identifying REO listings includes RealtyTrac, which offers listings to its paid members.24  Many of 
these proprietary sources of foreclosure data are maintained by the County Sheriff, Recorder of 
Deeds and Tax Assessor, but only made available as bulk lists at a cost. The County Government 
does make detailed property tax and deed information available for property-level searches with a 
Parcel Identification Number (Cook County Government, 2013). 
The National Community Stabilization Trust has partnered with a number of financial institutions to 
provide local governments and community-based organizations an opportunity to get a “first look” 
at REO properties held by banks and at a discount. These properties are aggregated and made 
available through the Trust’s REOMatch program to eligible buyers (National Community 
Stabilization Trust, 2013).  
Complementary Organizations and Allies 
This section describes both players that facilitate the development and community processes 
surrounding two- to four-unit buildings in a manner more involved than the provision of resources, 
those that support the same cause and those that provide complementary services. I have included 
players that perform parts of the real estate development process as well as organizations whose 
advocacy is aligned with the outcome of reducing vacancy in the market. 
Housing & Community Development Organizations 
Preservation of Affordable Housing (POAH) 
Central to the ecosystem of two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn is Preservation of Affordable 
Housing, the non-profit housing developer that is the lead implementation entity for the Choice 
Neighborhoods Initiative. Headquartered in Boston, POAH became active in the Woodlawn 
community in 2007 with its takeover of the Grove Parc Plaza Apartments. It subsequently began the 
redevelopment of apartment complex and then expanded its efforts to include the entire 
neighborhood with the help of a $30.5 million Choice Neighborhoods Implementation grant. The 
Small Building Initiative is a component of the Woodlawn Choice Neighborhoods Initiative 
intended to address the pervasiveness of distressed two- to four-unit buildings in the neighborhood. 
Mercy Portfolio Services 
Mercy Portfolio Services is an affiliate of non-profit housing developer Mercy Housing, created in 
response to the foreclosure crisis. They provide a range of related services, including a fund that 
purchases and modifies home mortgages, a database platform for asset management and the 
administration of Chicago’s NSP program, where they act on behalf of city in acquiring and 
rehabilitating properties in NSP areas, including Woodlawn due west of Cottage Grove Ave (Mercy 
Housing, 2013). They are likely candidates for spearheading work around small buildings in 
Woodlawn. 
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Community Investment Corporation 
CIC plays an additional role in Woodlawn beyond being a multifamily lender for multifamily 
properties. Under its affiliate Community Investment Initiatives, they serve as Woodlawn site 
coordinators of the Micro-Markets Recovery Program. They work with the Trouble Buildings 
Initiative to compel better building maintenance, accept properties through receivership and evaluate 
 the costs of renovation. Through their policy arm, the Preservation Compact, they are also actively 
exploring ways to finance portfolios of two- to four-unit buildings.25 
City & County Agencies 
Several city and county agencies play critical roles in the two- to four-unit building market, aside 
from providing resources. The DHED Housing Bureau has initiated several programs that generally 
focus on West Woodlawn. These include the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, Micro-Markets 
Recovery Program and the Troubled Building Initiative. The County Land Bank, approved this year, 
is expected to stabilize neighborhoods by removing properties from the market and preparing others 
for renovation. Lastly, the County Board of Review is an advocate for homeowners looking to 
reduce their property taxes. 
Cook County Land Bank 
After several months of planning, The County Board of Supervisors voted in January 2013 to create 
what will be the largest Land Bank in the country. The proposal for the Land Bank focuses on 
neighborhood stabilization, building on the best practices of other Land Banks such as the Michigan 
Land Bank to address blighted buildings and the communities around them. It will both accept and 
seek to acquire properties through various means. The programmatic uses for the properties it 
obtains include demolition and long-term land banking, creation of scattered site rental housing to 
stabilize housing prices, and funding innovative maintenance programs that develop alternative 
community uses (Gainer, 2013). Though it is still too early to say much definitively about the 
program, its creation was cited often as an improvement to dealing with vacant two- to four-unit 
buildings in Woodlawn. For example, it could provide a mechanism for removing back property 
taxes and municipal liens on a property without demolition.26 
Cook County Board of Review 
The Cook County Board of Review is a quasi-judicial agency that allows property owners to appeal 
their property tax assessment. Appealing an assessment, for example, would allow a homeowner to 
maintain lower property taxes in the face of speculation if property prices are over-valued. 
Commissioner Larry B. Rogers, on the Board since 2004, was commended for doing an effective job 
of hosting seminars to inform property owners how to appeal their assessment so that they can 
reduce their property tax burden.27 
Real Estate Professionals 
These include the developers and landlords of two- to four-unit properties who often renovate and 
operate properties. It also includes architects and other design professionals who help businesses 
and homeowners to envision and carry out renovations. Lastly, it includes professional property 
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managers who act on behalf of many landlords and appraisers who are critical to the financing of 
two- to four-unit properties. 
Two- to Four-unit Developers & Landlords 
The Metropolitan Planning Council (2013) describes three types of (for-profit) investors in one- to 
four-unit buildings who actively manage properties. The first, investors with significant amounts of 
capital, typically focus on middle-income neighborhoods. The second, a “mid-range” investor, will 
typically purchase portfolios using cash and “does not invest in the property as an asset manager, 
but treats it as a source of cash flow.” Beyond these larger entities, “small scale” investors may have 
a portfolio of 2 to 15 smaller properties and have significantly less professional management 
capacity. 
This is accurate for Woodlawn. Developers may focus on providing rental, homeownership, or a 
combination of both. They may be small to medium-sized, but generally their survival depends on 
being “vertically-integrated” and performing most of the development and management functions 
internally. They are often minority-owned and see particular opportunities for investing in urban 
neighborhoods that others might avoid. 
A subset of landlords described their marketing approach as something others might call 
“gentrification”: seeking to serve relatively higher income tenants. For rental apartments, they target 
a demographic that would fall above the area median income for a family of four, in census tracts 
where the median income (like those in Woodlawn) is much lower, i.e. between 30% and 60% AMI. 
Their apartments often invoke the marketing mantra of “condo-quality” as they provide amenity-
rich, spacious, and relatively cost-effective apartments to African-American professionals who are 
not dissuaded by the neighborhood’s challenges or who are in fact compelled by a sense of 
community solidarity.28  
Others may not develop buildings as luxuriously, but the unifying characteristic of these developers 
is that they seem to separate themselves from less sophisticated developers and landlords in their 
pursuit of high-road property management.29 They stress their positive reputations and provide 
amenities in the hopes of attracting a stronger tenant mix and fewer vacancies. In dealing with 
Housing Choice Voucher recipients, they hope that clear standards and quality management filter 
out the proverbial bad apples.30 
These developers may also acquire properties in order to sell them to home owners and to other 
landlords, landlords whose business strategy involves renting primarily to voucher holders.31  
Design and Build Services 
Providing design services was considered valuable by one multi-service real estate organization 
because it had observed a need for design capacity in investors of smaller buildings and homeowners 
who were looking to “invest back in their community.”32 
                                                 
28 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
29 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013, Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
30 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
31 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
47 | The Social Ecosystem for Revitalizing Two- to Four-Unit Buildings in Woodlawn 
 
A second professional illustrates the role of a 203(k) consultant in aiding a homeowner successfully 
execute an acquisition and rehabilitation loans. The 203(k) program structures the consulting process 
in a user-friendly manner, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development maintains a 
certification process as a form of quality control (HUD, 2013e). These consultants work to prepare a 
professional cost estimate and develop a scope of work for the construction, and then help oversee 
the construction process. The terms of the loan product spell out the compensation that the 203(k) 
consultants will receive in the form of a development fee that is added to the mortgage amount.33  
Neighborhood Housing Services performs many of these functions through its own efforts. As of 
January 2013, there were 17 active 203(k) consultants in the City of Chicago, and one had an address 
listed in Woodlawn (HUD, 2013e). 
Professional Property Managers 
Property management services were available for two- to four-unit buildings, as well as condos that 
might fall in a two- to four-unit building, with property management fees that for one firm in 
Woodlawn annualized at approximately 17.5%.34 A larger, more specialized, property management 
firm like My Property Management may charge $100 per unit monthly management fee per unit in 
two- to four-unit buildings (My Property Management, 2013). 
Appraisers 
Appraisers determine the market value of homes that forms the basis for how much mortgage 
financing will be granted for an owner-occupied home and an investment property. Weak market 
neighborhoods often have appraised values that are less than the cost of acquisition and the cost of 
renovation. Regardless of whether a property is acquired and renovated with cash or with a 
construction loan, they often don’t support the renovation needed.35 
Neighborhood Organizations 
The Network of Woodlawn 
The Network of Woodlawn is a burgeoning LISC-supported community organization addressing a 
range of issues in the neighborhood. During the early 2000s, LISC included Woodlawn in a long-
term effort to support comprehensive community development in 16 neighborhoods across 
Woodlawn, the New Communities Program. This involved the creation of a Quality of Life plan 
that has in many respects served as a roadmap for the work that has transpired in Woodlawn. The 
Network of Woodlawn was a direct result of the community development work, intended on 
addressing the systemic needs of Woodlawn including social services, public safety, economic 
development and housing. The Network consists of both a “network organization”—individual 
non-profits focused on Economic Development, Safety, Education and Health & Human 
Services—as well as a distinct central organization.36 
The Economic Development pillar addresses the neighborhood’s retail needs and is also responsible 
for the organization’s work around housing, but as of January 2013 there was no executive director 
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for this work. The organization supports efforts to reclaim vacant two- to four-unit buildings as 
owner-occupied buildings. 37 
The Chair of the Board for NOW is Dr. Byron Brazier, son of the late community leader Bishop 
Arthur Brazier and Pastor of Apostolic Church of God. Though this is a new organization, it was 
very evident in several interviews that the organization was still very closely related with Brazier’s 
leadership, too much in the eyes of some.38 Also on the Board is Mattie Butler, the founder of 
Woodlawn Community and Neighbors. 
The Woodlawn Public Safety Alliance, a component of the Network of Woodlawn, seeks to 
proactively deter violence in the community. They work to provide a continuum of services 
throughout the school year for youth, working with school-aged kids, teenagers and young adults. 
The Alliance active collaborates with the School District to support each other’s strategies. Its leader, 
Cortez Trotter, talks directly to gang leaders recruiting young men and asks for a chance to persuade 
them against the decision to join a gang.39 
Woodlawn Preservation and Investment Company 
Woodlawn Preservation and Investment Company is a community development corporation, started 
in 1989 in order to bring financial investment into the community, including an earlier acquisition 
and renovation of Grove Park Plaza apartments. It is associated with Bishop Arthur Brazier, 
reflecting a subtle pattern over time where different neighborhood leaders become associated with 
their respective community organization (Schuler, 2000). In recent years they have been staunch 
community advocates for developing housing to attract middle-class families back into the 
neighborhood. In late 2007, they worked with Woodlawn Community Development Corporation (a 
part of The Woodlawn Organization) and were on the verge of developing a 13.8-acre site in a 200-
unit mixed-income community called Columbia Point II, which has not materialized (Chicago Agent, 
2007). The first phase that was completed, Columbia Point I, is credited with improving housing 
values in the surrounding area.40 In addition, WPIC was the lead agency in the Woodlawn New 
Communities Program that led to the creation of the Network of Woodlawn (NOW).  
The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) 
The Woodlawn Organization is a neighborhood organization started in 1960-1961 based on the 
community organizing model established by Saul Alinsky (WTTW, 2013). It was co-founded by the 
late Bishop Arthur Brazier and Rev. Leon Finney Jr. and noted for its successful opposition to an 
Urban Renewal project by the University of Chicago. It was the lead agency for a Model Cities 
project in the 1970s, and today it is a network of non-profits with a real estate arm, Woodlawn 
Community Development Corporation (WCDC), that manages 4,600 Chicago Housing Authority 
apartments. WCDC’s property management activities have grown beyond the neighborhood of 
Woodlawn, extending as far as Gary, Indiana. As of this writing, WCDC and its current director Rev. 
Finney are under legal and financial duress. As it pertains to two- to four-unit buildings, Rev. Finney 
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has spoken publicly about investing in foreclosed properties (Olivo, 2012). WCDC was part of 
Columbia Point joint venture to develop new housing prior to the recession. 
TWO was criticized in some quarters for it’s lack of focus on the important issues and lack of 
effectiveness in advocating for the community. Even if only because of its close personal association 
with Rev. Finney and his personal legal travails, some felt that the organization would not be able to 
restore its credibility.41 
Woodlawn East Community and Neighbors (WECAN) 
Woodlawn East Community and Neighbors is an organization affiliated with resident/activist Mattie 
Butler.42 Their focus is largely on ensuring that economic revitalization of the neighborhood does 
not displace long-term and low-income residents in the neighborhood.43 They assisted Grove Parc 
Plaza tenants in a preserving the development as affordable housing and bringing POAH to 
Woodlawn to own and redevelop the property.44 
Butler and WECAN, in their role on the Housing Committee for the Network of Woodlawn, are 
committed to preserving Woodlawn for low to moderate-income households, regardless of tenure. 
They actively work to ensure that gentrification does not push such residents out and believe that 
the city’s efforts in pursuing fast-track demolition, leading to the demolition of many two- to four-
unit properties, abandons homes that could be renovated by developers and made available as 
properties for sale and for rent.45  
The Developers of Woodlawn 
There were reports of a group of developers of 4-12 unit properties who met informally on a 
monthly basis under this loose affiliation. They were motivated by the collective desire to be better 
neighbors and active property owners, to pool strategies for screening tenants better (to prevent 
“problem tenants” from jumping from property to property) and to work with the Alderman to 
implement a nuisance ordinance around certain businesses. 46 
Southside Together Organizing for Power (STOP) 
The Student Tenant Organizing Project was originally started in 2004 as a partnership between 
University of Chicago students and Woodlawn East Community and Neighbors to prevent 
displacement through gentrification in Woodlawn caused by demolition development of vacant land 
(Ginsberg-Jaeckle, 2013). Under their new name, today they are affiliated with the citywide Anti-
Eviction Campaign that advances the “right to housing” in order to stop economically motivated 
evictions that diminish humanitarian concerns.47 The larger campaign was born out of efforts to 
prevent the demolition of public housing projects like Cabrini-Green.48 
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STOP places an emphasis on grassroots organizing and advocacy for tenants, many who face 
displacement when their building goes into foreclosure, but increasingly they have advocated for 
homeowners facing foreclosure.49 
Homeownership-Supporting Groups 
A series of complementary organizations in and outside Woodlawn promote homeownership and 
support existing homeowners. They include block clubs, the homeowner association in Woodlawn 
and homeownership counseling organizations.  
Block Clubs 
Block clubs are social organizations that form at the scale of one or more blocks. They are the base 
unit of organizing and focused on improving the quality of life in the neighborhood (Chicago CAPS, 
2008). They were part of the grassroots organizing strategy of The Woodlawn Organizations during 
its well-documented struggle against the University of Chicago’s urban renewal efforts (Arthur M. 
Brazier Foundation, 2013).  Block clubs are an undisputed asset for strengthening the neighborhood, 
fostering distributed leadership and cleaning up the trash. However, Woodlawn was not known for 
having a particularly robust block club infrastructure.50 The Chicago alternative policing program 
(CAPS) maintains records of active block clubs. My research as recently as January 2013 only located 
three block clubs in Woodlawn: 
Block Club Block Covered Primary Contact 
6100 South Rhodes Block Club 6100 - 6199 S Rhodes Ave Norma Clark 
6100 Block of St Lawrence Block Club 6100 - 6199 S St Lawrence Ave Corey Howard 
6600 University-Greenwood Block Club  6600 - 6699 S University Ave Charemi Jones 
Woodlawn Homeowners Association 
The Homeowners Association exists to promote homeownership in the neighborhood and develop 
skills that will support the neighborhood’s stability. Their activities include a Facebook page, fencing 
vacant lots next to people’s homes, a neighborhood watch program, working with Chicago 
Alternative Policing Program and encouraging members to get involved with the local school 
council.51 
Homeownership Counseling Organizations 
The Neighborhood Stabilization Program required prospective homeowners to go through pre-
purchase counseling, providing an easily accessible infrastructure of housing counseling 
organizations.  Several are located on the South Side near to Woodlawn, including Agora 
Community Services, Genesis Housing Development and Greater Southwest Development 
Corporation. In addition, downtown-based Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago also 
provides housing counseling services (Mercy Portfolio Services, 2011). These counselors go over 
fundamental aspects of mortgages, the process, family budgeting and the range of services and 
benefits for which households may be eligible. 
                                                 
49 Interview with Informant #11, 1/23/2013 
50 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
51 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
51 | The Social Ecosystem for Revitalizing Two- to Four-Unit Buildings in Woodlawn 
 
Sunshine Gospel Ministries 
Sunshine Ministries is an urban ministry working in Woodlawn with a community development 
orientation. Their activities include youth outreach programs, business incubation and a Bridge 
Builders program that partners with rural and suburban church members to educate through 
membership exchange and to “engage the Gospel issues of race, class and poverty” (Sunshine 
Gospel Ministries, 2013). They are particularly interested in improving the community by promoting 
local homeownership among its congregation.52 
Political Leadership 
Active political leadership for the district (whether formally or informally) included the local 
Alderman and a State Representative. 
Alderman Willie Cochran 
Alderman Willie Cochran represents Woodlawn in City Council. Chicago Aldermen, generally, were 
described as particularly influential in the city government. One resident noted that they can make 
requests of city agencies through their mobile devices.53 Aldermen have also been known to work 
actively with NHS to inform homeowners of ways to reduce their property tax assessment. This was 
not prevalent in Woodlawn due to a combination of a lack of organizational presence and a lack of 
outreach on the part of the Alderman. 54  
State Representative Ken Dunkin  
State Representative Ken Dunkin was also identified as an official who had taken an active interest 
in the neighborhood despite jurisidictional boundaries.  He had even sought to broker conversations 
between homeowners and the Chicago Housing Authority.55 
Beneficiaries and Customers 
This section includes customers beyond the development process. It includes the eventual 
homeowners, their tenants and tenants of investor-owned properties. Moreover, it also includes the 
beneficiaries of the development activity created by renovations as well as investor owners of two- 
to four-unit buildings. 
Apartment Tenants 
Woodlawn is a heavily renter-community, with 75% of the housing units occupied by tenants (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2012a). 45%  of rental units located outside of single-family homes are in two- to 
four-unit buildings (IHS, 2012a). Two important trends for tenants were the number of people 
receiving Housing Choice Vouchers and the apparent differences in the East and West parts of the 
neighborhood.  
HUD-Assisted Tenants 
Tenants receiving Housing Choice and other subsidies are a controversial topic in the neighborhood 
Many believe that 50% of the neighborhood’s residents are recipients of these vouchers. The 
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proportion of occupied units that are assisted by HUD has grown from 20% in 2004 to 31% in 2012, 
driven largely by a 37% increase between 2008 and 2012 (HUD, 2013f).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there seemed to be a forming consensus that voucher 
recipients would be more costly, though not necessarily more difficult, to manage. Voucher 
recipients were more likely to be families with children, and tenants with children lead to harmless 
(but notable) additional maintenance, like the painting of common areas. Kids can also cause more 
noise and lead to greater conflict with other tenants, requiring more mediation (and time) on the 
part of a landlord. Because voucher recipients have utility allowances and don’t face incremental 
costs in their usage, they are more liberal in the use of the heater which leads to greater wear on the 
buildings mechanical systems.56 As tenants, voucher recipients make more service requests for 
repairs, which also translate into greater costs.57 
It is a widely believed that being a participating landlord in the program brought added costs. Part of 
this burden appeared to be in the administrative aspect of the Housing Choice Voucher program, 
such as the challenge in leasing or the policy design of the program.58 Leasing through the program 
required a landlord to have an empty unit for several months, and when a complaint is issued against 
a participating landlord, CHA isn’t perceived as fair and expedient in its treatment of the landlord, 
withholding rent payments and making follow-up appointments.59 
One trend indicated is that the more severe property-level and neighborhood challenges associated 
with HCV assisted tenants often come from individuals in their extended networks and from 
neighborhood residents who don’t receive the vouchers. On one occasion, a voucher recipient’s 
apartment was invaded by a group of non-residents in order to attack her son, prompted by a 
seemingly petty disagreement. The issue of social networks is one that would certainly not be 
addressed by a moratorium on Section vouchers.60 
Tenants On Both Sides of Cottage Grove 
As perceived by local real estate developers, Noticeable differences exist among the rental tenants on 
the two sides of Cottage Grove. Though 95% of the community is African American, tenants east of 
Cottage Grove are more often single female professionals (nurses, data entry specialists, customer 
service representatives), earning above $70,000 with 1-2 children. In addition, many of these couples 
have exited foreclosure and were looking to rent higher-amenity apartments while their credit 
prevented them from purchasing a home. These tenants were willing to pay above $1500 in rent,61 
leading to a perception that many landlords east of Cottage Grove used both explicit and subtle 
means to avoid renting to Housing Choice Voucher recipients.62 
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In contrast, tenants west of Cottage Grove are more often housing choice voucher holders with 
incomes between $25,000 and $30,000.63 Though racial differences were not highlighted, the 
dividing line of Cottage Grove Avenue bears a striking resemblance to the neighborhood during 
1920s-1940s, when Cottage Grove served as a the racial dividing line between the growing black 
(and poor) residents on the West and white residents on the East (Chicago Fact Book Consortium, 1984).  
Homeowners 
Typically two- to four-unit buildings house owner-occupants, who rent out the additional units. The 
additional revenue supplements their personal income, positioning the homes as both good starter 
homes or enabling the acquisition of a more expensive home than a single-family home. One of the 
unique characteristics is that two- to four-unit buildings historically and currently have a dual 
investment purpose when purchased. They are both assets that can grow in value and revenue-
generating properties. Homebuyers may consider remodeling them into larger single-family 
residences, but they are more likely to rent the extra unit(s).64 
In Woodlawn, only 28% of all the units in smaller (one- to four-unit) buildings are owner-occupied, 
which reflects the fact that even a neighborhood of owner-occupied 4-unit properties (four-flats) 
would only be 25% owner-occupied when considering additional rental units (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2012b). Current and prospective homeowners in Chicago are considered highly mobile, and are able 
to choose among many different communities.65 They are interested in purchasing on blocks that are 
well kept, which serves as a proxy for the level of desired social organization.66 The injection of 
middle class homeowners earning between 80% and 120% still falls under the DHED’s income 
limit.67  
Construction Workers 
Another indirect beneficiary of renovating two- to four-unit buildings is the cadre of workers who 
gain jobs from the resulting economic activity. One community organizer suggested this as a local 
economic development initiative, which could employ low-income neighborhood residents.68 
County Government 
A second indirect beneficiary of more development of two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn is 
the local government, who would receive more property taxes when tax delinquent, unoccupied 
properties become occupied and income producing. The decision to forgive taxes is a complicated 
consideration for the municipal government.  Oftentimes property taxes become delinquent but are 
eventually paid off after 1-2 years if markets improve. In many cases, then, there is a strong 
possibility of recapturing the taxes.69 
                                                 
63 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
64 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
65 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
66 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
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Competitors 
This section describes both players that compete for resources and those who compete to serve the 
same set of beneficiaries and customers. With a few exceptions, competitors are developers of other 
properties who compete with two- to four-unit buildings for tenants, homeowners, developer 
interest and capital. Resource competitors would include, for example, other multifamily apartment 
developers while competitors for customer could include larger condominium developments whose 
residents may increasingly forgo both single-family and two- to four-unit homes. In practice, both 
sources of competition are connected. 
 “Urban” Multifamily Developers 
One type of competitor of a two- to four-unit building is that developer of multifamily rental 
housing that actively invests in neighborhoods similar to Woodlawn that other developers may avoid. 
An example of this prototype is Pangea LLC. Their tenant-base is particularly similar to the tenants 
in parts of Woodlawn: 
They come from the check cashing business…you know currency solutions. And their 
tenants are the same profile as the customers for the check cashing business. They're looking 
at the [low-end] of twenty-one to thirty thousand dollars, who can afford that $875-$850, 
two bedroom, one bath rent. I think they have five thousand units on the south side now. 
Three thousand on the West Side. Maybe a thousand [in the] South Suburbs....They have a 
lot.70  
However, the nature of their business model and the building stock in Woodlawn causes them to 
have very little business in the neighborhood: 
Woodlawn has a lot of two-units and four-units […] They’re not doing two- to four-units, 
they’re doing multifamily buildings. They’re doing big buildings, [e.g.] thirty-flats. They also 
have a lot of six-flats, but they’re typically doing much larger buildings.71 
Though Pangea’s tenant mix is not the high-amenity type that some developers and landlords target, 
they have a positive and stabilizing impact in the communities where they invest because of effective 
property management, selectivity in tenant screening and “kicking out the undesirables.”72 Pangea, 
however, does actively welcome housing choice voucher recipients.73 
From a business standpoint, Pangea is an investment fund and will eventually have investors looking 
to exit the investments after several years. One potential concern is whether the ownership and 
management changes in ways that will destabilize the community when the fund reaches this point. 
                                                 
70 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
71 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
72 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
73 Visiting the Pangea Real Estate website http://www.pangeare.com, one has to look no further 
than the title of the home page (“Apartments in Chicago | Section 8 Housing | Indianapolis 
Apartments”) to see that they embrace voucher recipients in their properties.  
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This was the case for Midway Gardens, one of the few large Section 8 family complexes in the 
neighborhood (aside from Grove Parc Plaza), according to one informant74 
 “Upscale” Multifamily Developers 
This type of rental landlord relies more on higher income tenants who pay premium prices for 
increased amenities and employs a more restrictive standard for selecting neighborhoods in which to 
invest.  This could include developers in the downtown area, but more directly those with portfolios 
on the South Side of Chicago. One prototype relies greatly on management and locational 
efficiencies that makes buildings as small as 4 units infeasible.75  This type of developer may have a 
tenant base consisting of a mix of professionals, students and families. Rental development in 
Woodlawn may not be attractive because of the belief that the neighborhood does not have 
sufficient appeal and competitive advantage–when compared to other neighborhoods–outside of 
being a low-price community. The trap of “competing on price” is a dangerous proposition for an 
upscale developer.76 
Greater Capital Access for Multifamily Developers 
It is abundantly clear that multifamily properties (5 + units) are more highly sought out by investors 
than smaller properties. This is the case historically because multifamily properties have 
“government-backed products”, life insurance companies are willing to invest in them, and large 
commercial lenders like Chase will support them. There is a high degree of “sophistication” in these 
asset classes, whether one is talking about properties in low to moderate-income communities or in 
high-income communities given that they have been financed for several decades. In contrast, the 
one- to four-unit market “is not viewed institutionally.”77  
A pattern develops as a consequence of the more favorable investor climate of larger buildings: 
developers start off with two- to four-unit buildings, making the numbers work under capital 
constraints, mature, and increasingly shift to larger multifamily properties. 78 
Financing for multifamily properties has become much more difficult after the Great Recession, 
posing significant questions for the viability of less attractive two- to four-unit product types: 
It's inevitable that now there are fewer competitors that have the capital that's required to 
finance multifamily particularly in low to moderate income areas than was required seven to 
seven years ago. You could get financing with five to ten percent down on the deal, and if 
you were buying right now, you've have to really put thirty, maybe in some cases forty or 
even fifty percent. If it's a deal on multifamily, and on smaller properties, there aren't really 
even a lot of lenders who would want to finance it. 79 
The difference in capital availability was partially explained by the structure of the developer. Banks 
were described as more willing to provide commercial loans to a Limited Liability Company or a 
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private equity fund than they were to provide a mortgage on a one- to four-unit building.80 Bank 
financing and equity capital both require investments of a scale that is larger than even a small 
portfolio of smaller properties: 
When you have an institutional investment structure, it’s a lot harder, because you have to 
place more capital work, but if it’s just you and you’ve got a hundred thousand, or a couple 
hundred thousand, or up to a million, it’s not difficult. Right now you need a lot more equity. 
If you’re going to buy a property for fify grand and it needs fifty [in renovation costs], you’re 
probably going to have to put a majority if not all of that in as cash and then try to finance it 
once it’s stabilized, meaning the rehab is done and the property has cash flow. That’s 
eliminated a lot of people that compete in this space because there just isn’t a robust 
financing market right now. So if you don’t have cash to buy, whether the price is 20 and 
you gotta put 70 or 80 in, um,  it’s difficult. The barriers to entry are much higher.81 
Single-Family Homes & Larger Condominium Buildings 
Two- to four-unit properties must compete with single-family homes in other communities. For the 
price of $150,000, a reasonable cost of a completed renovation property in Woodlawn, a 
homeowner could find a single family homes in many other neighborhoods that do not face as many 
challenges as Woodlawn (Greenline Development, Inc., 2011). 
Condos in larger buildings present greater competition for condos in two- to four-unit buildings. In 
addition to the structural features that make renovating (and maintaining) larger buildings more cost 
effective, the foreclosure crisis has shown that larger buildings would not be as sensitive to 
foreclosures as a building with only 1 to 3 other units.82 Institutional capital would be easier to 
attract for higher-volume developments. 
Opponents and problem makers 
This section describes players that directly cause negative aspects of the ecosystem and development 
process, indirectly undermine the efforts in Woodlawn and serve as political opponents. An attempt 
has been made to relay the information provided by informants, and labels will inevitably be subject 
to differing opinions. 
Criminal Perpetrators 
Offenders of Violent and Quality of Life Crime 
Between June 2012 and June 2013, Woodlawn saw an average of one homicide every 45 days. For 
period from May 23 to June 22, 2013 Woodlawn ranked 10th   in most violent crimes and 12th  in 
most quality- of -life crimes out of the 77 community areas of Chicago (Chicago Tribune, 2013). 
Though criminal incidents are declining, the offenders present a key source of problems for the 
neighborhood and the strength of the market. There is an impunity with which criminals feel free to 
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82 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
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“pull out a gun and shoot for a significant amount a time.”  Residents have been known to abandon 
their property out of concern for their safety.83 
Recent Crime in Woodlawn 
 Violent Crime Property Crime Quality of Life Crime 
First 6 Months of 2011 279 679 720 
First 6 Months of 2012 268 607 655 
First 6 Months of 2013 202 461 426 
Source: Chicago Tribune, 2013 
Some informants reject the notion that would associate all such offenders with the neighborhood’s 
Section 8 population and the logic that fewer Section 8 tenants would reduce crime. They contend 
both that (1) at best it would just move offenders to other neighborhoods and (2) many of the 
offenders are not from families that receive housing assistance.84 
Past Perpetuators of Condominium Fraud 
Two types of illegal activity pertain to condomiums. First are the illegal conversions where 
developers completed construction without proper permits and often failed to abide by zoning laws.  
The consequence might be additional units in the basement, or substandard quality apartments.85 
More damaging activities are the conspiracies involving mortgage fraud, orchestrated so that 
developers could pocket mortgage funds for over-priced condos. An attorney described how these 
crimes would include an appraiser, mortgage broker, contractor, buyer and the buyer’s references.86 
Some people apparently did this to 20-30 buildings. Developers allegedly formed conspiracies to 
overstate the value of apartment buildings and the ability of borrowers to qualify for financing and 
subsequently took out a fraudulent loan.87  If these properties were under-renovated, a bank might 
demolish them once it realizes their actual worth.88 
Bad Tenants & Enabling Property Management 
Not surprisingly, not all tenants uphold the highest standards in rental apartments; however, there 
was a readily apparent role that enabling property managers played in translating problem tenants 
into neighborhood-level challenges.  
This trend is evident when looking at the experience of stronger property managers. One landlord 
remarked that many tenants “jump from unit to unit” and are effectively dissuaded from seeking 
apartments with landlords (like himself) who communicated a clear set of standards prior to a rental 
application being submitted. In his eyes, they preferred to "find someone else that suits their 
agenda."89 
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There are anecdotes, like an enabling landlord that allowed their tenants to throw highly disruptive 
parties with impunity. Neighborhood groups tried to intervene in a public manner by reporting the 
disturbances to the police, only to receive not-so- subtle threats from the tenants.  On another 
occasion, a porch was used for an open-air drug market, while the landlord repeatedly ignored 
complaints from other residents as well as the larger implications of his decision.  The landlords 
criticized were at  times professional firms, community-based organizations and smaller investors. 
Identification and essentially “shaming” these landlords was cited as a strategy for improvement.90 
Anti-Section 8 Advocates 
One constituency is especially vocal about the (real but often overstated) concentration of 
subsidized housing in the neighborhood, and it is evident that these anti-Section 8 advocates have a 
chilling effect on any rental use of two- to four-unit properties. The perception is that these 
advocates would rather see buildings remain vacant than filled with additional voucher recipients, 
thus subjecting all types of rental housing to blanket criticism for the concentration of voucher 
holders.91 Calls for a moratorium on housing choice voucher recipients were criticized as using a 
broad-brush stroke to blame crime on voucher recipients versus the more nuanced issues identified 
in other sections of this work.92 
Investors & Developers 
Specific actions of investors and developers were criticized as creating problems in the two- to four-
unit market. Many investors who brought property in the hopes of developing condominiums 
during the housing boombut who then lost their capital source for renovations when the market 
declined. They have been inclined to pursue Section 8 tenants as a source of cash flow, in some 
cases to even support development efforts in other communities. These investors, as a result of 
changes in the market, changed from managing assets to generating cash flow only. Another 
example of a problem-creating developer behavior is illegal dumping and improper trash storage and 
disposal in garages and streetside trash cans. These strategies represent ways to cut development 
costs at the expense of the neighborhood.93 
Secondly, absentee investors (who might even be former residents) were seen as using tax 
deliquency as a hedge in the process of land speculation. An owner may retire a mortgage and wait 
for market changes to improve the prospect of selling or developing the land. If an owner stops 
paying the property taxes on the property during this holding period, the County allows two years 
before taking action.  The bet may pay off, in which case the owner pays off taxes with minimal 
interest. If the market does not come around, the property will continue to deteriorate and taxes will 
continue to accumulate.94 
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Lastly, absentee landlords whose properties go into foreclosures were  also harmful to tenants. 
When the large number of rental two- to four-unit properties go into foreclosures in Chicago, this 
often uproots tenants as well.95  
Banks 
Banks were described as sources of problem with respect to their takeover of REO properties and 
their aforementioned restrictive lending practices. Financial institutions often find themselves in 
possession of a property with existing residential tenants in Woodlawn with conflicting underlying 
interests. They may need to clear out a foreclosed property in order to receive payment from their 
insurer. The firms hired to manage REO properties often do not try to maintain an occupied 
building; instead they are paid based on their ability to do the opposite.  Tactics include “cash for 
keys” approaches where managers provided financial incentives and simply pursued evictions.96 As a 
lender, even in situations where NSP had identified cooperative lending institutions that had 
reviewed the terms for the program’s second mortgage, there were still occasions when interested 
home-purchasers didn’t qualify.97 
University of Chicago 
University of Chicago has a long history with Woodlawn. Most recently their role has been more 
that of a community partner. However, it was alleged that affiliates of the University, formally or 
informally, discouraged employees from living south of 61st (the boundary between their South 
Campus and Woodlawn).98  
City Agencies 
Several city agencies were identified as presenting challenges for improving the neighborhood’s 
housing market. The departments of Police, Buildings and Streets & Sanitation, in addition to the 
Housing Authority, were described as providing poor customer service, selective enforcement and 
undertaking other actions harmful to the neighborhood’s improvement. 
Chicago Housing Authority 
The Housing Authority is known for almost reflexively taking the side of the tenant in disputes 
when the recourse requires stopping rental payments. This appears to discourage new landlords from 
entering the program.99 
Police Department 
Tactical officers received praise, with much more criticism directed at dispatch officers. In the eyes 
of residents, the police seemed not to be interested in enforcing property or quality of life crimes 
just as they seem to discourage resident involvement in the neighborhood.100 Anecdotes suggest a 
level of service in Woodlawn that is comparatively worse than other neighborhoods. In one example, 
dispatched officers would take several hours to respond to a break-in in Woodlawn and show little 
interest in collecting evidence in order to capture the culprit. A burglary in a popular neighborhood 
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on the North Side is responded to promptly by officers, who collect fingerprints copiously and 
successfully apprehended a suspect—a rare occurrence for any type of crime in Woodlawn.101 
In Woodlawn, the notion that residents in minority communities aren’t reporting things to the police 
was disputed, one informant claiming that there are more calls made to 3-1-1 in Woodlawn from any 
neighborhood, but that the multiple requests are not responded to.102 This, however, does not 
appear to be the case when looking at several representative requests to 3-1-1 and the Police 
Department: 
Request Type Number of 
Requests/Complaints 
Woodlawn’s Rank Among 
Community Areas 
311 - Sanitation Code 
Complaints (2011 to present) 
582 35/77 
311 - Graffiti Removal (2011 to 
present) 
407 61/77 
Police - Narcotics (2013) 293 20/77 
Police - Weapons Violation 
(2013) 
45 20/77 
Police - Theft (2013) 445 29/77 
Police - Battery (2013) 592 21/77 
Overall Crime Reported (2013) 2688 29/77 
Source: City of Chicago, Data Portal, 2013 
Department of Buildings 
Several brokers interviewed stated that, during the housing bubble, the Department of Buildings had 
been extremely lapse in requiring permits for developers looking to fix up two- to four-unit 
buildings and sell them as condos.103 After the recession, the Building Department put much greater 
restrictions on renovations, by either imposing stiffer rules or simply enforcing them more 
stringently. Such changes increase construction costs in neighborhoods like Woodlawn.104 In sum, 
these administrative rules increased the costs for individuals already holding property and hurt the 
potential returns from appreciation of the property at sale, pushing them towards a rental strategy.105 
One administrative change that preceded the recession concerned porches. In 2003, the Department 
of Buildings and the City of Chicago suffered considerable public criticism after the tragic deaths 
associated with a fallen porch in Wrigleyville. Motivated by ensuing liability, the Department shifted 
to being overly-proactive in identifying porches that needed to be fixed. A developer might have 
meticulously planned for construction costs, and a Building Inspector may deliberately check the 
deck and deem it out of code, even if it is unrelated to the inspection. As a new practice by the 
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Department, it increased the overall development costs of two- to four-unit buildings due to the 
cost of a single deck 106 
In addition, the City's Fast-Tract Abatement process leads the Department to identify vacant and 
occupied properties that are considered nuisances to crime, often demolishing them without giving 
consideration to managing the newly created land. In the eyes of some, the city hasn’t offered 
compelling evidence to support the claim that massive building demolition will actually curb 
crime.107 There is growing community concern over the demolition of architecturally-rich buildings, 
one of the neighborhood’s assets.108 
Department of Streets and Sanitation 
Similar to the descriptions of the police department, residents feel that the Department of Streets & 
Sanitation provides poor service to Woodlawn, with major consequences for housing demand. The 
failure to maintain trash on the streets attracted animals, and contributes to an image that prevents 
prospective homeowners with an abundance of choices from considering Woodlawn as a viable 
option.109 Without the concentrated action on the part of city agencies, including police, streets & 
sanitation, and the fire department, any neighborhood improvement will be challenging.110  
Affected and Influential Bystanders 
This final category is a loose category for players who don’t appear to have an active involvement in 
the two- to four-unit building market in Woodlawn, but who are impacted or capable of providing 
resources, assistance or other forms of support. Noteworthy groups and organizations in this 
category are inactive neighbors, NHS of Chicago, and Mercy Portfolio Services. 
Inactive Neighbors 
Many residents could be more proactive in enforcing community norms that improve public safety 
and improve the quality of life. Evident in the alleged impunity with which violence is committed, 
active residents feel that too many of their fellow community members do not sufficiently get 
involved in disrupting or merely reporting criminal activities that they saw. There was also a notion 
that more residents need to take ownership of the community and be willing to pick up trash in the 
neighborhood even if they did not create the trash. 111  
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago (NHS) 
NHS’s consists of several components. It is a lender and a charter member of the Neighborworks 
America and provides several complementary services to two- to four-unit buildings in Chicago. It 
does neighborhood-specific community development through a series of site-based offices. In 
several capacities, under the Micro-Markets Recovery Program, NHS works with Housing Court as a 
receiver and site coordinator in the same manner as CIC. It serves as a realtor and property manager, 
in addition to providing home-ownership education through “Neighborworks Home Ownership 
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Centers,” charged with helping homeowners obtain affordable financing. It has a redevelopment 
affiliate that develops properties (which includes multi-unit properties). Lastly, they also do research 
& development around issues facing neighborhood revitalization and homeownership (NHS of 
Chicago, 2013a). 
Though extremely important to the city’s broader homeownership infrastructure, as of January 2013 
their particular presence in Woodlawn has been much more limited. This was manifested in 
interviews that discussed the inability for their homeownership education about the reduction of 
property taxes for seniors to reach Woodlawn residents and the impressions shared by many that 
NHS may just not be interested in playing a role in Woodlawn.112 The 9 target neighborhoods in 
which they focus their community development work does not include Woodlawn (NHS of Chicago, 
2013b). 
Mercy Housing Lakefront & Mercy Portfolio Services 
Mercy Housing is a non-profit affordable housing development and management company. Mercy 
Housing Lakefront is their Wisconsin and Illinois regional office. Mercy Portfolio Services is the 
basis of their work around foreclosure remediation, which involves managing the City of Chicago’s 
entire NSP program.  Along with the Cara Program, they are participants in the 180 Properties joint 
venture that trains and employs hard-to-employ populations (ex-offenders, low-income, etc.) in the 
maintenance of smaller residential properties (Cleanslate, 2013). Outside of Mercy Portfolio Services’ 
role as NSP coordinator (their primary initiative for smaller buildings), Mercy is not active in 
Woodlawn’s two- to four-unit market. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the six categories of individuals and organizations involved in the 
ecosystem of two- to four-unit properties, including resource providers, complementary 
organizations & allies, customers and other beneficiaries, competitors, opponents & problem makers 
and bystanders. These players are generally described in relationship to the Small Building Initiative, 
a neighborhood planning initiative that is part of the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, but also 
include around individual or organization taking an active role in the real estate development of two- 
to four-unit buildings. 
Resource Providers 
Resource providers include large, national for-profit financial institutions like Bank of America, 
Wells Fargo and PNC Bank that provide single-family homeowner loans to one- to two- or four-
unit properties. They occasionally provide loans for investor portfolios of smaller building, but are 
more active in multi-family lending. These investor loans require a personal guarantee, and 
considerable down payments, an obstacle that affects less capitalized developers. Other financial 
products include a line of credit that provides a developer a limited amount of capital with which to 
pursue development. The banks have changed many practices as a result of their exposure to 
mortgage fraud prior to the recession. 
Lenders are more favorable to lending to owner-occupied homes, and are more lenient in treating 
rental income associated with two- to four-unit properties than pure investment income. 
                                                 
112 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013, Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
63 | The Social Ecosystem for Revitalizing Two- to Four-Unit Buildings in Woodlawn 
 
Institutional investors that pool together funds are not as apt to invest in two- to four-unit 
properties given the lack of interest in these properties by the capital market and because they have 
large amounts of capital to put into service, much more than even a small portfolio. In comparison, 
non-institutional investors are more likely sources of investment for two- to four-unit properties, 
with "turn-key" investing enabling absentee or less involved owners to get professional asset and 
property management and additional investors supporting mid-range developers with portfolios that 
are transitioning away from using their own funds. 
Non-profit lenders are important resource providers in the neighborhood, but to a lesser extent are 
resource providers for two- to four-unit properties. The most active in Woodlawn, Community 
Investment Corporation and Chicago Community Loan Fund, don't invest in two- to four-unit 
properties. NHS of Chicago does provide traditional lending, rehabilitation loans and 
acquisition/rehab loans to two- to four-unit properties; however, they are most active in other 
neighborhoods. There remains a gap left by the dissolution of Shore Bank that covered the 
neighborhood and the particular product type. 
HUD is an important resource provider for how the City of Chicago, banks, homeowners and 
investors improve smaller buildings. The Woodlawn Choice Neighborhoods funding will support 
the Small Building Fund.  Vouchers provide rental revenues that many landlords rely on. FHA's 
insurance supports homeownership loans, but the 203(k) renovation mortgage allows a homeowner 
to renovate a building with funds guaranteed prior to construction when a mortgage is signed. In 
addition, CDBG and HOME funds enable the city and state to put together reduced-rate loans, 
forgivable second mortgages, down payment assistance for homeowners and comprehensive NSP 
programs. The Department of Housing and Economic Development and the Chicago Housing 
Authority are the local face for implementing these funds. 
Another class of important resource providers is the various institutions selling REO properties and 
the information about where they are from traditional MLS and increasingly proprietary lists. These 
players are critical to the acquisition of two- to four-unit properties, given that they are historically 
owner-occupied buildings that might be caught up in foreclosure. 
Complementary Organizations and Allies 
POAH, a non-profit developer of multifamily housing, is the lead implementer of the Choice 
Neighborhoods and is leading the revitalization effort. They have started the conversation on the 
Small Building Initiative along with the City. There are a series of non-profits that are active in 
community development and addressing vacant properties. Mercy Portfolio Services, Mercy's 
foreclosure response affiliate, manages the city's NSP program in which many properties (though 
few two- to four-unit buildings) are purchased, transferred or renovated for sale or for rent. CIC is 
also the local partner for the city's Micro-Markets Recovery Program and its staff researches and 
takes action to preserve smaller buildings. 
Allies at the city and county level include the DHED Housing Bureau that actively address this issue 
of two- to four-unit buildings city-wide, the newly-formed County Land Bank that could clear 
properties of municipal liens and remove housing units from the market in interest of stabilization 
and the County Board of Review that helps homeowners keep property taxes low and avoid being 
displaced by increasing property values. 
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Complementary players in the two- to four-unit ecosystem include real estate professionals such as 
developers and landlords, design and build contractors and consultants and professional property 
managers that execute the main functions of real estate. Landlords range from small scale to well-
capitalized investors, but generally the largest investors focus on middle-income communities while 
the smaller investors are more inclined to pursue the "low-road" strategies described in Chapter 2 or 
simply not possess adequate management capacity. Homeowners and small investors often need to 
rely on architectural and design consultants for renovating properties. The consultants employed 
under the 203(k) loan program help homeowners draw plans for the scope of work and oversee the 
construction process for a fee that is regulated by FHA. Property managers may take on condos in 
two- to four-unit buildings; they may lease the entire building or even a portfolio of buildings. The 
greater number of units that are managed, the lower the average cost. Appraisers determine the 
value of properties, which lenders will use as the basis for determining the appropriately sized loan. 
The Network of Woodlawn is a 10-year-old organization filling the role of a comprehensive 
neighborhood planning organization, but has yet to develop the necessary capacity and may not be 
as much of a fresh start as some neighborhood observers would like. Several other organizations 
have not been as active in recent years, including The Woodlawn Organization, Woodlawn East 
Community and Neighborhoods and the Woodlawn Preservation & Investment Corporation.  
Several mid-size apartment building owners have been meeting regularly, and these developers could 
likely positively impact landlords of smaller buildings, even if not counting them among their 
membership.  Organizations that support homeowners and homeownership include the few 
neighborhood block clubs, the local homeowners association, homeownership counseling agencies 
and Sunshine Ministries, an urban ministry that focuses on community development. Though the 
particular efforts in these regards leaves much to be desired in Woodlawn, in other communities 
Alderman actively request city services using their mobile devices and work with homeowners to 
inform them of options for keeping their property taxes from rising. These efforts can help prevent 
disinvestment and the property tax delinquency that accompanies speculation and gentrification. 
Beneficiaries and Customers 
There were several classes of customers and beneficiaries for two- to four-unit buildings identified. 
There is a significant tenant population in Woodlawn, and that extends to these properties because 
even the owner-occupied buildings have 1-3 rental units. Among these tenants, just over 30% are 
subsidized by HUD, which has grown considerably since 2008. Despite a fairly even population in 
East and West Woodlawn, Section 8 tenants face more resistance east of Cottage Grove where more 
professionals reside and where the housing market is stronger. 28% of the units in one- to four-unit 
properties are owner-occupied. Two- to four-unit buildings have a unique advantage for 
homeowners because they bring in rental revenue, enabling households to afford a larger home than 
is otherwise possible. Other beneficiaries of rehabilitating two- to four-unit properties are 
construction workers, who could be local residents, and the local government that benefits from 
increased payment of property taxes. 
Competitors 
Competitors are those players competing for resources that two- to four-unit properties need, or for 
the customers that they serve. One source of competition is urban multifamily developers, who are 
actively developing in neighborhoods like Woodlawn, but focus on larger buildings. Because smaller 
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buildings are so prevalent in Woodlawn, these developers focus more elsewhere and take much of 
the limited capital with them. Upscale multifamily developers, even if they were active on the South 
Side, would generally avoid Woodlawn because of the neighborhood challenges. Both of these 
product types can more easily attract attention from capital markets and obtain bank financing, as 
described in Chapter 2. Multifamily also presents a growth opportunity for smaller developers of 
two- to four-unit buildings, potentially leaving the less promising developers behind. When 
compared with single-family homes, many of the two- to four-unit buildings have sale prices that 
aren't too different from single-family homes in stronger neighborhoods, making competition for 
buyers more difficult. 
Opponents and Problem Makers 
Problem makers include the criminal offenders who make residents feel unsafe and likely to move, 
and who deter prospective residents from even coming to Woodlawn. These offenders are often 
known to community members, and resources could be more effectively targeted. Past perpetrators 
of mortgage fraud have contributed to the difficulty rental housing developers and condominium 
developers have with obtaining financing. A subset of bad tenants are enabled by equally 
blameworthy landlords, which has led to blanket criticism of Section 8 tenants and that creates 
major obstacles to developing additional rental housing in the neighborhood. Some developers 
create problems as well, for example, when they pursue cash flow from rental units versus 
proactively managing assets for long-term value. The speculative actions in the neighborhoods have 
proven harmful as well. 
Several additional institutions are also sources of problems. Banks, in taking over REO two- to four-
unit properties, often clear out tenants to receive insurance payouts. Through their inflexibility in 
lending, they prevent households at 80% AMI from entering homeownership. The University of 
Chicago is historically seen as discouraging its affiliates from moving into the neighborhood, 
reducing an important source of neighborhood demand. CHA policies for managing tenant disputes 
in the voucher program discourage newer landlords from participating. Police officers provide a 
lower quality of service in Woodlawn than other neighborhoods. The Department of Buildings relies 
too heavily on demolition with little concern for additional vacant land, and its enforcement of 
building code is lax with regard to maintaining neighborhood standards and overly restrictive in 
high-profile situations that bring it bad publicity (like one major deck collapse). Finally, the 
Department of Streets & Sanitation is believed to provide trash accumulation that reduces the appeal 
of Woodlawn's blocks to prospective homeowners. 
Affected and Influential Bystanders 
Bystanders in the social ecosystem of two- to four-unit buildings include, quite literally, neighbors 
that don't inhibit the level of social capital to reduce the impunity with which crimes are committed. 
NHS has the set of skills and resources that could benefit Woodlawn tremendously, but focuses 
elsewhere. Lastly, Mercy Housing, through their Portfolio Services and their workforce partnership 
180 Properties, is also an influential player that could increase their level of involvement in two- to 
four-unit properties in Woodlawn. 
Conclusion 
Whereas the previous chapter introduced the development process, this chapter centered on the 
individuals and organizations that occupy various steps in that process, that consume the products 
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of the process, and that impact the process from a more removed position. Many of the same issues 
crop up in both chapters, but with a different perspective. Capital availability is an issue that faces a 
developer or homeowner, but it pertains to interaction with resource providers. Property 
management is a requirement of all two- to four-unit properties because even homeowners have 
rental units. The extent to which homeowners have the necessary capacity to provide property 
management on par with larger landlords and the business strategies employed by mid-range 
managers that often fall short on the quality of property management are examples of how 
additional insight that comes from analyzing the social ecosystem’s players. The next chapter takes 
an even broader step away from the perspective of development, individuals and organizations in 
order to provide a comprehensive picture of the factors that influence these previous perspectives. 
These include the policies and politics that influence how public resources are used and the 
population dynamics that are important drivers of the real estate market. Relying on individuals and 
organizations and a concerted effort to change environmental conditions are important keys to 
making broad-based changes to the social ecosystem. 
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Chapter 4: Environmental Conditions  
Introduction 
This chapter is the final component of a three-part presentation that reports the results of my 
findings in a qualitative case study of the market for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn, 
including both vacant and occupied buildings. Whereas Chapter 2—“The Development Process” —
focuses on the process stretching from acquisition, renovation to leasing & sale of two- to four-unit 
buildings (or parts within), including the availability of financing, Chapter 3 and 4 collectively 
present the social ecosystem surrounding the development process. They are inspired by the work of 
Bloom and Dees (2008) and how the community development financial institution Self-Help Credit 
Union effectively cultivated it’s social ecosystem in re-shaping the home mortgage market. In this 
chapter, I am concerned  with the environmental conditions that shape what players can do and 
their relationship with each other, including the economy, laws & regulations, demographics, culture 
and geography. 
Framework 
This chapter is organized by four environmental factors that shape both the process of residential 
real estate development and the individuals and organizations that take part in it. 
The first factor, economics and markets, encompasses the robustness and breadth of transactions 
associated with the purchase, sale and lease of two- to four-unit buildings. It also includes the 
neighborhood’s distribution of wealth, prospects for economic revitalization and secondary markets. 
For example, the property values of two- to four-unit buildings have fallen precipitously after a time 
of tremendous rise in the early 2000s that is closely identified with rampant land speculation. 
The second factor, politics and administrative structures, includes both the formal rules and 
regulations that bind the ecosystem.  Examples would be the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
as well as the political dynamics and informal processes like the opposition to increased housing 
choice voucher recipients in a neighborhood, something that can bleed over into opposition against 
additional investment in rental housing. 
The third factor, geography and infrastructure, includes not only the physical terrain and location-- 
three parks surround Woodlawn and its location in Southside Chicago-but also the transportation, 
communication and organizational infrastructure that support two- to four-unit buildings and the 
rest of the real estate market in the area:  the “El” stop at 63rd and Cottage Grove and the two 
METRA stations. While economics and markets would include spatial implications for economic 
vitality, non-economic drivers of demand such as proximity to downtown, green space and 
transportation access also fall in this category. 
The final factor, the cultural and social fabric, includes the relevant cultural norms and values, 
demographic trends and social networks of the neighborhood. For example, if in today’s culture if a 
smaller proportion of families are more inclined to purchase homes in suburbs, while a greater 
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proportion of childless professionals and empty nesters seek out condos in the city limits, this may 
have implications for the traditional role of two- to four-unit buildings as starter homes. 
Economics and Markets 
Two- to four-unit buildings are part of both the homeownership market and the rental housing 
market. There are series of market failures identified, including the speculative impact of Chicago’s 
Olympic bid, the transaction costs imposed by tax delinquency, genuinely and artificially depressed 
property appraisals and a sizeable number of vacant lots that could be developed into brand new 
properties.  
Homeownership Market 
The Institute for Housing Studies (2013) provides a quarterly price index for Cook County showing 
that property values of two- to four-unit buildings suffered much more than any other housing 
typology. 
Chicago House Price Index for Fourth Quarter of 2012 (by property type)  
 
Source: Institute for Housing Studies Quarterly Price, Index DePaul University, 2013 
Condominium Market 
During the height of the housing bubble, a vibrant condominium market in Woodlawn fueled 
conversions and new construction. A developer could increase his revenue by selling individual units 
of a two- to four-unit building as a condominium versus selling the whole building,  in some cases 
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by a factor of two.1 This was attributed to the low property values of Woodlawn. The “condo craze” 
did not apply to neighboring Hyde Park because the high and stable property values make it much 
less attractive than both Woodlawn and Bronzeville.2 
Median Value of Owner-Occupied Unit in Surrounding Neighborhoods 
Community Area 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Woodlawn  $26,600 $53,300 $84,160 $183,085 
Grand Boulevard (Bronzeville) $23,400 $49,700 $179,849 $257,137 
Hyde Park $98,000 $218,500 $271,020 $341,416 
Source: Voorhees Center, 2013 
Condos were more numerous in the part of the neighborhood east of Cottage Grove. Though the 
numbers began to decrease with the Great Recession, there is still a perception of demand on the 
part of developers. The condo market was previously and remains noticeably absent on the other 
side of Cottage Grove. The reasons informants gave for the difference were the larger size of rental 
apartment buildings on the Westside and the prominence of bungalow-style housing deemed less 
suitable to condominium conversion.3  
Mortgage Fraud and Illegal Condo Conversion 
Different types of fraud associated with condominiums were tied directly to the challenges of the 
market. As described previously, the strength of the market led some entrepreneurs to ignore permit 
requirements in order to capitalize on the demand, and others to sell over-valued condominiums to 
complicit buyers overstating their qualifications, only to disappear with the profit received from the 
mortgage. What is unique about the environment is how the appraisal process inadvertently fueled 
the growth of the latter practice. Geographic concentrations of these activities led to higher 
comparable sales in the neighborhood, which made it even more attractive to pursue fraudulent 
mortgages.4  While this was not limited to two- to four-unit buildings, an apparent chain effect of 
foreclosures in smaller buildings led to disastrous consequences. 
A related issue was illegally converted condominiums. The Department of Buildings was notorious 
for showing a lack of concern for communities in South Side Chicago, where construction 
frequently took place without permits.  These illicit efforts to develop condominiums, fueled by the 
burgeoning condo market, were highly lucrative.5 Both the unregulated condo conversions and 
fraudulent sales were linked to the speculative rise in property values, an under-renovated housing 
supply and a chain effect of foreclosures. 
Rental Market 
Several sources and informants identify two- to four-unit buildings as critical to the neighborhood’s 
rental housing market and the larger neighborhood revitalization. Stakeholders identified Woodlawn 
                                                 
1 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
2 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
3 Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
4 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
5 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
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as having a significant portion of vacant smaller buildings.6 According to the Institute of Housing 
Studies (2012a), 44.6% of the units in multi-family buildings in Woodlawn were located in two- to 
four-unit buildings, and 40.9% of these buildings were impacted by foreclosure. 
This characteristic varies widely across Chicago, with some neighborhoods having as high as 90% of 
their units in two- to four-unit buildings and others as low as 0.1% (Downtown). However, few 
neighborhoods other than Woodlawn had as many as two- to four-unit buildings affected by 
foreclosure. Woodlawn stands with West Englewood, Englewood and Burnside only in surpassing 
the 40% mark. To show the extent to which place matters, in Hyde Park—the neighborhood on the 
other side of the University Chicago—one finds only 5.8% of multifamily units in two- to four-unit 
buildings (IHS, 2012a). As a result, Woodlawn is unique in relying on two- to four-unit buildings for 
rental housing at the same time that much of its rental housing stock has experienced foreclosure. 
In addition, there is an increased rental housing demand stemming from families who have exited 
homeownership with damaged credit and those experiencing difficulty in obtaining financing for 
homes in a tight financing market.7 As a result, having a strong-homeownership market in the 
context of a devastated rental market would have a destabilizing effect on the community.8 Some 
perceive that past efforts have focused too much on homeownership in Woodlawn and believe that 
“homeownership has been over-sold.”9  
Market Failures 
A recurring theme in the interviews was the belief that, without government intervention, buildings 
in Woodlawn would not be developed in the current market. The reasons that were identified 
include the degree of tax delinquency, the stock of vacant land and comparatively low property 
appraisals. 
Imperfect Information: “Olympic Dreams” 
Another key market observation was the speculative effect of the 2016 Olympic Bid on housing 
prices, centered in nearby Bronzeville. The likelihood of a successful Olympic bid was a decisive 
factor in the move of many households to Woodlawn.10 Speculation fueled purchases and land 
banking of homes.11 By October 2009 when Chicago was no longer being considered, a 20 month 
period had passed that included both the early softening and the precipitous fall in housing prices 
(Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2013).  The combination of collapse of the housing market and 
the failure of Chicago’s bid was blamed on the extensive decline in Woodlawn’s property market.12 
Tax Delinquent Properties 
Tax delinquency adds to development cost in a manner that makes it no longer feasible for profit-
driven developers to acquire and renovate properties. Absent any type of action by a municipal 
                                                 
6 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
7 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
8 Interview with Informant #10, 1/23/2013 
9 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
10 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
11 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
12 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
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agency, various liens for utilities, taxes and fees would be transferred to the new owner. More 
vacancy was attributed to long-term tax delinquency than to recent foreclosure.13  
Vacant Lots 
The amount of vacant land amounts to a deterrent for initial investors. The potential for new 
construction threatens to negatively impact the re-sale value of older, even rehabilitated, properties.14 
Indeed, despite the weakness of the existing market demand, redeveloping vacant land into more 
housing is still actively being considered by community planners.15 
Low Property Appraisals 
The appraisal process dictates and limits the amount of capital available for renovation in Woodlawn. 
Financial institutions rely heavily on market appraisals to identify the value of collateral, the basis for 
the upward threshold for the amount of financing to be provided.16 The appraisals take place 
according to a standard methodology of identifying sales of comparable buildings in the nearby 
vicinity.  They look at properties with similar physical amenities, but consciously use the distressed 
sales of foreclosed homes as a source of credible market data. These homes then compete with non-
foreclosed homes to be purchased.17 
Though lenders may occasionally challenge low appraisals in a low to moderate-income community, 
many informants believe low property values are a major reason why developers and homeowners in 
Woodlawn struggle to obtain financing.18 
Market Changes and Investor Behavior 
Market changes that have occurred as a consequence of the Great Recession have had an apparent 
impact on investor behavior. Prior to the recession, two- to four-unit buildings were selling at 
$250,000 at times above $400,000. After the crash, larger houses were available for $20,000.19 As a 
consequence, cash purchases have become more popular (63.2% in Woodlawn, as reported in 
Chapter 2) as an easier way to purchase buildings.20  
After the recession, landlords were often not adequately renovating properties that they had 
purchased and only rent the properties out in order to obtain cash flow.21 Rental housing was 
advantageous with the potential to target housing choice voucher recipients, given the higher and 
more reliable revenue sources these provided.22 As will be discussed later in the chapter, when 
comparing the maximum Fair Market Rents approved by HUD for Chicago with apparent market 
rents,  the rents received by Housing Choice Voucher landlords appears to be higher. 
                                                 
13 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
14 Interview with Informant #7, 1/22/2013 
15 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013 
16 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
17 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013 
18 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013  
19 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
20 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
21 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
22 Interview with Informant #9, 1/22/2013 
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Politics & Administrative Structures 
The section includes both the formal rules and regulations that bind the ecosystem. It also includes 
the political dynamics that place demands and limitations on the administrative infrastructure, as 
well as informal processes and procedures. These primarily include the nature of tension along 
different types of tenure, spatial differences in resource allocation and market demand and the 
structure and design of various public policy initiatives that have implications for the success of 
improving the market for two- to four-unit buildings. 
Tension Between Renters and Owners 
Opposition to Rental Housing 
Tension exists between some in the homeowner community in Woodlawn and the beneficiaries and 
providers of the subsidized housing. There is rising political opposition in the neighborhood to an 
approach to renovating two- to four-unit buildings that would produce increased subsidized rental 
housing. 23 
This, it appears, applies not only to subsidized rental housing but also to all rental housing. A 
common refrain on one community organization’s website is that 50% of the units in the 
neighborhood are subsidized, leading to a negative impact on the real estate market (Williams, n.d.). 
Informants identify project-based and housing choice vouchers in their reports and arguments. The 
opposition to subsidized housing is partially fueled by greater turnover among households and the 
resulting instability. 24 However, others counter this view by pointing out that some tenants have 
lived in Woodlawn for generations, and tenant advocates want to ensure that long-term tenants can 
remain in the neighborhood.25 With so much emphasis placed on housing choice vouchers and 
secondarily on project-based vouchers, political pressure easily shifts from government officials to 
developers and landlords.26 
Increasingly, Chicago’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has been implicitly criticized for 
supporting the rehabilitation of buildings purchased by landlords and rented overwhelmingly to 
HCV tenants who were subsequently blamed for public safety issues in the neighborhood (West 
Woodlawn Coalition, 2011).27 
Caveats to the Anti-Rental Sentiment 
Despite how convinced various officials and developers are of these pressing concerns, their 
sentiments may actually represent only a vocal minority of the neighborhood. If a framework of 
social services and other neighborhood investments accompanied affordable rental housing, many 
feel might be more politically palatable.28 Often, the focus on the surface level topic of housing 
choice vouchers gives way to a focus on the actions of landlords, i.e., whether or not they secure 
                                                 
23 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
24 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013; Meeting Minutes from 20th Ward Housing Committee, 
9/27/12  
25 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
26 Meeting Minutes from 20th Ward Housing Committee, 9/27/12 
27 Meeting Minutes from 20th Ward Housing Committee, 9/27/12 
28 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
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their property, perform credit checks on tenants and are not adding a problem property to the 
neighborhood.29 
A second caveat to the tensions surrounding affordable housing lies in the execution of past 
political/policy agreements. In the planning of the Grove Parc redevelopment, there was intense 
debate about whether to do “one-for-one” replacement of the existing Section 8 units. Tenants and 
their advocates were successful in achieving this, and they in turn agreed to a plan for building units 
outside of the existing footprint.30 Some properties at the heart of the controversy, like those 
developed by POAH under the NSP program, are often if not mainly the replacement units that 
were the result of these earlier neighborhood-planning agreements.31 
East vs. West 
As noted in Chapter 3, notable political and class divisions characterize the areas East and West of 
Cottage Grove Ave. These play out in the social, cultural, economic, resource-driven and typological 
differences that distinguish these two parts of the Woodlawn neighborhood. To even the casual 
observer visiting the real estate site Zillow.com (2013), a search for Woodlawn will only include the 
part of the neighborhood east of Cottage Grove, while one must search for “West Woodlawn” to 
find listings in the area west of Cottage Grove. In addition, during the period of racial turnover 
(1920s-1940s), Cottage Grove was the racial boundary between largely African Americans on the 
West and whites on the East. 
Several similar distinctions exist in the formal administrative structure. The areas have two different 
active tax-increment financing districts with the City’s Department of Housing and Economic 
Development (Chicago DHED, 2013a, 2013b). The NSP program is also limited to the area west of 
Cottage Grove as a result of the federal regulations. There is both an acknowledgement that the city 
aims to concentrate more resources in western portion of the neighborhood and that the 
neighborhood should have a unified image. Some organizations routinely “push[…] back on the 
mention of West Woodlawn vs. East Woodlawn."32 
Choice Neighborhoods Support of Small Buildings 
The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative is based on the 20-year HOPE VI program, which sought to 
eradicate distressed public housing and achieve comprehensive, but housing-centered, neighborhood 
revitalization. Whereas HOPE VI had allowed projects to spend 15% of the award on supportive 
services and the remainder on public housing, Choice Neighborhoods saw 15% of the budgetary 
allocations go toward neighborhood improvements and the remaining 70% available for use beyond 
the targeted housing development. As part of the Choice grant, POAH has already committed to 
using a portion of the Housing funds to support smaller buildings.33 As is the case with much 
publicly funded development, Choice Neighborhoods monies must be used to employ higher wage 
                                                 
29 Meeting Minutes from 20th Ward Housing Committee, 9/27/12 
30 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
31 Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013 
32 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013 
33 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013; Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
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labor complying with prevailing wage legislation in the construction and renovation of two- to four-
unit buildings.34 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
Background 
The Neighborhood Stabilization Program was a program of the City’s Department of Housing and 
Economic Development. In three consecutive rounds of funding that states and municipalities 
received, the program stated its purpose “of stabilizing communities that have suffered from 
foreclosures and abandonment” (HUD, 2013d). DHED’s three rounds of NSP funding totaling 
$169 million, to be used for financing acquisition and redevelopment of “foreclosed homes and 
residential properties,” to directly acquire and rehabilitate residential properties, to land bank homes, 
perform demolition and redevelop both properties and cleared land (Ludwig, 2012). Beneficiaries of 
the funds had income restrictions: 120% of AMI for any portion of funding ($90,100 for a family of 
four) and below 50% AMI for at least 25% of the funds ($37,550 for a family of four) (HUD, 
2013d). 
Geographic Focus 
Not only was the program to benefit families 
qualifying as low to moderate income, but 
recipients of the program were also to prioritize 
areas of greatest need, illustrated by the greatest 
percentage of foreclosures, sub-prime loans and the 
likelihood of additional  foreclosures (Chicago 
DHED, 2013c). In NSP1 and NSP2, Woodlawn’s 
census tracts of 4205, 4206 and 4207 were eligible 
census tracts. In NSP3, none of the tracts in 
Woodlawn were eligible (Chicago DCD, 2010). The 
map to the left shows that NSP investments were 
thus limited to the area that is west of Cottage 
Grove. 
NSP and Single Family Properties 
Although the program included single family (one- 
to four-unit buildings), these were far fewer among 
the funded activities than larger buildings. 
Throughout the program, only three single family 
properties were acquired: one single-family home 
sold and a two two-flats buildings listed for sale in 
Woodlawn (Chicago NSP, 2013a). 
Several reasons explain the focus away from smaller 
single-family properties. Selling homes to owner 
occupants (the likely consuners of one- to four-unit properties) presented important market risk to 
                                                 
34 Interview with Informant #7, 1/22/2013; Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
Source: Chicago DCD, 2010  
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DHED (Gross, 2012). As such, the city was described as having been “burned” by this process and 
not wanting to hold onto properties.35 In addition to the difficulty of selling smaller properties, the 
need to meet strict HUD guidelines in the disbursement of funds was a major factor. There were 
tight timelines for committing and disbursing NSP funds and DHED deemed it necessary to focus 
on properties that were ideally above $500k. This strategy differs from many other NSP programs. 
Planners and policymakers also believed  that focusing on larger buildings would have more impact 
as an intervention in Chicago’s neighborhood (Miripol, 2012):  
They serve as gateway or marquee buildings for blocks of one- to four-unit houses, and 
therefore generate a large enough revitalizing effect that it’s even worth pursuing getting 
those that are vacant but not yet REO into REO status and eligible for acquisition. 
The program’s other efforts to fund single-family homes included renovations in other 
neighborhoods, homebuyer assistance in the form of rehabilitation loan, and a purchase assistance 
forgivable loan (Chicago NSP, 2013b). While there was no an extensive program evaluation at the 
point when this research was collected, it was confirmed that all but a few units rehabilitated in 
Woodlawn were, in fact, large multifamily rental buildings, and most of them were replacement units 
for former residents of Grove Parc Plaza.36  
As of January 2013, there was discussion of a partnership with financial institutions to provide loans 
using the structure of the 203(k) loan. The program uses NSP funds to provide second mortgages to 
write down the cost of loans originated by traditional lenders if they are not low enough.37 
Limitations in Elig ible Activities 
A key characteristic of the program was that some beneficial activities in stabilizing communities 
were forbidden by the NSP rules and regulations. Although the program funded research & 
development in order to figure out what was working, the program’s restrictions prevented funding 
from going to and therefore meeting some of these needs. For instance, the program could only aid 
properties that had already gone through foreclosure, not the neighbors that were on the verge of 
doing the same.38 Even with a retroactive regulatory change in the second round of NSP, properties 
had to be tax delinquent for 90-days or 60-days delinquent on the mortgage prior to becoming 
eligible for NSP purposes. Properties still couldn’t be assisted under the program prior to a short 
sale (ICF International, 2010; NeighborWorks America, 2013). 
Additional Department of Housing & Economic Development Programs 
Troubled-Building Initiative 
A second initiative of Department of Housing & Economic Development is the Troubled-Building 
Initiative, an interdepartmental initiative coordinated by DHED. Its focus is on the following: issues 
(Chicago DHED, 2013d): 
• “Neighborhood gang and drug activity 
                                                 
35 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
36 Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013 
37 Interview with Informant #16, 1/25/2013; Interview with Informant #14, 1/24/2013 
38 Interview with Informant #10, 1/23/2013 
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• Disconnection of utilities that place residents at risk 
• Lack of maintenance or repairs that creates dangerous conditions for residents.” 
The program assesses fines and other economic incentives for problem properties that are not 
abandoned, seeks to prevent their deterioration by collaboration across city agencies, and enlists the 
help of financial institutions if buildings are vacant and abandoned (Chicago DHED, 2013d). Some 
dissatisfaction was expressed because of the mixed messages the program sends. When it is 
juxtaposed with the Department of Building’s Fast Track Abatement program that often leads to 
demolition, the city’s commitment to preserving buildings in disinvested communities seems 
inconsistent39 This invokes the general sentiment that increased vacant land can be a barrier to 
neighborhood improvement rather than aiding in rehabilitation. 
Micro-Market Recovery Program 
The Micro-Market Recovery Program is largely an extension of the NSP program, intended to focus 
additional efforts on turning around certain weak markets with potential. It began in August 2011, 
and it has NSP’s same West Woodlawn geographic focus. Because of the perceived challenge in 
addressing 19,000 to 20,000 vacant buildings, DHED opted to enlist community partners to 
organize residents and blocks of 8-9 different “micro-markets”, to conduct inventories of buildings 
and the refer clients for services.40 These are highly structured contractual relationships, where 
partners agree to key deliverables. The partners were selected on the basis of prior activity in the 
neighborhood.41 The partner for Woodlawn is an affiliate of Community Investment Corporation, 
that CDFI that focuses on multifamily affordable rental and has the best track record of active 
lenders in the neighborhood. Although this work isn’t exclusively focused on two- to four-unit 
buildings, surveys of the targeted area showed that 95% of the vacant buildings were in this 
building typology so they are a major focus.42 Part of the work done by CIC in Woodlawn includes 
referring buildings to building court, helping to resolve questions of ownership, taking buildings into 
receivership, securing and cleaning buildings, and preparing feasibility studies for properties.43 
Tax-Increment Financing-Neighborhood Improvement Program 
Tax-Increment Financing (TIF) program is also overseen by DHED. TIF is a program that uses 
future flows of property tax revenue to make investments in the present period. Funds are available 
for area redevelopment when either a “blighted area” or a “conversation area” has been 
demonstrated through the designation of a series of factors including dilapidation, obsolescence, 
deterioration, excessive vacancies, and lack of community planning (Laube Consulting Group, 2010).  
There are two TIF districts in Woodlawn, one east of Cottage Grove that was created in 1999 and 
one west of Cottage Grove that was created in 2010 (Chicago DHED, 2013a, Chicago DHED, 
2013b). The strategies of the two districts include public improvements, park and open space 
improvements, incentives for private investment and building rehabilitation, incentives for 
homeowner improvements, land assembly, and development of vacant land (S. B. Friedman & 
                                                 
39 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013 
40 Interview with Informant #8, 1/22/2013 
41 Interview with Informant #8, 1/22/2013 
42 Interview with Informant #8, 1/22/2013 
43 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
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Company, 1998, Laube Consulting Group, 2010). The program was identified as a potential source 
of support for homeownership, but had proven difficult up as of January 2013, when the research 
for this study took place.44 The TIF Neighborhood Improvement Program, created to give access to 
homeowners to the program, allows for exterior and interior improvements to single family and 
multifamily buildings.  
West Woodlawn TIF District 
 
Woodlawn TIF District 
 
 
Public Housing and Section 8 Vouchers 
Guided by the Plan for Transformation and earlier desegregation decrees, the Chicago Housing 
Authority has shifted its housing footprint away from high-rise public housing to mixed-income 
housing communities and over the past fourteen years, to Section 8 vouchers. Since 1995, the 
Chicago Housing Authority has been undertaking this massive effort to replace 25,000 units of the 
former and also to build new communities on the footprint of the previous housing that will be 
evenly split between market-rate, affordable and public housing. During this time, they have 
increased the amount vouchers and that has led to  concentration of voucher-assisted tenants in 
neighborhoods that are already distressed (Moore, 2013).  
Scattered Site Rental Program 
Approximately 2,500 of the 18,000 remaining public housing units are part of a scattered site rental 
program containing units that are smaller than typical multifamily apartments and housing 
complexes (CHA, 2012).45 One of these developments is in Woodlawn, managed by the Woodlawn 
Community Development Corporation (CHA, 2013a). A remnant of the Gautreaux court case 
where the Chicago Housing Authority faced a court injunction to desegregate, the program’s explicit 
goal has been to obtain smaller buildings (many two- to four-unit properties) in areas with little or 
no concentration of public housing and other forms of subsidy. These units  were to be outside of 
                                                 
44 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
45 Interview with Informant #5, 1/18/2013 
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the City’s South and West Side (where the earlier high-rises were most prevalent). Unfortunately, the 
Authority has not purchased additional units over the past 8 years. 46 
Property Rental Assistance Program (PRA) 
Under the Property Rental Assistance Program (PRA) A , CHA provides more traditional project-
based vouchers to private landlords. The vouchers do not follow the tenant, as they do in the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program, but a landlord agrees to a longer 5 to 30-year contract. The ideal 
size of the portfolio is at least 8 units, allowing a landlord with a portfolio of two- to four-unit 
buildings to be competitive. CHA is currently pushing to get more private owners into this 
program. 47 In deciding which landlords will participate in the program, the Authority considers 
whether the buildings are in opportunity areas, accessibility of transportation, the level of retail 
amenities and public safety. This program reflects the Housing Authority’s objective to identify 
partners to help reduce the concentration of low-income residents and subsidized housing. In 
addition, both a committee and the CHA Board of Commissioners have to approve every landlord’s 
application to participate in the program; the Authority has staff to ensure successful property 
management. 48  Notably, there is a 25% statutory limit on the number of assisted units in one 
property; CHA has the flexibility to waive the 25% statutory limit on the number of assisted units in 
one property. In addition, the CHA application (2013b) states a preference for low-income areas:  
As part of the Plan for Transformation, CHA aims to provide opportunities for low‐
income families to live in areas with a mix of incomes and backgrounds. Therefore 
preference for PRA assistance will be given to properties in census tracts that have low 
concentrations of poverty (20% or less). (p. 20) 
A sub-set of this program focuses on providing supportive housing for various target populations in 
need of comprehensive social services. 
Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCV) 
In 2013 CHA will authorize over 38,000 Housing Choice Vouchers, representing over half of its 
total beneficiaries (CHA, 2012). These portable subsidies enable a recipient to identify private 
housing and that household must meet the set of threshold requirements known as Housing Quality 
Standards (HQS) that applies to the programs described above.49 Unlike Scattered Site housing and 
Project Rental Assistance where a general sense of selectivity drives the choice of landlords and 
properties and where neighborhood factors are explicitly considered, all any Housing Authority can 
do to effect de-concentration is proactively inform HCV recipients about housing opportunities in 
non-traditional communities.50 
The process for entering a HCV contract dissuades many developers from participation. There is 
requirement that property be taken off the market for 90 days prior to a landlord’s receipt of a rent 
                                                 
46 Interview with Informant #5, 1/18/2013 
47 Interview with Informant #5, 1/18/2013 
48 Interview with Informant #5, 1/18/2013 
49 To be precise, HQS applies to all private landlords participating in Housing Authority programs, 
including the Program Rental Assistance but with Housing Choice Vouchers the requirement to 
meet HQS is presumably imposed at the beginning of a tenant’s lease with a landlord.   
50 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
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check.51 This requirement can create upfront costs for new participants in the program.  As a 
consequence, landlords with a lot of HCV residents knew how to work the system, but those with 
few or none seek to avoid the program.52 Though brokers are bound by professional ethics that 
prevent their discrimination on the basis of income, they nevertheless witness landlords using 
creative approaches to weed out voucher holders.53 Many screening protocols, such as the use of 
credit checks, income verification, etc., are difficult for fair housing-minded officials to bar if they 
are applied uniformly.54  
Tenant and Neighborhood Relations 
If tenants have complaints about their properties, they can pursue a remedy through CHA’s regular 
inspections or request immediate assistance for a set of emergencies that may arise (CHA, 2013c). If 
neighbors have questions about properties in their neighborhood, they can also report problem 
properties to the Housing Authority. It is up to both the CHA and the partnering landlord to ensure 
that tenants abide by the rules and regulations.55 
Concentration in Woodlawn 
HUD data on the number of assisted households in Woodlawn reveal an overall increase of assisted 
homes in Woodlawn, nearly 1300 between 2004 and 2012. The most recent year’s data saw the 
percentage of all assisted housing units surpass 30%, a trend that validates many of the assertions 
from community members about increases but not about the extent of the increases: 
 HUD-Assisted Housing in Woodlawn (2004 to 2012) 
Year 2004 2008 2012 
All Residential Units (2000 Census) 11,941 
Housing Choice Voucher Units 1,049 999 1,775 
% of All Units 9% 8% 15% 
% of HUD-Assisted Units 45% 37% 48% 
All HUD-Assisted Units 2,356 2,716 3,712 
% of All Units 20% 23% 31% 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2013; HUD, 2013f 
Housing Quality Standards 
As mentioned above, all housing that is rented under Housing Choice Voucher Program or Property 
Rental Assistance must first be inspected and meet HUD’s Housing Quality Standards (HQS).56 If a 
unit is not in compliance with HQS, it is unable to be leased through the HCV program until the 
building has passed a subsequent inspection.  If it is already leased, after a documented period of 
non-repair the landlord ceases to receive payment from the Housing Authority (HUD, 2001).  The 
regulatory structure can be rather difficult for private landlords to manage because of the length of 
                                                 
51 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
52 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
53 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
54 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
55 Interview with Informant #5, 1/18/2013 
56 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
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time it takes to schedule a CHA appointment. If a landlord is deemed in violation, after completed 
the necessary repairs, he or she must make a second appointment for re-inspection and approval.57 
Most of the HQS standards listed in the Housing Choice Voucher Guidebook pertain to the state of 
the structure and its condition, yet one does concern the neighborhood: “The site and neighborhood 
must be reasonably free from disturbing noises and reverberations or other dangers to the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the occupants” (HUD, 2001). This might suggest the HCV Program 
incorporates de-concentration in a similar manner as other housing programs; however, the goal of 
“housing choice” for tenants is central to the implementation of this provision: “PHAs should be 
careful not to restrict housing choice in deciding acceptability. Failing a unit because the 
neighborhood is considered “bad” is not appropriate” (ibid). This would appear to cover 
concentrations of other voucher recipients. 
Fair Housing 
The Housing Choice Voucher program is obligated to meet Fair Housing requirements in dealing 
with concentration of housing choice voucher recipients. The phenomenon could be due to “pull” 
factors—tenants have deeply rooted networks in the area that are highly valuable—or “push” 
factors—they are subject to indirect or subtle discrimination when they try to lease an apartment 
neighborhoods beyond Woodlawn that offer much more economic opportunity.58 The same Fair 
Housing policies that prevent CHA from entertaining a moratorium of housing choice vouchers 
facilitate investigating and eliminating illegal “push” factors.  In addition, the approach to HCV de-
concentration that Housing Authorities are able to take essentially counter-balances the “pull” 
factors highlighting those non-traditional areas where voucher holders can move. They cannot 
dictate neighborhoods that are off-limits.59 
Leasing & Rent Levels 
HUD sets Fair Market Rents for each metropolitan area in the Country, which applies to assisted 
housing within the region. As a result, the same method of calculating rent subsidy would apply 
downtown that would apply to Woodlawn.60 Currently, HUD is conducting a demonstration of 
Small Area Fair Market Rents that adjusts maximum rents for each zip code within a larger 
metropolitan area.  The study seeks to prevent both over-subsidy in weaker market areas while it 
allows the payment of greater subsidy in higher-rent areas typically inaccessible to certain 
populations (HUD, 2012). 
The Small Area rents for Woodlawn (zip code 60637) are consistently closer to the neighborhood’s 
median rent than the original Fair Market Rent. 
  
                                                 
57 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
58 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
59 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
60 Interview with Informant #4, 1/17/2013 
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Simulated Comparison of Section 8, Market-Rate and Small Area Rents 
 Chicago Fair 
Market Rent61 
Median Rent in 
Woodlawn62 
Woodlawn Small 
Area Rents 
Efficiency $717 $700 $690 
1BR $815 $650 $780 
2BR $966 $850 $930 
3BR $1,231 $1,150 $1,190 
4BR $1,436 $1,350 $1,380 
Source: Novogradac & Company LLP, Hotpads.com & HUD  
The Small Area project is a demonstration, but HUD regulations already speak to rent levels under 
the “Rent Reasonableness” requirement that governs its assisted housing. The requirement is 
intended to prevent voucher recipients from paying rents that are higher than the market rent, and 
to prevent rents that are lower than the market rent and thus less attractive to better quality or 
landlords. Thus, the requirement is intended to prevent a situation where the Housing Choice 
Voucher program encourages any action on the part of a landlord outside of providing safe, quality 
housing when a tenant is receiving an income subsidy (HUD, 2001): 
By accepting each monthly housing assistance payment from the PHA, the owner certifies 
that the rent to owner is not more than rent charged by the owner for comparable unassisted 
units on the premises. The owner must provide information requested by the PHA on rents 
charged by the owner for other units on the premises. The language of the HAP contract 
states this requirement. (p. 9-3) 
Cook County Property Taxes & Utilities 
Tax delinquency is potentially the most significant barrier to addressing the problem of vacant 
buildings. When a building has municipal liens from unpaid water, utilities, and property taxes, the 
law does not allow any option to completely forgive the liens other than abandonment and turning 
over the property to the City (or County). Without this, a developer who purchases the property will 
assume responsibility for these liens. This is noticeably different than foreclosed properties, where 
the city can obtain title through a lower legal hurdle.63 
In addition, property taxes are an important aspect of the pressures that lead to vacancy. Speculative 
rises in home prices in Woodlawn (that surely resulted, in part, from condo fraud over-heating the 
market) led to higher property tax assessment for local residents. For fixed-income tenants (the 
elderly, for example), this present more hurdles. Seniors were not fully informed about their rights to 
lower their property taxes by appealing to the County, and if they were, the process has to repeated 
annually to maintain the reduced rates.64 
                                                 
61 Includes utilities 
62 The median rent comes from the apartment listings reported by Hotpads.com 
63 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
64 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
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Building Hearings & Demolition 
Building demolition is completed by the Department of Buildings, while the Buildings Hearing 
Division of the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings facilitates the judicial process. In 
the absence of a formal program to clear the title and municipal liens in two- to four-unit properties, 
demolition tends to be the only viable option for getting control of properties. First, it is often 
simpler to “knock a building down than it is to settle title issues,” given the challenge of pursuing 
abandonment cases in the Administrative Hearings.65 In addition, without a pre-approved program, 
every building must be approved by City Council before it is disposed of, something that would be 
politically perilous.66  
Past demolition appears connected to some of the market improvements in the neighborhood. A 
demolition program decades prior in East Woodlawn appears to have facilitated newer construction 
that, even with the recession, provides a strong infrastructure for developers to renovate homes.67 
These past demolition efforts seem, interestingly enough, correlated with the portion of the 
neighborhood that many consider more desirable. Many blocks of the eastern part of the 
neighborhood show evidence of housing that, from visible inspection, seems newly constructed. 
  
                                                 
65 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
66 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
67 Interview with Informant #7, 1/22/2013; Interview with Informant #6, 1/18/2013 
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New Construction in East Woodlawn 
  
 
Source: Photographs Taken by Author 
Dynamics of Community and Political Leadership 
Local leadership has been the target of fairly pointed criticism. . Many prominent organizations were 
known to attract various financial and grant monies while having minimal impact on or actual 
interest in improving the community and being generally out of touch with the community’s real 
needs. These organizations have leaders as the community “gatekeepers” serving for outside actors, 
and who have authority to veto the neighborhood’s participation in initiatives that they don’t 
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support. Some other stakeholders feel that the status and confidence placed on the existing 
leadership is misplaced.68 
The state of community leadership was in a rather fluid state, or in the words of one non-profit 
leader, the community has a “leadership void.” More locally established organizations may have 
credibility issues, and the organizations that drew the most positive comments were a crop of newer 
players, upon which the responsibility of leadership was consistently conferred69 The more that 
newer organizations were independent of the older organizations and their leaders, the more some 
stakeholders see them as breaking with “business as usual.”70 
Geography and Infrastructure 
This section includes the physical terrain and locational features associated with the larger 
neighborhood and the individual two- to four-unit buildings, as well as the transportation and 
communication infrastructure that support two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn. Woodlawn has 
key neighborhood strengths in its park and transportation infrastructure, as well as proximity to 
cultural amenities. However, the weak retail infrastructure is most problematic for attracting 
households to the neighborhood. 
Parks and Green Space as a Neighborhood Strength 
Woodlawn is surrounded on three sides by parks, Washington Park, Midway Plaisance and Jackson 
Park. These are crucial neighborhood assets that homeowners consider when deciding to move to 
the neighborhood.  Washington Park, for example, is the 3rd largest in the city, complete with 
baseball diamonds and golf courses.71 A second asset is the lake front to the East. One broker 
pointed out that land that was closer to Lake Michigan was much better for condominium 
development prior to the housing crash.72 
Transportation Infrastructure as a Neighborhood Strength  
Transportation infrastructure is yet another strength of Woodlawn.  The neighborhood provides 
convenient access to major Interstates 90 and 94, as well as Lake Shore Drive, a 15-mile expressway 
bounding the South- and North-Side of Chicago from Lake Michigan. Further, Woodlawn is both 
the terminal point of the Green Line El and has two stops on the commuter-focused Metra train. 
However, key challenges exist for the transportation infrastructure. Many feel the urban design 
created by the elevated Green line tracts running West on 63rd Street from Martin Luther King Drive 
make improvements to the community difficult73 The tracks block much of the sunlight, a situation 
that is uninviting for businesses.  As a result, some have successfully called for the deconstruction of 
parts of the  tracks in the past (Washburn, 1994):  
                                                 
68 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013; Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013; Interview 
with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
69 Interview with Informant #17, 1/25/2013,  
70 Interview with Informant #12, 1/23/2013 
71 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
72 Interview with Informant #1, 1/9/2013 
73 Interview with Informant #10, 1/23/2013 
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Demolition supporters contend that the line produces noise pollution, darkens the street 
underneath, and contributes to a perception of crime and a lack of security. They also say 
that ridership is low and that few people would be inconvenienced if the Jackson Park leg 
terminated at Cottage Grove. 
Amid public outcry and after two decades of debate, in 1996 the CTA board approved plans to 
deconstruct the portion of the line that ran from Cottage Grove to Dorchester (Washburn, 1996). 
The area that was cleared continues to be vacant. 
East 63rd/Cottage Grove Green line Station 
 
Source: Photo by Jeff Zoline 
Source of Weak Demand: Lack of Key Neighborhood Amenities 
Consensus forms around another weakness in the neighborhood’s infrastructure: the availability of 
retail amenities, notably restaurants and grocery stores and other convenience-oriented retail. The 
Cottage Grove retail corridor has been in decline since 1940 (Chicago Fact Book Consortium, 1984). 
Important comparisons were made with Bronzeville, a nearby community that is relatively similar to 
Woodlawn but had a stronger condominium market. Bronzeville is also underserved by retail and 
yet real estate professionals and residents both bought into the idea of continued revitalization of the 
market and the inevitable development of an infrastructure Unfortunately, the financial crisis dashed 
these dreams, and residents seem less likely to believe that these investments would take place in 
retail-starved communities like Bronzeville and Woodlawn.74 
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Retail attraction is no simple task as it invites a chicken or egg dilemma. Retail wouldn’t come 
naturally without more population growth and specifically more middle class residents. There was no 
simple answer to what must come first. 75 
Potential Neighborhood Strength: Proximity to Cultural & Economic Institutions 
The accessibility of a rich cultural infrastructure was identified as a possible source of improved 
demand for the neighborhood. Proximity to the University of Chicago is a source of strength, as 
well as the proximity of museums, theater and musical venues that are either associated with the 
University of Chicago or simply located in nearby Hyde Park.76 The University is also among the 
largest employers on the South Side of Chicago.77 Thus, there are potential job opportunities that 
residents, if matching the skill profiles, have access to. 
Social and Cultural Factors 
This section includes the relevant cultural norms and values, demographic trends and social 
networks of the neighborhood. Sharp demographic trends have born a lot of the blame for the 
softening homeownership market, extenuated by past and continuing public safety challenges. As a 
primarily African American community on Chicago’s South Side, in the shadow of one of the most 
elite education institutions in the world, issues of race and class are never too far away. Social factors 
pertaining to maintenance of the public realm also present important challenges and opportunities. 
With respect to two- to four-unit properties, homeownership has does not only represent an 
economic component, but also a social and cultural one as well. Lastly, there is also clear evidence of 
broader neighborhood change and firmly held beliefs about the possibility of a very different future. 
The Effect of Population Loss on Weak Demand 
Woodlawn has experienced long and consistent population loss since 1968, and this is among the 
root causes of the neighborhood’s housing vacancies. It is an even more significant source of 
vacancy than foreclosures and REO properties resulting from the Great Recession.78 Much of the 
population loss derives from middle-class families (who often are owner-occupants) moving out of 
the community.79 
Woodlawn Decennial Census Population Changes Since 1940   
Year Population Black % Total Housing 
Units 
Overall 
Vacancy Rate 
Ownership 
Rate 
1940 71,685 17% 23,444 5.6% 7.9% 
1950 80,699 39% 27,624 3.4% 10% 
1960 81,279 90% 29,616 6.6% 8.8% 
1970 53,814 96% 22,261 15% 10% 
1980 36,323 96% 15,747 11% 13% 
1990 27,473 96% 13,109 20% 17% 
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77 Interview with Informant #13, 1/23/2013 
78 Interview with Informant #15, 1/25/2013 
79 Interview with Informant #2, 1/10/2013 
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2000 27,086 94% 11,941 15% 18% 
2010 24,483 93% 14,127 20% 25% 
 
The Decennial Census shows the population peaking in the 1960s and falling precipitously until 
2010, when it was approximately 30% of the 1960 population level. Further, the bulk of the 
population loss was concentrated in the three decades after the 1968, with much smaller reductions 
since 1990. The amount of housing units has fallen as well, but not to the same degree. 
Public Safety, Social Capital and Community Cleanliness 
Public safety overrides all other positive aspects of the neighborhood in depressing the residential 
demand. Residents are “so concerned with their safety, they don’t mind leaving their home,” 80 one 
informant noted.  As public safety issues have increased, many homeowners not forced out by 
foreclosure have still left. One Latino resident, who eventually walked away from his home, suffered 
racially motivated harassment and property damage.  A nuanced view of crime suggests that the 
strength of social networks in Woodlawn (whether they are familial, or gang-related given the legacy 
of gangs such as the Blackstone Rangers that originated in the 1960s) attract visitors and residents of 
the neighborhood who are seeking to benefit from these networks (Taub, 1988).81 Ultimately, the 
effect of the violence is to override all other considerations of homeowners as they consider whether 
or not to remain in the neighborhood: “safety is starting to trump everything.”82 
Related to the extent of public safety is another consequence of low social capital, the tendency of 
residents not to take collective ownership in the physical appearance of the neighborhood streets. 
The attractiveness of a block and whether trash is picked up are important signals potential residents 
observe that point to the level of social organization they would enjoy if deciding to purchase on a 
block. The lack of cleanliness also manifests itself in the proliferation of illegal dumping of materials, 
but the lack of social capital received much blame since it makes residents, for example, unlikely to 
pick up a piece of trash they walk past. These neighborhood norms are an explicit component of 
what the block clubs and the homeowner association in the neighborhood are supposed to do. As 
noted earlier, Woodlawn has far fewer block clubs than other communities.83 
Housing and Neighborhood Change 
A direct correlation was drawn between the ease of obtaining housing choice vouchers and the 
strength of the neighborhood. Many believe that growth in the program’s size and the waiting list 
has been associated with inadequate screening of participants for criminal records.84 While some feel 
there are concentrations of voucher holders in the neighborhood, within the neighborhood there 
has actually been de-concentration of low-income residents. Previously, most low-income residents 
lived in Grove Parc Plaza and Parkway Gardens; now this is much less of the case. The demolition 
of public housing in the State Street corridor has led to the dispersal of lower-income residents 
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82 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
83 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
84 Interview with Informant #3, 1/16/2013 
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throughout Woodlawn in a less isolated manner than previously.85 Another consequence of the 
changes related to public housing concerns the complication of gang territory, a change that has 
been suggested as contributing to an increase in neighborhood-area violence (Babwin, 2012). 
Gentrification started in Woodlawn in 1999, but has been generally limited the eastern part of the 
Cottage Grove.86 
Race, Class and Ownership 
Increasing the share of homeowners in Woodlawn is an important approach of stakeholders to 
strengthen the market. With this attempt to bring additional people to the neighborhood, to many 
success would simply be the addition of families falling between 100% and 120% AMI, earning at 
least $60,000. Even these middle class families are characteristically mobile, having significant 
choices for where to live.87  
Increasing the concentration of owner-occupants on particular blocks is often suggested as an 
effective strategy for addressing crime.88 However, as many informants pointed out, since the 
increased concern over public safety leads homeowners to sell or even abandon their homes, it’s not 
clear in what direction the causality can actually flow.89 
Neighborhoods on the South Side are also noticeably more segregated than other major cities in the 
country.90 Since the racial turnover of 1940s, Woodlawn has been overwhelmingly African American. 
As it pertains to new residents, some developers (who happen to be African American) contend that 
mainly moderate-income individuals who are African American would consider living in a 
neighborhood like Woodlawn, where they can have greater residential amenities at a more affordable 
price.91 Other real estate professionals are adamant about Woodlawn needing to be more 
consciously integrated racially.92 
In any case, most Woodlawn residents—regardless of housing tenure—are African American. 
Debates around housing choice voucher recipients often reveal class-based tensions between 
moderate-income residents and lower-income tenants. Often the criticism is not just directed at low-
income tenants but also at the landlords, who are accused of ruthlessly attacking the way of life in 
middle-class black communities in ways that do not happen in largely non-African American 
neighborhoods93 
Summary 
This chapter presented a comprehensive picture of the environmental conditions that shape what 
players can exist and their relationship with each other, with a substantial focus on the economy, 
laws & regulations, demographics, culture and geography. 
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Economics and Markets 
Two- to four-unit buildings are fixtures in both the homeownership and rental markets. Housing 
values have fallen precipitously within this housing typology, more than single-family homes, condos 
and multifamily buildings. Condos in Woodlawn, many of which are in two- to four-unit buildings, 
have fallen off as a result of the recession, in contrast to a previous period when selling two- to four-
unit buildings as condos was more lucrative than sale of the entire building. One of the causes for 
this was speculation and mortgage fraud, which fed off each other to put unsustainable pressure on 
Woodlawn's market. Woodlawn is also a heavy renter community: more than 40% of the rental units 
are located in two- to four-unit buildings. An improved rental housing market, therefore, is critically 
important to the neighborhood's improvement. 
A series of market failures illustrate the economic factors that pose challenges in the neighborhood. 
The 2016 Olympic Bid by the City set off a storm of rampant speculation that coincided with 
recession and worsened vacancy with the higher-than-average fall in demand. Tax delinquencies and 
liens for municipal services make physical renovation cost prohibitive. Vacant lots that could be 
developed make renovated buildings less than resilient to investors. Low property appraisals reduce 
the financing available for renovation. In addition, falling property values have caused landlords, 
instead of selling, to pursue cash flow from renting out two- to four-unit properties, often with 
Section 8 vouchers that fetch higher rents than the market. 
Politics & Administrative Structures 
Formal rules and informal political dynamics both influence the social ecosystem.  Tensions result 
from homeowners who are alarmed by the perceived (but not unsupported) concentration of 
subsidized housing, and view additional investment decisions as feeding a harmful trend. This 
translates to opposition for all rental housing given the portable nature of vouchers. There is also a 
complex dynamic between the politics of East and West Woodlawn, as the areas are markedly 
different in social, cultural, economic, building typology and public investment, yet the commitment 
to being unified can seemingly ignore these differences that point to different fates. 
Support exists for targeting smaller buildings in the administrative structures. This was a 
fundamental part of the Choice Neighborhoods application. Another city program, the Troubled-
Buildings Initiative, uses economic incentives and further legal action to address gangs and drugs, 
and resident safety that often accompanies poorly managed properties. The city's Micro-Market 
Recovery Program targets West Woodlawn and empowers CIC to take responsibility and organize 
the community in order to remedy vacant two- to four-unit buildings. 
Though Neighborhood Stabilization Programs often express a goal to target single-family 
foreclosure, in Chicago the implementation has focused on much larger apartments in general and 
only a handful of two- to four-unit properties in Woodlawn. This reflects efforts to meet HUD 
funding requirements and supports the consensus that larger apartment buildings have greater 
impact on advancing community improvement. These properties are less common in Woodlawn. In 
addition, funds couldn't be used to prevent foreclosure early on; only properties that have completed 
the process. The two tax increment financing districts separate East and West Woodlawn, and they 
include a neighborhood-focused program that allows homeowners to make mainly exterior 
improvements. 
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The Chicago Housing Authority has shifted its strategy decidedly towards Section 8 vouchers under 
the Plan for Transformation, which by design doesn't discourage neighborhood concentration of 
program participants. Other programs, such as Scattered Site Rental and Property Rental Assistance, 
are more direct in their efforts to prevent the outcomes of concentration for which many 
neighborhood residents have criticized the Housing Choice Voucher program. In addition, the 
Housing Quality Standards that are designed to ensure housing standards for participating tenants 
seem to primarily dissuade new and unfamiliar developers from entering the program. Potentially as 
a response to the concerns over partnering landlords, CHA has protocols for both tenants and 
neighbors to complain about problem landlords. Though it has yet to be implemented by CHA, 
HUD is running a demonstration program that reduces the maximum rent for voucher-assisted 
apartments in weaker markets (and increases it in more expensive markets), which would undercut 
an important incentive currently motivating landlords exclusively pursue voucher-holders exclusively. 
Property taxes also have important rules to consider. Unpaid property taxes and municipal service 
fees cannot easily be forgiven by standard municipal efforts, even if properties can be transferred to 
new owners. In addition, when speculative pressures push housing values up, all homeowners (even 
fixed-income residents for whom moving is not feasible) will see higher property taxes which can 
lead to tax delinquency and vacancy. The Building Department often finds it easier to demolish 
buildings that have become so complicated between title issues, foreclosure, tax delinquency, 
municipal services and code enforcement, than to undertake the massive legal efforts that may be 
just as much work for a 20-unit building as it is for a 2-unit building. Though criticized heavily in the 
current setting, massive demolition does appear to have allowed the eastern part of the 
neighborhood to achieve a newer housing stock more appealing to building developers than the 
western part of the neighborhood. 
Lastly, there is an apparent leadership void as more questions are raised about the credibility and 
effectiveness of long-time leaders and "gatekeepers" while new players continue to establish 
themselves. 
Geography and Infrastructure 
The neighborhood has key strengths in the amount of parks, transportation infrastructure, but it 
suffers in having a lack of retail infrastructure with seemingly little hope for improvement given the 
economy. Proximity to the University of Chicago is also a source of strength for the neighborhood. 
Social and Cultural Factors 
Social and cultural factors round out the environmental factors of the social ecosystem for two- to 
four-unit properties. Woodlawn has experienced dramatic population loss since the 1960s. 
The lack of social capital that manifests in ineffective social control over crime and neighborhood 
upkeep is a cue that strikes at the core of decisions made by prospective homeowners and any 
residents capable of moving to other neighborhoods. In addition, inadequate screening of tenants 
for criminal records, dispersal of low-income residents into neighborhoods that were previously in 
high-rise housing and gentrification in East Woodlawn are also considered key social challenges for 
the neighborhood. 
Many place the hope for Woodlawn in increasing the share and involvement of middle-income 
homeowners, itself an acknowledgement of the flight of this class of residents since the 1960s when 
91 | The Social Ecosystem for Revitalizing Two- to Four-Unit Buildings in Woodlawn 
 
the neighborhood became predominantly black and the population peaked. Along with the racial 
composition of the neighborhood, debates over housing seem more impacted by class dynamics 
than by racial dynamics alone. 
Conclusion 
This chapter concluded the analysis of the social ecosystem on two- to four-unit buildings in 
Woodlawn. Economic factors influence various aspects of the development process and influence 
the actions of individuals and organizations. They represent the aggregation of all the individual 
acquisitions, renovations, leases and other parts of the real estate process. Given the extensive role 
of public resources in neighborhood revitalization, and also the general role that urban governments 
play in housing, it easy to understand how a range of administrative rules and regulations have 
important implications for development decisions, individual incentives and collective challenges. 
Equally important are the political dynamics, which interact with the formal rules to shape this 
environment. The perch of real estate and housing finance emphasizes economic and policy 
perspective, subordinating geography and infrastructure; yet these factors are no less important to 
the residential decisions and to the future of the neighborhood’s two- to four-unit buildings. Social 
and cultural factors are also undoubtedly important to the rest of the social ecosystem. They 
represent the patterns of interactions between players, bring attention to important issues like 
population and class, and they (even if not explicitly in this analysis) approximate the less tangible 
parts of the real estate process, such desirable tenants and neighborhood characteristics.. 
Given the practical nature of planning, the next chapters collectively answer the question of “So 
what?” Chapter 5 takes stock of the rich descriptive detail present in the social ecosystem analysis 
and identifies key findings and implications for the research questions that have motivated my 
research. The final chapter converts these findings into a strategic plan that proposes actions, 
objectives and high-level outcomes for guiding neighborhood planners of two- to four-unit 
properties. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Key Findings 
Introduction 
The following research questions have guided the development of my original research proposal, 
collection of data, analysis and reported findings with only minor modifications to better focus on 
the “existing conditions” of the ecosystem surrounding the market for two- to four-unit buildings: : 
1. What are the causes of vacancy in smaller buildings in Woodlawn? 
2. What challenges face the market for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn? 
3. What strategies to address vacancy have been employed and how have they fared? 
4. What community goals and most promising recommendations should be factored as a 
part of the Small Building Initiative and broader neighborhood planning? 
 
These questions model an planning exercise as it pertains to two- to four-unit properties.  One must 
understand the historical contributors of vacancy to prevent history from replaying itself. Root 
causes of current obstacles must be ascertained as well, lest our efforts concentrate on mere 
symptoms. Existing strategies and policies must be acknowledged, and provide insight into what 
might work, what hasn’t worked, and what hasn’t been tried. Lastly, stakeholder interests must be 
identified and considered when developing recommendations for actions.1 Interviews with 
stakeholders may very well lead to strategic considerations and recommended actions themselves 
that simply need to be expanded. 
Within the framework of analyzing existing conditions, I have identified the key findings along with 
the categories of real estate, community development, public policy, and planning. These categories 
serve to formalize the requirement of viewing two- to four-unit buildings as real estate assets 
operating in a neighborhood subject to policies and planning decisions for which  additional actors 
may be responsible The findings draw on the three previous chapters describing the development 
process and analysis of the social ecosystem analysis (Chapters 2-4), drawing implications from the 
observations and respondent interviews. 
Causes of Vacancy and Market Decline 
Historically, vacancy in Woodlawn had several triggers: delinquency in property taxes, municipal 
services and other municipally-related debts resulting from population loss after 1960, lower demand 
for homeownership and declining property values. The neighborhood, which had seen greater 
density among a similarly sized housing stock before 1960, has retained a fairly stable housing 
footprint structure despite demographic changes afterwards. Middle-class residents represented a 
major component of population loss (both black and white), taking the retail infrastructure with 
them thus making it even less likely they would return today. Speculation plays a pernicious role in 
the recent history, as Woodlawn’s potential as a hot market put pressure on property taxes that have 
drastic consequences even after the pressure subsides. The path of neighborhood decline extends 
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from speculation to the housing crash and tightening of housing finance, more tax delinquency, and 
depressed housing values, opening the door for two- to four-unit investors with management 
practices that reinforce community decline.  
Though the recent foreclosure crisis is a factor, much of the vacancy in two- to four-unit buildings is 
indicative of longer-term building vacancy in the neighborhood that triggered cycles of non-payment 
of property taxes, water bills and other municipal bills. The implication is that increasing the 
development potential of building stock requires a mechanism for resolving title issues and clearing 
municipal liens on the property. 
As such, it appears that vacancy in two- to four-unit buildings appears to be due to the inability of 
the housing stock to adjust to massive demographic shifts.. Woodlawn is a neighborhood of large 
single-family homes originally inhabited by wealthy families. The conversion of these homes into 
multi-unit buildings occurred as wealthier households left, accommodating the many (lower-income) 
households who entered the neighborhood in the post-WWII period. These new homes facilitated 
greater access to homeownership and generated housing units. Yet, in response to the significant 
population loss following the 1960s, there have been no systematic efforts to plan for a logical 
reduction in housing units. Some degree of adjustment, therefore, either by deliberate demolition or 
building renovation, is likely necessary to “right-size” the neighborhood to the meet the population 
levels for the foreseeable future. The fact that the urban core is experiencing a renaissance in 
American cities further suggests that a flexible short-term strategy for reducing housing units would 
be best if resurgence in demand for housing units occurs. 
As a driver for the general population loss, departing middle class residents enabled the communities 
to become dominated by lower-income families with less political economic clout to vie for 
important city services, and less household capital to retain the once-dominant retail infrastructure. 
All these factors then become cruel barriers for attracting mobile middle-income households to 
return to the neighborhood. African American residents, for whom living in South Side Chicago has 
traditionally has appeal oftentimes as a sociopolitical statement, are more sensitive to quality of life 
factors such as the lack of various retail categories. The conclusion is that the neighborhood has an 
even more difficult time competing as a neighborhood of choice in today’s environment than it did 
before.  
In addition, the role that speculation has played in heightening the effect of the recent foreclosure 
crisis has made any real transformation impossible. The speculative rise in property values in 
Woodlawn, aided by the general housing bubble and the potential bid for the Olympics, proved 
extremely unsustainable in the long run. Leading to increases in property taxes for existing 
homeowners, this speculation made it more difficult for existing homeowners to benefit from the 
increase in housing prices by selling their homes. Those who may have benefited (at least 
temporarily) from the increased asset value through re-financing (in addition to new homeowners 
who simply purchased at the inflated values) would easily find themselves with underwater 
mortgages once the market corrected. Speculation, more pronounced in Woodlawn for the variety 
of reasons including the sheer potential of the neighborhood, has left a clear mark. 
Process of Neighborhood Decline in Woodlawn 
Based on a summary of the data, we can identify the following stages of decline that have taken 
place in Woodlawn. 
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Existing Conditions 
Real Estate 
Several factors make development and/or operation of two- to four-unit buildings too expensive for 
both homeowners and investors. Tax delinquencies and municipal debts can’t be easily removed, 
adding to costs for development. Two-to-four unit properties have a volatile revenue stream, and 
owners get relatively smaller margins than they would if they had more units. Foreclosures and 
vacant land are chief among the market destabilizers. While there are a series of “best practices” that 
enable healthy two- to four-unit building redevelopment, less healthy investment strategies have 
taken hold. . 
Market demand prospects are strongest with rental housing, with unrealized assets lying dormant for 
a future resurgence in homeownership demand. Demand for rental housing is up because loans are 
so difficult to get and because of households exiting foreclosure. For the homeowners who can get 
loans, Woodlawn would have to compete in a much more difficult environment. While the parks, 
transit and employment proximity are major assets, these are still overshadowed by other 
neighborhood challenges, making homeownership still a tough sell. 
Capital is a barrier with major implications, providing more reason for the influence of low-road 
developers having greater opportunity with the two- to four-unit market. Borrower credit and 
tightened standards are both at fault. Given all the work involved for investors in financing two- to 
four-unit properties, they see clear advantages in investing in larger buildings. Investment structure is 
important as well because securing bank financing and investors are much easier for a limited 
liability corporation or investor with a portfolio than it is for an entrepreneur with one property. 
Overall Pricing 
Bubble + "Olympic 
Dreams" 
Speculative Land 
Banking 
Legimate Condo 
Deconversion + 
Condo Fraud 
Increased Property 
Taxes for Existing 
Residents 
Burst of Housing 
and Olympic 
Bubble 
Shrinkage of 
Housing Finance 
Macro-Economic 
Shocks 
Additional Tax 
Deliquency + 
Vacancy 
Growth of Low-
Road Developers 
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Supply-Side 
Among the most significant challenges for re-positioning the housing stock are the large tax 
delinquencies and municipal liens. These are simply added development costs for potential investors 
(or homeowners) in a neighborhood beset by many other challenges. Much of the literature around 
housing development argues that oftentimes the construction costs of housing in weak market 
neighborhoods are too great for the post-construction value. In the case of Chicago, developers 
must also contend with the municipal liens that come with tax delinquency and non-payment of 
municipal services. Because many of the problem buildings do not have mortgages, land speculation 
is easier to pursuewithout bank payments. Pursuit of property abandonment in courts appears to be 
the only mechanism for removing all of the municipal liens and back-taxes, yet a homeowner can 
easily dispute the charges. If they actively fight the effort, it is much harder to obtain the property 
cleared of back property taxes and liens. 
Smaller buildings are suited for owner-occupants, with little historical, physical and financial 
characteristics to support a healthy shift to rental products. Scattered-site rental is complex.  
Although it is a growing rental market, it is consistently more expensive to manage. The focus on 
two- to four-unit buildings doesn’t appear to change how professional management considers them, 
with the exception of geographic concentration that lends itself to a similar management afforded to 
low-rise apartment complexes. As a standalone financial investment, the revenue generated by an 
apartment falls instantly to 25-50% as the result of one vacancy.  
Two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn serve as a path to homeownership and facilitate additional 
rental housing. To the extent that a homeowner can successful get a loan, lenders count rental 
income (set at appraised values) of additional units as qualifying income for the homebuyer. This is 
the result of the fall in homeownership having led to a stronger demand for rental apartments, 
meaning that landlords are able to anticipate less vacancy even in a weaker neighborhood like 
Woodlawn. Because of the lower property values, and historically low interest rates, homes can be 
purchased at values lower than those in competing neighborhoods.  
Several market factors lead to destabilization in Woodlawn’s two- to four-unit market. First, the 
foreclosure crisis continues to depress property values. Though the sale of buildings that are 
evidently blighted and foreclosure are discounted when considering the appraisal of newer homes, 
every short sale or below-market cash-purchase of a foreclosed home that is inarguably a depressed 
sale is considered if the property is comparable.  Thus, the ability to finance all homes in the 
neighborhood is limited by the continuing disposition of foreclosures. 
A second existing market destabilizing factor is vacant land in the neighborhood. The threat of new 
construction in the neighborhood of newer two- to four-unit buildings lowers the long-term 
investment value of the initial rehabber. Indeed, the more successful revitalization efforts (Columbia 
Pointe I, redevelopment east of Cottage Grove) have actively promoted demolition and new 
construction over renovation. In more indirect ways, the lack of effective vacant land management 
adds to neighborhood issues and can be counterproductive to development such as increasing more 
space that is actively owned or managed by a local presence. 
A third, less observable destabilizing factor, is the extent to which lower property values lower the 
barrier to entry for investors interested more in generating cash flow at the lowest cost than 
generating long-term asset appreciation. Endemic to this is the use of cash purchases that both 
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disqualifies homes for future FHA insurance and eliminates the role of financial intermediaries who 
are more interested in the long-term value of the collateral. These business strategies are highly 
susceptible to the low-vacancy strategy of targeting captive Housing Choice Voucher recipients that 
has little concern for market-driven standards that exceed the bare Housing Quality Standards 
governing the voucher program. 
From a commercial development standpoint, two- to four-unit buildings tend to be economically 
viable only under particular conditions.  This means controlling the cost of labor by avoiding union , 
wages, obtaining the property at a significant discount out of foreclosure or with cash purchase and 
clearing municipal liens; otherwise the development budget is too expensive.  In order to reduce the 
volatility of the revenue stream and be considered for financing, properties must be part of a 
portfolio. Without these considerations, landlords are forced to identify other means for reducing 
construction or operating costs which may include an inadequate renovation plan for the property, 
under-maintaining, relying on tenant subsidies that exceed market-rate rents, or some combination 
of these strategies. The hope for improvement of the market lies in ensuring that initial conditions 
are met, while making it more difficult to under-maintain and under-improve the properties. 
Demand-Side 
Increased demand for rental housing that has taken place across all economic spectrums includes 
Woodlawn. This is a market consequence of fewer home purchases, but also a consequence of 
families exiting foreclosure. Households exiting foreclosure like to live in similar neighborhoods and 
in similar houses, which helps explain the growth in rental of single family housing in the suburbs, 
which could present a potential opportunity for two- to four-unit homes in Woodlawn. 
Though the housing stock is more inclined to owner-occupants, a combination of personal financial 
difficulties and tightened lending standards make purchasing two- to four-unit buildings very 
difficult. Those families who have exited foreclosure often rent the more premium-quality 
apartments in the neighborhood, the general inability for households at 80% AMI to qualify for a 
loan means that these vacant properties are less likely to be replaced by new tenants. Many other 
households earn too little to be a candidate for home purchase or lack the ability to save enough for 
the down payments. 
Within the context of a weaker market, often described as a “buyer’s market,” qualifying 
homeowners face expanded options. Woodlawn’s lack of residential amenities, presence of quality of 
life and public safety concerns place it in a poor position to vie for more homeowners. Relying on 
the traditional pursuit of homeowners is unlikely to be a panacea as a result. 
Woodlawn has clear infrastructural and physical assets. This includes three surrounding parks, 
including Washington Park, Jackson Park and Midway Plaisance the second largest park in the City 
of Chicago. In addition, it is accessible to Downtown Chicago on the Green Line, the commuter-
focused Metra, and by Lake Shore Drive by car. It is also adjacent to the largest employer on the 
South Side of Chicago, the University of Chicago. These assets make it both an ideal location for 
both middle-class households with cars, lower-income households dependent on public 
transportation, and University employers hoping to live near work. 
Chapter 5: Discussion and Key Findings | 98 
 
Capital Access 
Private capital availability is a particular barrier to more two- to four-unit homes being purchased 
and renovated by investors and homeowners. Many homes sit vacant because interested buyers 
cannot qualify for a mortgage, even with income levels at or greater than $50,000. All lenders don’t 
seem to be as enthusiastic in their support of the HUD 203(k) loan program as others, and 
inconsistency could easily be a barrier to broader adoption. Even though the NSP program got pre-
commitments from participating lenders who supported the terms and conditions of the program, 
the lenders still denied loans to many seemingly qualified borrowers. As a result, the combination of 
borrower credit and lender standards jointly explains the difficulty in securing financing. 
The situation is similar for investors, who must develop a sufficient relationship with a lender and 
sufficient scale before they can successfully finance a portfolio of two- to four-unit buildings. At this 
level of sophistication, there are plenty of advantages in purchasing larger multifamily buildings (that 
are less common in Woodlawn). By doing so, they gain the advantage of institutional investors and 
other financing that do not historically cater to smaller buildings. The consequence is that the 
investors purchasing two- to four-unit buildings have little financing, must rely on cash purchases, 
purchase at below-market values, appear unconstrained by the standards imposed by financial 
institutions, and have more pressure to pursue properties that generate cash flow.  These are all 
consequences of the lack of availability of capital.  
Part of the financing outlook for investors has to do with different prospects for obtaining financing 
for two- to four-unit and 5+ unit properties as a single investor and as a Limited Liability 
Corporation (LLC). LLCs can more easily obtain bank financing and investor financing, yet they 
require a larger portfolio (either through larger buildings or several smaller buildings). Single 
investors would also need to pool properties into a portfolio to attract the interest of banks, and 
they would have requirements of 20-25% equity that, given low margins in two- to four-unit 
properties, would be unlikely to attract equity investors. 
Community Development 
The community development environment is characterized by diverging interests, divergent ideas on 
strategy and increasingly divergent fates of different parts of the neighborhood, with under-
performing organizational infrastructure and no homeownership infrastructure. There are less than 
constructive debates over who the beneficiary of neighborhood improvement should be, which can 
serve to maintain the status quo through paralysis. The eastern part of the neighborhood is 
gentrifying, with the many primarily condo projects potentially disrupting the neighborhood with a 
less balanced development pattern that will lead to a less integrated community.  
Organizations that forged their relationship through the opposition to Urban Renewal efforts of the 
University of Chicago find themselves in disagreement over whether to focus public investment on 
rental housing or homeownership. Not surprisingly, the University of Chicago, which has embraced 
its role as the primary local institution, has found its efforts (fairly or unfairly) met with resistance 
and suspicion  that it hopes to radically transform the neighborhood community in a manner that 
would lead to significant displacement. Though the controversies had their crescendos in the early 
2000s, when the market was “hot,” there is not clear consensus about the neighborhood’s planning. 
Homeowners are pitted against affordable housing advocates, community organizations are pitted 
against each other, and to some degree these divisions correspond to political coalitions. 
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Some residents are highly vocal in opposing strategies that would add Housing Choice Voucher 
recipients to the neighborhood, and their efforts are making it harder to pursue any rental strategy 
for two- to four-unit properties. Both affordable housing developers and government officials 
appear to be significantly concerned with these sentiments, all the while staying true to the 
requirement of non-discriminatory requirements of Housing Choice Vouchers. The desirability of 
voucher holders, however, does not extend to landlords in the stronger parts of the neighborhood 
(East of Cottage Grove). Further, these efforts dampen the efforts to build any rental housing, 
despite the argument by many that turning vacant homes into housing for the long waiting lists at 
the Chicago Housing Authority would be an improvement for the neighborhood. 
Unfortunately, the “strength” of the area east of Cottage Grove indicates the onset of gentrification, 
a development pattern that contrasts sharply with the area west of Cottage Grove. The continued 
development on the East consists predominantly of condominium projects, which presents 
fundamentally different homeownership opportunities that serve certain homebuyers and not others. 
Condominiums don’t create complementary rental housing, they don’t facilitate home-ownership 
through the rental income, and they don’t create local landlords. It is not surprising that landlords on 
the East are relatively resistant to voucher recipients. That rental trends on the East are so 
categorically different from those to the west of Cottage makes a subtle point: refusing to refer to 
one part of the neighborhood as “East Woodlawn” and another part “West Woodlawn” is not 
sufficient to make them an integrated neighborhood. The socioeconomic differences in residents,  
concentration of NSP funds, boundaries in tax increment districts, and current major challenges all 
work against the actual unification of the community. 
In addition, counter to the storied history of activism in Woodlawn, it is rather low in organizational 
capacity and doesn’t seem capable of executing any specific plans for dealing with two- to four-unit 
buildings without external support. This is manifested in the lack of agency among tenants, worse 
than just a decade prior. The organizational weakness manifests itself in all-consuming high-profile 
legal issues faced by local leaders, and the connection between the leadership challenges and 
organizational capabilities. The Network of Woodlawn, a promising decade-long initiative, of several 
individual non-profit organizations, as of January 2013 had no dedicated staff member in charge of 
the Economic Development pillar that would include management of two- to four-unit buildings. 
Without confidence in the more historically prominent organizations, POAH becomes the 
presumed organizational leader, having been active in Woodlawn for 6-7 years during which it 
owned, operated and undertaken the development of Grove Parc Plaza apartments. 
Connected to capital availability and organizational capacity is the dearth of community 
development infrastructure promoting homeownership in Woodlawn. The homeownership 
association addresses this, in part, but from the standpoint of advocacy rather than the systemic 
nature one would expect from a community development corporation or another formal entity. The 
local Neighborworks affiliate is Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, and Woodlawn is not 
one of their target neighborhoods. The most active CDFI in Woodlawn, Community Investment 
Corporation, is explicitly a multi-family lender. There isn’t a clearly identifiable place for a 
Woodlawn resident to go to get homeownership counseling, though there are places in neighboring 
communities. Developing this infrastructure is critical for increasing homeownership in the 
neighborhood. 
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A gaping hole in the infrastructure is the loss of Shore Bank in nearby South Shore, which 
previously served Woodlawn’s smaller building market. Shore Bank’s failure, attributed to its 
inability to recover from a portfolio of fraudulent mortgages and the general housing crisis, was an 
unexpected but intuitive contributing factor to Woodlawn’s struggles. The institution marketed loans 
for smaller buildings as well as for homeowners and investors, made investor loans that were 
designed to discourage slumlords, and invested in both multifamily buildings and nearby smaller 
buildings in order to geographically concentrate investments. Moreover, their actions were 
consistent with the full-sale development of South Side neighborhoods like Woodlawn, since they 
also provided lending for commercial real estate. 
Public Policy & Planning 
In the area of public policy and housing planning, there is qualified support for the notion that 
voucher concentration requires public intervention. The interaction of the Housing Choice 
Voucher’s program design, neighborhood concentration, and two- to four-unit buildings creates 
unintended consequences in allowing landlords to depart from ordinary standards required by un-
assisted tenants. The program could be more deliberate in addressing building concentration, but it 
is important to recognize the major issue is landlord incentives and not indict  voucher holders. 
Outside of housing policy, municipal services must be more consistent in Woodlawn if the 
neighborhood seeks to attract new residents. 
Though the problem is not too many voucher holders in Woodlawn, the Housing Choice Voucher 
program design does create the conditions for poor management practices in smaller properties. 
When small properties occupy so much of the rental housing stock in a neighborhood with a high 
concentration of voucher holders, it is not hard to imagine that two- to four-unit properties could be 
100% occupied. Moreover, there is a particular appeal of pursuing Section 8 tenants exclusively, 
whose above-market rents accommodate any financial hassles presented by the program. The ability 
and willingness to meet HUD’s Housing Quality Standards is not an indication of high-quality 
management, but rather a checklist that familiar landlords can easily surpass. Less experienced 
landlords face a high barrier when entering subsidized housing, but once they understand how to 
navigate the system, there is no incentive for surpassing the minimum standards. 
The design of the Housing Choice Voucher program creates some perplexing comparisons with 
other HUD-funded housing subsidies. Outside of traditional public housing, all other housing 
subsidies from the Chicago Housing Authority explicitly  prevent concentration of both buildings 
and neighborhoods unless there is a mitigating resident-focused factor. The scattered site program is 
focused on opportunity areas for its acquisitions (granted there haven’t been many). The Property 
Rental Assistance only allows 25% of a property’s units to be assisted. Even Public Housing units 
are no longer in high-rises, but in mixed-income communities where they are on average one-third 
of a development. In contrast, developers and government officials were very open about the 
Housing Choice Voucher program attempting nothing of this nature. In maintaining fealty to the act 
of choice, yet taking a less active approach to providing better options to choose from (acquiring 
properties, contracting landlords beforehand, transforming entire neighborhoods), it is not 
surprising that the program concentrates in the manner than it does. 
It is important to illustrate a particular model that suggests why landlords in the voucher program 
would act as they do. There is a unique relationship between socially responsible property 
management, market strength, and diversity of tenant mix. Subsidized housing residents, if subjected 
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to various forms of housing restrictions, are less sensitive to different management practices than 
non-subsidized tenants with more bargaining power. As a result, the lack of a market-rate tenant in 
small building poses risks to voucher-holding families.  In weaker markets such as Woodlawn with 
lower rents and higher vacancy, landlords will rely heavily on voucher recipients for tenants. Because 
more of their tenants are less sensitive to property management, unscrupulous landlords can exploit 
these tenants by pursuing low-road strategies. This reflects the work of Ellen et al, showing that 
landlords in declining areas become more open to leasing to voucher holders. The risk here is that 
landlords “milk” properties for higher cash flow to the detriment of the families, rather than 
maintaining the property as an appreciating asset, when they feel the neighborhood is declining. 
In stronger markets, the risk is that landlords will completely eschew voucher recipients in favor of 
tenants they see as more stable, who make fewer maintenance calls and have a consistent set of 
social norms.  Pursuing a low-road strategy is much less attractive because the rent premium 
associated with providing higher quality property management services is higher in strong, urban 
markets.  Ideally, landlords in stronger neighborhoods will pursue high-road strategies and opt for 
the more socially responsible course of action (often demanded by the politics of communities on 
the South Side of Chicago), which means actively leasing to voucher holders. However, this is not 
always the case. The importance of this model is that the locus of the problem is on the landlord, 
not the neighborhood concentration of voucher holders. The implication is that the appropriate 
intervention should be to affect landlord behavior and leasing and not the neighborhood location of 
voucher holders. 
The allegations of inadequate public services in Woodlawn have implications for the neighborhood’s 
ability to attract homebuyers. This is one of the more substantiated benefits of mixed income 
housing. The presence of higher-income residents allows the neighborhood to vie for better public 
services. In Woodlawn, the lack of a critical mass of such residents is thus plausible as a reason 
behind the reports that dispatched police officers are less interested in doing police work for quality 
of life crimes, streets and sidewalks are not cleaned as many would like, and the Building 
Department is more tolerant of important code violations. 
Previous Policy and Planning Efforts to Improve the Market 
The city’s most prominent housing revitalization efforts (under NSP) didn’t focus on two- to four-
unit properties, reflecting a revitalization strategy that neglected the diversity of housing stock across 
different neighborhoods. By focusing on larger buildings, neighborhoods like Woodlawn dominated 
by smaller buildings saw much of their housing stock ignored.  In addition, a lot of public 
investment in the neighborhood has focused on low-income rental housing in the more disinvested 
portion of the neighborhood as opposed to focusing on homeownership, retail development, and a 
broader or block-based geographic focus. The 203(k) loan program and the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit represent major opportunities for obtaining financing for renovation for both home 
ownership or rental housing. Demolition by the Building Department is rightfully criticized for not 
considering the community impact of more vacant land, but in recent decades, much of the 
neighborhood has willingly prioritized demolition and new construction over more modest 
renovation. 
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Though the city has actively pursued housing improvements, the existing efforts appear to miss the 
mark on two critical aspects: dealing with small buildings and dealing with the issue of municipal 
liens. First, the strategic focus on large multifamily apartments has left two- to four-unit properties 
unaddressed. Even if the rationale that the larger buildings pose greater challenges to revitalizing 
neighborhoods is correct, because certain neighborhoods like Woodlawn have much fewer large 
multifamily buildings and many more two- to four-unit buildings, the strategy by design was likely to 
have less of an impact in Woodlawn than in other neighborhoods. It seems evident that the design 
of the NSP program, which seems heavily directed by logistical and administrative concerns over 
spending the money rather than the actual theory of catalytic change, was inflexible and did match 
the diversity of housing stock across the entire City of Chicago. Out of the entire NSP budget of 
$169 million, very little has benefited the two- to four-unit building market in Woodlawn.  
Important to point out here is that the NSP program pursued a more capital intensive approach of 
renovating buildings with public monies in order to sell them, as opposed to using fewer resources 
to induce private lender participation through subordinate lending, loan guarantees, and other items 
in the economic development toolbox. This decision, combined with a focus on larger projects, left 
little program funds for two- to four-unit properties that might have been better suited for less 
capital-intensive approaches.  
Taken as a whole, the concerns of certain stakeholders that more investment gets put in low-income 
rental housing is justified. Public investment has been both focused on providing affordable housing 
(multifamily housing often with CHA partnership such as redevelopment of Grove Parc) and largely 
restricted to the more disinvested portion of the neighborhood. The census tracts in the strongest 
portion of the neighborhood (East of Cottage Grove) did not qualify for any NSP funding. As a 
result, any NSP funds that Woodlawn received had to be directed to the area west of Cottage Grove.  
There is a subtle point to be made about how past redevelopment efforts of the neighborhood have 
been based on demolition and new construction. Using the frame of the Art of Revitalization, the 
embrace of “gentrification” were redevelopment efforts designed to attract higher-income residents, 
and not an “incumbent upgrading” that prioritizes existing residents and owners. Moreover, the only 
prior strategy for smaller buildings were those that would get constructed on cleared land, with no 
efforts for more modest renovations. 
One of the more significant findings is the under-utilization of existing financing mechanisms for 
the stock of two- to four-unit buildings. Most evident is the HUD 203(k) program whose focus on 
home ownership, combination of acquisition and renovating financing, structures a process for 
assisting a homebuyer in managing a construction process for a two- to four-unit property. Beyond 
homeownership, this program could serve as a vehicle for non-profits to create rental housing in 
two- to four-unit buildings that are currently vacant on a block-by-block basis. The under-utilization, 
however, may reflect inconsistency in the lending community’s willingness or lack of familiarity with 
the program. Because of its omission and overall significance in the production of affordable rental 
housing, another under-utilized financing mechanism are Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, which 
would provide a more shallow subsidy, often considered more politically and financially viable for 
funding renovation of scattered site buildings in weaker demand areas. 
The extent to which the City of Chicago Buildings Department has relied on demolition of troubled 
buildings without clear plans for use is in direct conflict with the neighborhood’s desire to stabilize. 
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The Micro-Markets Recovery Program is a significant step in tasking a local entity with managing 
troubled buildings. However, local implementation entities like CIC in Woodlawn don’t have the 
ability to remove all of the municipal liens on a property, one of the primary challenges to getting 
buildings renovated. There is not a robust vacant land management strategy. The choice between the 
lower cost approach of demolition and making a property developable doesn’t appear to factor in 
their decision on demolition. As discussed, offering more vacant lots for sale and presenting more 
opportunities for new construction will continue to make it harder for the renovation market to 
succeed in its infancy. An important silver lining is the Cook County Land Bank that will present the 
opportunity to “land bank” and perform municipal action that will clear properties of liens and title 
issues. 
Stakeholder Interests 
Ever-present and sometimes partially-conflicting sets of stakeholder and policy goals for housing 
planning and development exist: producing affordable housing units sufficient to meet the 
enormous aggregate demand while making the most efficient use of various forms of below-market 
housing subsidies, avoiding the concentration of poverty and providing residential mobility through 
residential choice. One group of stakeholders interviewed, many of whom were tenant advocates, 
tended to prioritize the aggregate production and residential choice through non-displacement. They 
were concerned about macro-level declines in affordable housing, the relative desirability of 
Woodlawn, and were in opposition to those that believe the way to neighborhood improvement is 
through displacement of low-income residents. Another group, dominated by homeowners, is 
concerned with both concentrations of poor residents in the neighborhood as a contributor to the 
neighborhood’s continued decline—implicitly unconcerned about the nature of their residential 
decisions—and the practices of landlords that destabilize their community. Different stakeholders 
have different perspectives on concentration, some believing that better social services is the 
solution with doubts about mixed-income communities, others believing the more moderate income 
residents are the solution. The most likely point of consensus is promoting true residential mobility 
across neighborhoods in a manner less subject to the whims of private landlords is the commitment 
to developing affordable rental housing that is managed well and provides effective services to 
residents. Responsibly providing paths to homeownership for current residents—merging the 
homeowners and tenants—would also be a point of consensus. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the implications of the social ecosystem and development process that 
supports two- to four-unit properties. One of the important takeaways is that the challenges facing 
the two- to four-unit buildings market in Woodlawn are not too different from the challenges facing 
the entire neighborhood in many respects. Woodlawn has significant work to do before becoming a 
“neighborhood of choice” as the aptly titled Choice Neighborhoods initiative seeks to do. 
Market challenges are evident among the key findings identified. Homes values are artificially low, 
which prevents renovation. Tax delinquency and title issues add significant indirect costs given the 
legal and bureaucratic hassles and direct costs they may add to development costs. Addressing these 
market concerns is a big key to improving the market. The discussion about voucher-holders and 
two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn should not be interpreted as support for the notion that a 
moratorium on voucher holders in the neighborhood would be a positive development.  It would 
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further restrict housing choices for voucher holders and likely increase the impunity with which 
landlords target them. When one looks at the organizational infrastructure surrounding two- to four-
unit properties, it isn’t surprising that home-ownership isn’t particularly strong. In addition, too 
much hope has been placed on University-induced gentrification to lead to a full-scale change of the 
neighborhood. Also evident is that a better balance should be met between investing in the more 
challenged western part of the neighborhood, investing in the actual residents and supporting the 
stronger eastern part of the neighborhood in a more inclusive manner than has currently exists. The 
concentration of public resources in West Woodlawn does address a great need but it also, through 
omission, allows inequitable development in East Woodlawn.  
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Chapter 6: Strategy and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Having presented the social ecosystem and discussed key findings, I now propose a series of 
recommendations linked to a set of strategic outcomes and objectives. These recommendations 
address the social ecosystem of two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn, barriers to their acquisition 
and renovation, and the need to improve property management and expand access to capital. The 
strategy also builds upon the strengths and opportunities that I have identified and speaks to the 
interests of local stakeholders. 
Acquisition 
Despite the substantial number of vacant two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn, many languish 
and continue to physically deteriorate because of direct barriers to acquisition and indirect factors 
that discourage investment. Currently, properties whose owners have fallen behind on property 
taxes, municipal services and building code violations cannot be purchased and renovated without 
paying these debts.  As a result, additional strategies for easier acquisition are needed. 
Renovation 
Renovation strategies must be flexible in order to accommodate the unknown and varied building 
conditions. Controlling labor costs and providing reliable technical assistance are necessary to enable 
middle-income homeowners and smaller, entrepreneurial developers to take an active role in 
renovating two- to four-unit buildings. To ensure that properties are renovated sufficiently, a holistic 
approach must be taken to prevent landlords from milking properties and weakening the strength of 
the housing stock. Lastly, the economic activity generated by this labor-intensive process is a 
potential source of wealth for neighborhood residents. 
Leasing, Sale and Property Management 
Many of the “soft” issues in real estate development remain important to consider in the 
development of the strategy. Homeownership is down nationally, and increased rental demand 
presents an opportunity that should only be ignored at the peril of housing planners. Property 
management, a task that concerns homeowners and investors alike with two- to four-unit properties, 
has specific challenges given the nature of smaller buildings in weak market neighborhoods with a 
concentration of voucher recipients. Care must be taken to avoid blaming the most vulnerable 
participants in the real estate process, i.e. low-income tenants, for environmental conditions over 
which they have no control. More support for the landlords pursuing “high-road” property 
management would upgrade the residential options for all residents and reduce the viability of short-
term cash flow driven investors. Attracting homeowners as well as tenants requires being more 
resolute and strategic about improving quality of life and public safety challenges in the 
neighborhood. A second approach for increasing homeownership is to rely more on tenants with an 
existing connection to the neighborhood. 
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Capital Availability 
Several general and more specific challenges in capital availability have significant ramifications for 
two- to four-unit properties in Woodlawn. Beyond the macroeconomic challenges that have reduced 
many families’ earning capacity to purchase a home, homeownership is difficult because households 
cannot obtain financing in the same way they did prior to the recession.  Because of the obstacles 
that would discourage many investors from renovating these properties, an important step is 
bolstering the ability of homeowners to obtain acquisition and rehabilitation financing. Much of the 
shortage in financing can be attributed to low property appraisals in the neighborhood, appraisals 
that are artificially low as a result of continued foreclosure, short sales and cash purchases. The 
community development institution in Woodlawn that historically filled this niche (ShoreBank) 
doesn’t exist anymore, while the institutions that do target Woodlawn fill a different niche in their 
lending. Developers can follow a series of best practices for obtaining financing: they need track 
records and carefully cultivated relationships with lenders, they need scale in putting together 
portfolios, and they need either personal funds for down payment or investment capital. Ideally, this 
last condition would ensure that asset appreciation takes precedence over cash flow. As a 
consequence of the difficulty of obtaining traditional sources of capital, other business strategies that 
are less community-minded become less viable. 
S.A.L.A.D. Strategy to Improving the Two- to Four-Unit Market in Woodlawn 
Theory of Change 
In order to address issues in both the homeownership and investor markets for two- to four-unit 
buildings, the Small Building Initiative should resist the urge to focus entirely on homeownership or 
rental housing. In fact, this is a false choice because a newly renovated two- to four-unit building 
adds rental housing even when bought by homeowners. By working to promote homeownership, 
namely addressing the market-oriented challenges that work against it, and supporting stronger and 
more neighborhood-minded developers and landlords through financial and non-financial means, 
Woodlawn can anticipate some material improvements in the housing values and vacancy associated 
with the market for two- to four-unit buildings. Pursuing changes to the non-vacant housing stock 
will also make important strides in improving the market for vacant properties. 
Planners in Woodlawn should seek to revitalize through market-means, making actions that are 
directly tied to a stronger market where purchases, investment and leasing are more prevalent in the 
two- to four-unit building market. This is not to detract from the importance of demand-side (or 
supply-side) subsidies that facilitate income transfer and social welfare, but it stresses the importance 
of conditions that allow additional market transactions to take place.  The targeting of efforts on 
specific blocks and the anchoring of work on existing strong blocks can create stronger sub-markets 
in surrounding areas.  Successful development in tax increment districts will create future flows that 
can be leveraged for investment today. 
In addition, paying close attention to the relationship between general neighborhood health and the 
two- to four-unit building market is important.  Making Woodlawn an area where people desire to 
live for several reasons will improve the two- to four-unit building market. These are not entirely 
economic factors, but they are just as important to reducing vacancy in the building stock. Enhanced 
public safety, higher quality of life and retail amenities will highlight the neighborhood’s various 
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assets, overcome the challenges, and reverse the population loss that contributed to neighborhood’s 
decline. 
Building neighborhood consensus around better rental housing within two- to four-unit buildings 
and local economic development that builds wealth for existing residents will facilitate an equitable 
strand of revitalization. For example, rental housing with shallow subsidies and effective property 
management, and potentially housing that actively transforms tenants into homeowners, can tie the 
income diversification goals of homeowners with the goals of maintaining housing affordability. 
Expanding efforts to target construction work to local residents generates wealth and can lead to 
incumbent upgrading that will alleviate poverty and lead to other gains by existing residents rather 
than simply pushing poor people into other communities, a common consequence of unbalanced 
gentrification. 
Lastly, a multi-faceted approach is best for addressing the multitude of issues present in the two- to 
four-unit market, one that acknowledges the importance of synergy. Destabilizing factors in the 
market that artificially lower property values create gaps that must be filled by capital, gaps that are 
increased by the absence of homeownership education and counseling that enable households to 
adequately save and otherwise prepare for ownership. Incentives created by public policies may 
favor patterns of development that prompt community concern and opposition, and policies meant 
to improve urban markets may succeed in addressing one segment of challenges at the risk of 
neglecting others. This includes demolishing buildings to stem the drug trade, only to introduce 
more vacant land in the market that weakens the property values of nearby residents. 
Strategic Framework 
The thrust of the S.A.L.A.D. Approach to Two- to Four-unit Building Revitalization is combining 
disparate ingredients that come together in a healthy, mutually reinforcing and attractive 
neighborhood strategy. Those ingredients include the following: Stabilization, Advocacy, Loan Fund 
and Financial Assistance, Assistance and Counseling and Developing Responsibly. Removing the 
salad dressing makes the salad significantly less enjoyable, and less likely to be eaten. Similarly, there 
are five outcomes of the S.A.L.A.D. Approach, which, if met, can speak to the interests of a broad 
swath of stakeholders and accomplish revitalization through a mix of reinforcing objectives. 
Goal I—Stabilization: A stabilized, well-functioning property market for two- to four-unit properties. This goal 
reflects the destabilizing influence of rampant speculation that can take hold in a high-vacancy 
neighborhood with under-realized potential, causing more harm than good when unaccompanied by 
a plan for actual improvements in quality of life. The goal goes beyond identifying the symptoms by 
seeking to treat the root causes of the unhealthy market of two- to four-unit properties. 
Objectives: 
A. More stable property taxes 
B. Fewer short-sales 
C. Fewer lots and demolition for new construction 
D. Fewer multi-family housing units and new, spacious single family housing 
E. More ready-to-renovate two- to four-unit buildings 
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Goal II—Advocacy: Policies and organizational infrastructures in alignment with the unique challenges of two- to 
four-unit properties. This goal reflects the acknowledgement that changing policies and structures is 
important within and beyond the boundaries of Woodlawn. It envisions creative approaches to 
problems in the Housing Choice Voucher program, building organizational infrastructure, 
improving the factors that determine neighborhood appeal, and identifying supporting resources. 
Objectives: 
A. More active organizations in Woodlawn that specialize in two- to four-unit buildings 
B. Fewer non-professionally managed two- to four-unit buildings that are 100% occupied by 
housing choice voucher recipients and/or that exhibit weak property management 
C. Higher quality of life and stronger market demand for housing in Woodlawn 
D. More sources of funding for the Small Building Initiative 
Goal III—Loan Fund and Financial Assistance: Adequate financial resources for investing in two- to four-unit 
properties for interested and current homeowners in Woodlawn. This goal reflects the extent to which bank 
practices limit financing by homeowners and serve as a barrier to renovating two- to four-unit 
properties. It envisions the expanded use of acquisition and rehabilitation financing and more 
availability of down payment assistance and loans for exiting homeowners–not simply by providing 
additional money but by utilizing existing resources. 
Objectives: 
A. More interest in and attainment of acquisition/rehab loans by for owner-occupant purchases 
B. More interest in, availability of, and attainment of down payment and subordinate loans for 
owner-occupant purchases of two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn 
C. Greater access to renovation loans for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn 
Goal IV—Assistance and Counseling: Adequate technical assistance and counseling for investing in two- to four-unit 
properties for interested and current homeowners in Woodlawn This goal reflects that prospective homeowners 
have personal, financial and technical barriers to homeownership. It envisions the expansion of this 
infrastructure within the boundaries of Woodlawn for the benefit of new and future owners of two- 
to four-unit properties. 
Objectives: 
A. Greater access to pre-purchase and consumer credit counseling in Woodlawn 
B. Greater access to technical assistance in the design-and-build process for two- to four-unit 
buildings 
C. More participation of both owner-occupant and investor owners of two- to four-unit 
buildings in landlord management training and certification 
Goal V—Responsible Development: Current residents have pathways to build wealth through local economic 
development and pathways to homeownership, while diverse rental products and necessary amenities attract newer 
(moderate income) residents. This goal reflects, most directly, the importance of considering equity in 
planning for the neighborhood. Balance must be sought in attempting to compete for external 
residents as well as cultivating homeownership within the neighborhood. 
109 | The Social Ecosystem for Revitalizing Two- to Four-Unit Buildings in Woodlawn 
 
Objectives: 
A. More steering of development jobs to residents and tenants 
B. More rental housing for low-income households (60-80% AMI) that incorporate pathways 
to homeownership 
C. More financial capital for strong developers of rental two- to four-unit buildings 
D. More retail amenities 
The Small Building Initiative 
Potentially the most important topic that has been largely unaddressed is who will be responsible for 
managing the temporary initiative that has been described, in this publication as well in official 
Choice Neighborhoods grant applications, as the Small Building Initiative. While the proposed 
strategic plan will rely on several partners to pursue initiatives that will positively impact the 2 to 4-
unit market in Woodlawn, several initiatives must and will be undertaken by dedicated staff with 
programmatic resources. While the question of who should compose this entity is no less important, 
this thesis has instead focused on creating the road map that the organization, when chosen, may 
adopt. Taken as a whole, the recommendations illustrate what may be asked of potential partners 
and the content of a request for proposals to competitively select the Small Building Initiative 
administrator that is most capable and willing 
of fulfilling the role. In the typical framework 
of planning, this thesis could address the initial 
existing conditions and strategic planning in 
order to provide the foundation for actual 
implementation. 
Implementation Considerations 
The first implementation consideration is the 
basis for which political capital can be 
expected to enable the strategy’s breadth and 
ambition. Among other recommendations, the strategic plan calls for changes to the Chicago 
Housing Authority’s implementation of the Housing Choice Voucher program. This may, in turn, 
require changes to HUD rules governing the program, placing pressure on departments that provide 
core city services. It seeks the attention of the Land Bank Authority that has just created its 
governing board in January 2013. However, there is at least one reason why I believe that Woodlawn, 
one of 77 Community Areas in Chicago, should be able to attract a high level of political support: 
the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative. The City has committed to making a not insignificant financial 
investment and to transforming the neighborhood. Indeed the DHED is a co-implementation 
partner in the endeavor and reportedly the entity that pushed for the Small Building Initiative in the 
Choice Neighborhood’s application. Moreover, given the City’s well-documented reliance on HOPE 
VI funds, they are invested in ensuring success for the program’s replacement and should support its 
component strategies that include a focus on two- to four-unit buildings. For these reasons, there is 
ample political support available for the various recommendations in the strategy. 
Secondly, while this chapter serves to illustrate both existing ideas and new proposals to address the 
problems identified, Appendix I organizes the recommendations into primary and secondary sets of 
priorities. The primary category consists of recommendations from stakeholders and newly 
generated recommendations anticipated to have a high impact using relatively few resources. 
Surveying 
Existing 
Conditions 
Strategic 
Planning Implementation 
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Secondary priority recommendations may be more creative approaches, particularly difficult to 
implement or simply less promising for the respective objective. Next, the first priority 
recommendations are organized into low and high-effort, identifying those that are low-effort as 
“easy wins” which should precede tackling those deemed high-effort. 
Strategic Plan 
This section lays out a detailed set of actionable recommendations that advance the objectives that 
will bring about the five outcomes of the S.A.L.A.D. Approach and revitalize Woodlawn’s two- to 
four-unit building market. 
Goal I: Stabilization 
This component of the strategy involves taking directed action through new neighborhood 
programs and Land Banking to neutralize existing problems in the two- to four-unit building market 
and to prevent the negative side effects of speculation from misleading the market in Woodlawn. 
Objective A. More Stable Property Taxes 
Because of past speculative increases in property values that led to additional vacancies and tax 
delinquencies, anticipating the effects of a stronger market and create mechanisms that will work 
against its harmful consequences is a priority. This translates to creative approaches that allow fixed-
income households (for example seniors) to cope with increasing property values, recognizing they 
may not simply be able to sell their home and move when property values increase. 
One approach would build on existing Homeowner Association efforts to inform seniors of their 
ability to request both an exemption from increased valuation and a freeze on previous assessed 
values (Cook County Assessor, 2013). This effort requires more expansive community outreach, and 
because the two exemptions require re-applying each year, it should start immediately to build habits 
before property values increase. As an existing program of Metropolitan Family Services, the 
resident services provider under the Woodlawn Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, senior home 
counseling could be a collaborative effort of MFS in Woodlawn, the Cook County Tax Assessor and 
the local Alderman. 
A second more creative approach would convert the incremental property taxes into a lien on the 
property that would be deferred each year the homeowner continues to occupy the residence, but 
paid in full upon the sale of the home or discontinued use as a primary residence. The lien would be 
assessed by Cook County and found in a basic title search. This would enable occupancy of an 
owner-occupied two- to four-unit home by the same owner-occupants and tenants despite increases 
in neighborhood’s property values. The deferred lien, by design, also serves as a hedge against purely 
speculative rises in property values. If a household benefits from the inflated prices in selling their 
home, they pay the associated property taxes. If the values are not sustainable, as they were prior to 
the housing bubble, a household that does not move will face a predictable amount of property 
taxes that will prevent speculation from fueling vacancy. 
A final approach follows the approach associated with many land trusts. Homeowners could 
permanently sell the land associated with their property to a county-controlled land trust (perhaps 
the County Land Bank) in exchange for a long-term land lease and deed restrictions on the sale of 
their house. No longer owners of the land, they could continue to pay their property tax with a 
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nominal annual increase. Their house would be subjected to permanent affordability even under 
resale. 
Objective B. Fewer Short-Sales 
Stabilization efforts in the neighborhood, including NSP but also other DHED programs, lack the 
necessary tools to deal with the market disruptors that depress local property values. The newly 
established Cook County Land Bank is a promising opportunity to obtain properties through 
donations, tax delinquency, intergovernmental transfer and purchase. One important step is to 
actively seek the elimination of short sales that push down appraised values and make renovation 
harder. The Land Bank can accept these properties through donations or alternative arrangements to 
the short sale process. 
Objective C. Fewer Vacant Lots and Demolition for New Construction 
Because the presence of vacant land has harmful effects, the Land Bank should develop a next-door 
lot program that builds on the existing efforts of Block Clubs and the Homeowner Association. 
Building owners would be given long-term leases for property if they maintain them as yards or 
develop them into parking lots. This might even include an option to buy the lot at an agreed upon 
price after market conditions have improved significantly. 
Another step, which is an explicit goal of the Land Bank, is to procure and hold land in Woodlawn 
and set clear signals to the market that the land will not be developed anytime soon. This prevents 
the threat of new construction from intimidating housing renovators. The Land Bank would serve as 
a much better manager of the land and buildings for the Building Department than when it 
undergoes demolition and city ownership, given that the Land Bank actively plans for how each 
vacant building or newly leveled lot will be used. 
Objective D. Fewer housing units and new, spacious single family housing 
By encouraging the conversion of two- to four-unit buildings back into fewer units, the 
neighborhood’s housing stock would be “right-sized” (without demolition) to reflect the significant 
reduction in density that has resulted from population loss. This action reduces the total stock of 
housing units, reduces vacancy, all the while providing more spacious homes that are rare 
commodities in a dense city. As a result, this stabilizes the market through reduction of housing unit 
supply, but also creates a market-oriented commodity along with the potential of obtaining a next-
door lot for long-term management. This action helps restore a sense of flexibility in the housing 
stock. If the neighborhood experiences significant growth in the future, not unlike it did post-WWII, 
and vacant land proves insufficient to meet the demand for housing, these homes may be converted 
back to two- to four-unit buildings. 
Goal II: Advocacy 
This component of the strategy involves pushing for policies that reform external policies that that 
allow sub-market conditions to exist in Woodlawn and also to improve the neighborhood’s 
organizational infrastructure. 
Objective A. More active organizations in Woodlawn that specialize in two- to four-unit 
buildings 
This recommendation involves the positioning of the Network of Woodlawn and its affiliates as the 
neighborhood’s leading community organizations, making sure they are seen as representative of all 
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residents. This would require seeking stakeholders who may be less enthusiastic in their support for 
the organization and its base of support and directly speaking to their concerns. The most pressing 
complaint is the level of independence from Dr. Byron Brazier’s leadership. A board that was 
sufficiently representative of the entire neighborhood and an organization that was guided by true 
consensus should provide an enhanced sense of legitimacy. In addition, the organization needs to be 
sufficiently staffed and resourced, including the hiring of a coordinator of Economic Development 
whose portfolio will include housing revitalization. 
This recommendation also calls for the invitation and support of Neighborhood Housing Services 
of Chicago to develop a field presence in Woodlawn. As was discussed in Chapter 5, much of the 
missing home-ownership infrastructure stems from the fact that (in the void created by Shore 
Bank’s demise) NHS only has a field presence in a subset of Chicago neighborhoods that does not 
include Woodlawn. Whether it is home-ownership counseling, marketing of home purchase and 
acquisition & rehabilitation loans, technical assistance for home renovation or housing preservation, 
NHS has a successful track record of providing these services for two- to four-unit buildings in 
other neighborhoods. The Small Building Initiative could enter a partnership with NHS whereby a 
NHS employee is subsidized by the Small Building Fund and spends 50% of their time working out 
of Woodlawn in space provided by POAH and eventually the Woodlawn Resource Center. 
The last recommendation calls for a clear shift in the redevelopment strategy of demolition and new 
construction (embodied by the both of the Columbia Point phases) to renovating vacant buildings. 
With the removal of tax delinquencies and municipal liens, not only would it be environmentally 
more sustainable to renovate, but it would also be less expensive and keep housing costs lower and 
minimize displacement through the continued provision of modest housing. 
Objective B. Fewer non-professionally managed two- to four-unit buildings that are 100% 
occupied by housing choice voucher recipients and/or exhibit weak property management 
Advocacy around the apparent sub-market of landlords targeting Housing Choice Voucher 
recipients should affect the behavior of these landlords without restricting the residential mobility of 
households. There are three approaches to this that can be used in tandem or pursued separately. 
Approach Summary Feasibility 
#1: Argue for a 
lower 
“Reasonable 
Rent” 
Argue that landlords must charge less 
rent to voucher-holders in order to 
abide by “Rent Reasonableness” 
requirements. 
It is fully within the existing legal 
framework of HUD’s Rules & 
Regulations, but relies on documenting 
that rents are charged are higher than 
market rents and protesting rents on a 
case-by-case basis. 
#2: Small Area 
Demonstration 
Project  
Systematically reform all HUD 
programs such that Fair Market Values 
vary by smaller areas. 
Currently a promising demonstration 
project would need to be demonstrated 
as successful and implemented into 
HUD rules & regulations. 
#3: One 
Market-Rent 
Unit 
Minimum 
Add to the Housing Quality Standards 
that one unit of a two- to four-unit 
building must be maintained for 
owner-occupancy or market-rate 
Requires change in CHA Rules & 
Regulations and likely enabling 
regulatory changes by HUD.  
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tenancy. Could include a waiver when 
a supportive services plan is filed with 
the CHA. 
The first approach to reform responds to the documented observation that market rents in 
Woodlawn are, on average, lower than the rent received by Housing Choice Voucher landlords.   
The over-payment of subsidy creates an advantage for accepting vouchers in low-rent 
neighborhoods like Woodlawn over other neighborhoods. By reducing the rent that a landlord 
would receive, it would also reduce the profits of landlords providing lower-quality management in 
Woodlawn and assist more households. As discussed in Chapter 5, HUD has a requirement of “rent 
reasonableness” that is intended to prevent a landlord from charging a Housing Choice Voucher 
recipient more than they charge for un-assisted units in the same building (assuming they have 
unassisted units) and what identical unassisted units would receive on average in the market place. 
Because of anecdotal evidence that tenant and CHA payments are more for units located in the 
same building, statistical evidence that assistance payments are higher than the market rate and the 
presence of clear regulations that forbid this, the natural solution would be better enforcement. This 
could include conducting a detailed study/inventory of current apartments rented by HCV residents 
along with non-assisted apartments that would provide clear evidence of unreasonable rents. It 
could be argued that this approach reduces the rent that “good” landlords receive in Woodlawn, 
which would have a depressing effect on housing options. However, these landlords provide a better 
service and have a credible case for charging more to Housing Choice Voucher recipients. Indeed, 
helping the market to better distinguish landlords on the basis of management quality would 
certainly be a positive side effect. 
The second approach revolves around the Small Area Fair Market Rent demonstration discussed in 
Chapter 4. If adopted, this program would reduce the maximum rent any landlord could charge a 
Housing Choice Voucher recipient in Woodlawn. It would also increase the rent a landlord could 
charge in a higher-rent area within the region, creating more rental opportunities for assisted 
households. If successful, this program would work towards the same objective as the first approach, 
Unlike the first approach, however, it would not as effectively allow apartment and management 
quality to be a source of differences in rent, since the maximum rent will be reduced for all landlords 
regardless of quality. Less discretion would give way to a more uniform approach to reducing the 
incentives for targeting voucher holders. 
The third approach to effecting change in the Housing Choice Voucher program disallows the 
business strategy of targeting voucher holders through administrative rules. It targets only the 
landlord that exclusively leases to voucher holder and by forcing the landlord to market at least one 
unit in a building to a non-subsidized tenant (or sustain the vacancy), it would reduce the profits 
associated with the business strategy.  The rule could be added to the Housing Quality Standards 
enforced at the time of application through inclusion in the Request for Tenancy Approval form 
that each landlord must complete before a HCV contract is created (CHA, 2013d). The addition of a 
question about the number of units in a building would allow a queries of data to show the number 
of active housing assistance payment contracts at a particular address alongside the number of 
inhabitable units. Verifying the housing units in a two- to four-unit property could be an easily 
added inspection item.  
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The requirement could be narrowly tailored to address the particular problem-causing landlords. 
Landlords who develop and implement a supportive services plan could receive a waiver, releasing 
them from the marketing requirement since they should have already developed such a plan to 
qualify for CHA project-based housing vouchers. A unit that is owner-occupied would satisfy the 
one-unit minimum, further limiting the policy to investor-owned two- to four-unit buildings. Still, 
the policy would likely require changes in federal rules and regulations for the Housing Choice 
Voucher. 
Another means for improving the entire rental market, including two- to four-unit buildings, is the 
adoption of a rental-licensing program. The program would require annual inspection and payment 
of $40-$140 per rental unit per year. It would convert the complaint-driven process typical of code 
enforcement to a compliance-driven process that has wider coverage. 
Objective C. Higher quality of life and stronger market demand for housing in Woodlawn  
One recommendation, not specific to two- to four-unit buildings, involves continuing broad-based 
neighborhood efforts around improving public safety. These include the use of Interrupters to 
prevent escalation of interpersonal conflict into violence, prayer vigils to encourage neighborhood 
healing and discourage retaliatory violence, and training landlords about their role in preventing 
crime with the support of law enforcement. Improvements in public safety are critically important 
for improving the neighborhood’s perception issues. 
A second series of recommendations improves the quality of life by putting pressure on public 
agencies for better service, notably the Police Department, the Department of Streets and Sanitation, 
and the Department of Buildings. 
The first recommendation involves continuing education for residents on Chicago’s existing 3-1-1 
infrastructures teaching how to make a host of non-emergency requests, namely filing a police report 
after a crime has occurred and the offender has gone, i.e. property theft, noise disturbances, and 
property/automobile damage (Chicago CAPS, 2013). 
The second recommendation for improving public services involves tracking the requests and the 
performance metrics, which are open to the public on Chicago’s Data Portal and likely available to 
the Alderman’s office in more detail. The type and total number of requests to different departments 
can be analyzed across community areas, as well the percentage of service requests that have been 
completed, average number of days to complete and spatial clustering. This analysis can serve as 
important evidence for disparities that surface across neighborhoods, inspiring practices for creative 
improvement by agencies using a clear set of performance indicators (Behn, 2006). As an example, 
the Data Portal provides daily requests to the Sanitation department, included in the screen shot 
below, listing opening date of the request and the completion date (if applicable), which can be 
transformed into a new variable: “Days to Complete.” This new variable can be analyzed across the 
community area with standard spreadsheet software. 
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Chicago Service Requests for Sanitation Complaints 
 
Source: City of Chicago, 2013 
Comparing average days to complete a request and the level of poverty across community areas 
reveals there is no a clear relationship between the two factors.  Woodlawn’s average length of 
completed requests is longer than many other communities, but not much longer than communities 
with a comparable socioeconomic condition. This sample analysis could, for other factors, 
substantiate the anecdotal evidence of quality of municipal services. It may also support other 
explanations for the lack of satisfaction, such as the amount of service requests made per capita. 
Average Days to Close 3-1-1 Sanitation Complaints (by Community Area and Poverty Rate)  
 
Source: City of Chicago, 2013 
The final part of improving public services concerns itself with cultural and behavioral concerns, 
which are generally beyond the scope of service requests and analyzing standard performance 
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metrics. These concerns are often best highlighted by anecdotes that highlight cultural practices that 
need to be changed and other examples of the ideal behavior (Behn, 2006). As such, identifying 
formal and informal channels for documenting “customer service”-oriented complaints and bringing 
them to the attention of decision makers capable of taking action (either disciplining employees or 
pursuing other efforts of redress) are extremely important. Each documented issue creates more 
momentum for change. Neighborhood actors who were more willing to pursue these alternative 
avenues were more successful in making their concerns held. 
Informal and Formal Channels for “Customer Service” Complaints 
Channel Contact Information 
Chicago 
Elected 
Officials 
Alderman Willie Cochran 
Office: 6357 S. Cottage Grove, Chicago, IL 60637  
P: 773-955-5610; F: 773-955-5612 
Email: ward20@cityofchicago.org 
 
Office of the Mayor 
121 N LaSalle Street 
Chicago City Hall 4th Floor 
Chicago, IL 60602 
State 
Elected 
Officials 
State Senator Kwame Raoul 
1509 East 53rd Street, 2nd Floor 
Chicago, IL 60615 
P: 773-363-1996; F: 773-681-7166 
 
State Representative Barbara Flynn Currie 
1303 E. 53rd Street 
Chicago, IL 60615 
P: 773-667-0550; F: 773-667-3010 
 
State Representative Christian L. Mitchell 
449 E. 35th Street 
Chicago, IL 60616 
P: 773-924-1755; Fax: 773-924-1775 
Email: MitchellDistrict26@att.net 
Police 
Department 
Independent Police Review Authority 
http://ipraportal.iprachicago.org/pls/htmldb/f?p=1503:12:2759055067321044 
Department 
of Streets & 
Sanitation, 
Bureau of 
Sanitation 
Bureau of Sanitation Ward 20 Office 
6401 S. Evans, Chicago, IL 60637 
Phone: 312-747-6017 
Fax: 312-742-1318 
Department 
of 
Buildings 
General Email: buildings@cityofchicago.org 
Commissioner Phone: 312-743-9021 
Chicago 
Housing 
Problem Property Report Form 
http://www.thecha.org/filebin/hcv/Problem_Property_Report_Form.pdf 
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Authority Email: HCVIPI@thecha.org 
Objective D. More sources of funding for the Small Building Initiative 
In order to align the financing mechanisms with community interests in connecting the areas west 
and east of Cottage Grove, the two Tax Increment Districts should be merged into one. Continued 
(or past) gentrification of East Woodlawn would generate a source of funds for both financing 
affordable housing in the stronger eastern part and also for stabilizing investments West of Cottage 
Grove. 
Goal III: Loan Fund and Financial Assistance for Homeowners 
Since the inclusion of the Small Building Initiative in the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, various 
types of financial assistance for homeowners have been considered. This part of the strategy seeks to 
provide financing and grants to support owners looking to renovate or otherwise improve two- to 
four-unit buildings. 
Objective A. More interest in and attainment of acquisition/rehabilitation loans for two- to 
four-unit buildings by owner-occupants 
The Small Building Initiative should build on the stabilization efforts and perform preliminary 
building inspections on vacant two- to four-unit buildings held by the Cook County Land Bank or 
buildings held by the City of Chicago that have already had their title and municipal liens cleared. In 
the interest of reducing further information costs for homeowners, a preliminary home inspection 
would identify the required renovations and any other major capital improvements in order to 
approximate the total renovation cost. This is consistent with the service that 203(k) consultants and 
MMRP coordinators provide for properties, and when done en masse it would reduce a key 
uncertainty in marketing properties. The cost of inspection (roughly $5,000 for an individual 
property) would ideally be lower for an entire portfolio. 
In addition, as part of the marketing of the Small Building Initiative, the marketing agent should 
establish relationships with Chicago lenders that provide acquisition and rehabilitation loans, as well 
as 203(k) lenders, to understand how to appropriately broker or otherwise prepare prospective 
buyers to successfully qualify for loans. Understanding and researching each individual lender 
requires consideration of the following elements: 
• Is the lender a reliable entity and are their rates reasonable? 
• How do they use the 203(k) program and other loans for two- to four-unit buildings? 
• Do they exercise the 10% bonus on appraised property values? 
• What protocols exist for how they count rental income in approving mortgages? 
• Are there different reserve or down payment requirements specific to two- to four-unit 
buildings? 
• How best can an intermediary support the rehabilitation/acquisition process? 
• Do they loan to non-profits using the 203(k) program to create affordable rental housing? 
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Active 203(k) Lenders in Chicago 
 
Source: HUD, 2013 
There are several subordinate acquisition and rehab loans that are also available for consideration. 
These could be used in conjunction with a traditional mortgage, funding the renovation work that 
will be completed and some portion of the original acquisition.  
Loan Restrictions Loan Amount 
IHDA HOME 
Acquisition/Rehab 
Subordinate Loan 
80% AMI. Must contribute $1,000 to 
purchase. Forgivable over 5-10 years. 
Up to $40,000 (up to $2,000 for 
closing costs) 
NSP 
Acquisition/Rehab 
Subordinate Loan 
Only west of Cottage Grove. 120% 
AMI. Not for closing costs. Must 
contribute 1% to purchase. 
Forgivable over 5-15 years. 
Up to $70,000 
Objective B. More interest in, availability of and attainment of down payment and 
subordinate loans for owner-occupant purchases  
The Small Building Initiative should leverage existing down payment assistance programs. A 
complex web of existing, temporary and restricted programs exist that would assist the purchase of 
two- to four-unit buildings.  These represent strategic financial sources to be accessed by the efforts 
in Woodlawn. I propose that the Small Building Initiative provide down-payment assistance to two- 
to four-unit buildings that are moderately renovated and that are formerly vacant, in the form a 5 
year forgivable loan for which households up to 120% AMI are eligible. This particular down-
payment assistance is intended to fill the gap for households at 80-120% AMI, prioritize projects 
that renovate properties, and require continued residence consistent with existing programs. The 
focus of lending to two- to four-unit buildings (and not homes converted to single family homes) 
means that this effort will create additional rental housing as well. 
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Eligibility of Assistance by % of Area Median Income1 
Area Median 
Income 
0-30% 31-50% 51-80% 80-120% 120%+ 
Permanent AHTF Grant n/a n/a n/a n/a 
AHTF 
Subordinate 
AHTF 
Subordinate 
AHTF 
Subordinate 
AHTF 
Subordinate 
n/a 
FHLB DPP FHLB DPP FHLB DPP n/a n/a 
Temporary or 
Significantly 
Limited 
City Lift City Lift City Lift City Lift n/a 
Univ. of 
Chicago 
Univ. of 
Chicago 
Univ. of 
Chicago 
Univ. of 
Chicago 
n/a 
NSP NSP NSP NSP n/a 
List of Down-Payment Assistance Programs 
Loans Restrictions Amount 
FHLB Down 
Payment Plus 
First-Time Home Buyers. Issued by 
FLHB Member Banks. 80% AMI. 
Up to $6,000 
CityLift Based on availability of funds from 
foreclosure settlement. 120% Area 
Median Income. Homeowner must 
stay in home for 5 years. 
$15,000 
University of 
Chicago Down 
payment 
Assistance 
Only for U of Chicago Employees. 
120% AMI. 
Up to $8,000 
NSP Purchase 
Assistance 
Subordinate Loan 
Only west of Cottage Grove. 120% 
AMI. Not for closing costs. Must 
contribute 1% to purchase. Forgiven 
over 5-15 years. 
Up to $70,000 
IHDA/Affordable 
Housing Trust 
Fund Down 
payment Grant 
Forgiven over 5 years. 0-30% AMI. 
Must contribute $1,000 to purchase. 
Up to $3,000 
IHDA/Affordable 
housing Trust 
Fund Subordinate 
Loan 
Below 80% AMI. Must contribute 
$1000 to the purchase. Must 
contribute $1,000 to purchase. 
Up to $30,000 for 50% AMI; Up to  
$20,000 for 51-80% AMI 
Proposed Small 
Building Initiative 
Assistance 
120% AMI. Only for two- to four-
unit homes that were formerly 
vacant. Must contribute 2% to 
purchase. Forgiven over 5 years. 
Minimum of $10,000 in construction 
Up to $8,000 
                                                 
1 Programs represented: Affordable Housing Trust Fund Grant and Subordinate Loans (AHTF); 
NHS-administered City Lift program, University of Chicago down payment assistance; and 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP). 
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must be performed. 
Objective C. Greater access to renovation loans for two- to four-unit buildings in Woodlawn 
While supporting new homeowners is one focus, another focus must be allowing current owners to 
upgrade their homes. Supporting their ability to refinance allows them to invest in their buildings as 
well, further upgrading the neighborhood. Several options exist. First, homes can be refinanced 
through the 203(k) loan program. Second, the TIF-Neighborhood Improvement Program has begun 
or will soon begin to provide renovations for existing homeowners covered by the West Woodlawn 
TIF, up to $22,500 for a 4-unit building, with up to 30% available for interior repairs that are health 
and safety related. Finally, NHS of Chicago also provides renovation loans. Facilitating greater 
access requires publicizing these existing opportunities, and possibly leveraging the TIF-NIP 
program with additional funds. 
Goal IV: Assistance and Counseling 
The Small Building Initiative should provide both homebuyer counseling, general credit counseling 
as well as design and build assistance for renovation work. These forms of technical assistance will 
enable households to repair their credit and qualify for loans for two- to four-unit buildings, as well 
as prepare them to partner in the renovation of two- to four-unit buildings and overall improvement 
of the community. 
Objective A. Greater access to pre-purchase and consumer credit counseling in Woodlawn 
The most basic assistance that prospective homeowners need is pre-purchase counseling, a 
requirement of the more effective first-time homeownership programs and an important method of 
reducing the incidence of foreclosure. A network of providers associated with NSP serves as a 
resource for this work, including Agora Community Services, Genesis Housing Development, 
Greater Southwest Development Corporation, and the downtown-based Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Chicago. 
Because foreclosure and other financial obstacles have damaged consumer credit, pre-purchase 
counseling may not be sufficient. Many post-foreclosure households are renting in Woodlawn with 
the intention of purchasing in the future. Others have been unable to purchase homes in Woodlawn, 
similarly because of impairments to their credit. Both groups require long-term credit repair in order 
to (re)join the ranks of homeownership. The people-based approach of credit repair, combined with 
place-based efforts such as rent-to-own strategies discussed later in this chapter, will also be valuable 
local wealth-building efforts.  
Consumer Credit Counseling 
Source Resource 
US Department 
of Justice 
Approved Credit Counseling Agencies for Northern District of Illinois 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/CC_Files/CC_Approved_Agenc
ies_HTML/cc_illinois/cc_illinois.htm 
City of Chicago 10 Things Every Consumer Should Know About Credit 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/bacp/Consumer%20I
nformation/10thingstoknowaboutcredit12611.pdf 
Money 
Management 
City of Chicago-Recommended Resource 
http://www.moneymanagement.org/ 
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International 
US Federal 
Trade 
Commission 
Consumer Information – Credits and Loans 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/topics/credit-and-loans 
Objective B. Greater access to technical assistance in the design-an- build process for two- 
to four-unit buildings  
Another critical form of technical assistance would help prospective homebuyers, who are not 
construction experts, but who are open to acquisition and renovation of two- to four-unit buildings. 
Low-cost finished homes in the market are in large supply, so acquisition and rehabilitation must 
provide value that cannot be found elsewhere with as little burden as possible. Hopefully, these 
homes are less costly than finished homes and provide a homebuyer the added value of being able to 
design a home to suit one’s particular needs.  This process, however, hinges on competent and 
trustworthy general contracting. There are three approaches considered that could provide this form 
of technical assistance to potential homeowners in Woodlawn. 
• Make. The Small Building Initiative could hire a part- or full-time construction manager to 
provide in-housing consulting services to homeowners. This staff member should either 
already be a certified 203(k) consultant, or would do so upon hiring, which would allow him 
earn compensation for the Small Building Initiative in the form of the 203(k) consulting fee.  
• Buy. As an alternative, The Small Building Initiative could retain a series of existing 203(k) 
consultants to perform services for homeowners under the program on behalf of the 
Initiative, with payments passing through to the Initiative. This could introduce more 
competition for the work, reduce the overhead of the Initiative and also spread the work 
among a series of consultants (not one salaried employee) in a manner that is more 
conducive to how they already operate, taking the amount of business they can handle at any 
time. This may also take the form of a revenue-sharing agreement whereby 203(k) 
consultants provide a portion of their fee to the Small Building Initiative for brokering the 
relationship. 
• Sponsor. Finally, the Small Building Initiative could take on the role of passive intermediary 
(and perhaps incubator), taking no direct business interest in the 203(k) consulting process. 
The Initiative could host workshops for successful contractors to become 203(k) consultants 
and establish a list of “preferred consultants” based on quality control that it would use for 
directing homebuyers.  This strategy does not involve a source of revenues for the Initiative, 
but it also involves very little financial expense and risk beyond administrative overhead.  
Based on the expressed preferences for supporting local developers and the need for flexibility, it is 
advised that a construction manager be hired than can serve as a 203(k) consultant to assist several 
homes through the construction process during start-up phase. This manager will also perform 
general administrative functions and transition the Initiative to serving as a more indirect 
intermediary “sponsor” of local 203(k) consultants. 
Objective C. More participation of both owner-occupant and investor owners of two- to 
four-unit buildings in landlord management training and certification 
A third form of technical assistance is landlord education and training for landlords of two- to four-
unit buildings in Woodlawn. This training is important because margins can be very tight with this 
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type of housing. Community Investment Corporation provides such landlord education and 
certification, which applies to landlords of both multifamily and two- to four-unit buildings. 
Certification for completing this program is required by the Neighborhood Housing Services of 
Chicago for their CityLIFT program to assist homeowners in purchasing two- to four-unit buildings 
(NHS of Chicago, 2013c). In line with this practice, the Initiative should have the blanket 
requirement that any homebuyer or landlord that is assisted with funds from the Small Building 
Initiative must successfully obtain a certificate of completion from CIC’s landlord training. 
Many other landlords will not be covered under these requirements and should be encouraged 
through other means. Free courses in Woodlawn with a proof of membership in the Homeowner 
Association or Block Club can be offered to those landlords who sign a code of conduct and/or 
participate in no-fee rental registration program with the Small Building Initiative. Despite the lack 
of explicit enforcement, this will create public information about available rental housing and 
provide standards for enforcing community norms. 
Note on Implementation of Counseling and Training Activities 
A host of providers for housing counseling, credit counseling and landlord training exist in Chicago, 
if not close to Woodlawn. As a result, the challenge of implementation rests on developing 
partnerships to bring the existing opportunities to beneficiaries in Woodlawn and those who may 
look to relocate Woodlawn. This can be done by advertising the counseling opportunities on Choice 
Neighborhoods materials and in those of supportive services coordinator Metropolitan Family 
Services. The Small Building Initiative could also develop an online presence or a regular distribution 
list of non-profit staff members, residents and officials. The message can be successfully distributed 
through existing organizational networks. Lastly, the Initiative could sponsor a series of “teaser” 
workshops with the Network of Woodlawn, Homeowners Association or the Metropolitan Planning 
Council that educate the community on issues such as repairing credit and landlord practices, but 
also introduce existing service providers to the community.  
Goal V: Responsible Development  
The final component of the SALAD Approach consists of supporting development in the 
neighborhood that does more than attract new residents and commits to building wealth among 
existing residents. It also intends to use partnerships and investments to support new models of 
rental housing and homeownership that would have a positive impact on the community. 
Objective A. More steering of development jobs to residents and tenants 
Local economic development initiatives are important mechanisms for channeling neighborhood 
improvements into enhanced opportunity for residents. As Woodlawn revitalizes, existing residents 
are more likely to create multiplier effects in spending and also to continue to live and invest in the 
neighborhood. 
The first local economic development initiative calls on POAH to partner with a workforce 
development intermediary to successfully develop HUD Section 3 business concern in Woodlawn 
for performing work on all Choice Neighborhoods construction projects, including the 
redevelopment of Grove Parc Plaza, development of off-site replacement housing, planned 
commercial developments, and any development associated with the Small Building Initiative. This 
is, of course, already an interest of POAH, but the formation of a partnership with an intermediary 
or a firm would improve the effort. One such organization is 180 Properties, a joint venture between 
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the workforce intermediary Cara Program and Mercy Housing that provides intensive job training to 
hard-to-employ workers for inspecting and maintaining vacant properties. The Chicago Housing 
Authority also maintains a regularly updated list of businesses with contact information that claim to 
be Section 3 business concerns that are potential partners as well (CHA, 2013e). A Request for 
Qualifications and/or Request for Proposal could identify businesses and organizations that actively 
hire in Woodlawn and would be interested in the potential partnership. 
A second more expansive local economic development initiative would develop for-sale housing 
with New Market Tax Credits that has been demonstrated in Ohio. Examples include the Columbus 
Housing Partnership that weathered the recession in 2008, and previous projects by Vintage 
Development Group and Zaremba, Inc., in Cleveland. By providing a construction loan to a 
business located in a qualifying low-income census tract, tax credits can be used to finance the 
development of for-sale housing (Anderson, 2008). Because of the necessity of having a large 
project to raise capital using tax credits, the focus would need to expand beyond the approximately 
200 two- to four-unit homes in Woodlawn to include homes in additional communities.  There 
would also need to be a qualifying developer located in Woodlawn with sufficient capacity to take on 
the construction loan, which presents an easy tie in with the expansion of local Section 3 business 
concerns. This would present a systematic way to leverage large amounts of capital at discounted 
rates and capture the economic development impacts for the benefit of residents. 
Objective B. More rental housing for low-income households (60-80% AMI) that 
incorporates a pathway to homeownership 
The first recommendation is to develop two- to four-unit buildings into scattered site affordable 
housing with shallow LITHC subsidies, and offer up all for deed-restricted purchase after 15 years. 
Case studies show that the LIHTC subsidy is often very successful in renovating scattered site 
housing in weaker markets, partially because the shallow subsidy of LIHTC developments (50%-
60% AMI) are received more positively than the deeper subsidy of Section 8 vouchers (Thomas & 
Dewar, 2013). Viewed not as a substitute but a complementary development strategy, LIHTC 
development could add income diversity to the neighborhood that hopefully would counteract the 
negative connotation that affordable housing has. Affordability would be viewed in relation to the 
resident. The opportunity to purchase houses (or individual units) through a limited-equity co-op 
would encourage greater resident stability and provide an opportunity for building wealth 
The second recommendation is to develop two- to four-unit buildings into scattered site affordable 
housing through the 203(k) loan program, and making them available for purchase. These units 
would be restricted to households at or below 80% AMI, and like the LIHTC program, would 
provide a more shallow (supply-side) subsidy that should be positioned as complementing existing 
affordable housing options. If the program allows, the units could also be sold as limited-equity co-
ops. Use of the 203(k) program for rental housing is only available, however, to a non-profit 
developer. 
Objective V. More financial capital for strong developers of rental two- to four-unit 
buildings 
To address the gap in financing that exists for rental housing developers of two- to four-unit 
buildings, the Small Building Initiative should jointly participate in providing loans to non-profit 
developers, for-profit developers and joint ventures of the two. Identifying an experienced non-
profit to develop homes under the 203(k) loan program would be difficult, potentially even more so 
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with the requirement that all homes are limited to 80% AMI. Rent-to-own strategies for 80% to 
120% AMI would be eligible for these additional loans. Support of for-profit developers would be 
accompanied by safeguards that require effective property management and Fair Housing for 
Housing Choice Voucher recipients. The inclusion of joint ventures can allow non-profits to gain 
development experience in partnership with for-profit partners, a practice that was effective in 
Philadelphia (Kromer, 2000). Providing developers better access to financing will encourage the 
participation of more financial intermediaries, who are useful for shifting investment strategies from 
generating cash flow to creating long-term asset growth.   
Objective D. More retail amenities 
Beyond the scope of housing, retail amenities are an important determinant of quality of life for 
residents of all income levels. Investing in commercial retail at 63rd and Cottage Grove, including a 
grocery store, coffee shop, dry cleaners, bakery and restaurants, would appeal to current and 
prospective residents alike. These investments should be considered priorities in order to ensure that 
the “brand” of the revitalization efforts in Woodlawn represents the whole set of planned initiatives. 
Conclusion 
In closing, I reiterate the significance of each component of the SALAD Approach. Without 
stabilizing the market, planners in Woodlawn and similar communities risk using resources in ways 
that do not reflect best practices of reducing capital imperfections (not displacing private capital and 
making only the amount of investment necessary to create the desired impact). Without advocating 
for market-correcting reforms outside of neighborhoods and pushing for local institutions aligned 
with neighborhood goals, the neighborhood may remain stymied by policies dictated by actors 
uninterested or uninformed about their impact in a localized setting, by the advocacy of vocal but 
non-representative actors, and by crippling gaps in capacity . By not making loans and other 
financial assistance easily accessible and adequate, scarce resources are left on the table and gaps in 
capital availability continue the trend of disinvestment. Without assistance and counseling, 
homeowners will not be able to overcome financial and market-dictated challenges to 
homeownership, preventing them from becoming active partners in investing in the community, 
overseeing renovations and creating more quality housing.  Lastly, without responsible development 
that both builds wealth and diversifies the type of housing tenure and tenants, revitalization will not 
translate to improvements in economic opportunity for all of the residents. In short, the divide 
between low-income tenants and middle-class residents and homeowners will continue and the 
victor will most surely not be Woodlawn.  
I have sought to link a comprehensive set of actions and a broader strategy directly to my 
assessment of the two- to four-unit market’s strengths and opportunities in Woodlawn, based on 
informant interviews, field observations and professional exposure. Though this study speaks to the 
direct experience in the neighborhood of Woodlawn and provides a set of context-specific 
recommendations, many of the lessons are indeed applicable outside of Woodlawn. Housing 
markets must be addressed through market-means, but with appropriate attention for the role of 
effective and aligned institutions, evaluation of public policy and the consideration of equitable 
outcomes. Such approaches, I firmly believe, are more likely to bring broad community stakeholders 
together, to attract the assistance of necessary partners and to bring about positive neighborhood 
improvements that all can appreciate.  
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Appendix I: Implementation Plan 
 
Goal 
 
Objective 
Low-Effort/High-Priority 
Recommendations 
High-Effort/High-Priority 
Recommendations 
Low-Priority 
Recommendations 
I. Stabilization 
 
A stabilized, 
well-functioning 
property market 
for two- to four-
unit properties 
A. More Stable Property 
Taxes 
1. Expand outreach to seniors 
for property tax exemptions 
2. Offer sale to land trust in exchange 
for long-term land lease, stable 
property taxes and permanent 
affordability 
3. Creation of 
deferred/forgivable loan 
program that freezes property 
taxes and comes due on sale 
of property.  
B. Fewer Short-Sales  1. Re-direct many or all properties to 
the Land Bank Authority so they aren't 
included in appraisals 
 
C. Fewer Lots and 
Demolition for New 
Construction 
1. Allow neighbors long-term 
management opportunity of 
neighboring lots 
2. Perform long term land banking with 
Land Bank Authority; 
3. Turn over vacant lots/buildings from 
Building Dept to Land Bank 
 
D. Fewer housing units and 
new, spacious single family 
housing 
1. Demonstrate and encourage 
the conversion of two- to four-
unit buildings into single family 
housing and two-flats 
  
E. More ready-to-renovate 
two- to four-unit buildings 
 1. Actively use Lank Bank Authority to 
acquire vacant buildings and clear title 
and municipal liens 
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II. Advocacy 
 
Policies and 
organizational 
infrastructures 
better aligned to 
addressing the 
unique 
challenges of 
two- to four-unit 
properties 
A. More active 
organizations in Woodlawn 
that specialize in two- to 
four-unit buildings 
 1. Positioning the Network of 
Woodlawn and its pillars as the leading 
community organization. 
2. Invite NHS to have field presence 
vis-à-vis a satellite staff member. 
3. Develop community-wide 
consensus around prioritizing 
renovation over demolition 
and new construction. 
B. Fewer non-professionally 
managed two- to four-unit 
buildings that are 100% 
occupied by housing choice 
voucher recipients and/or 
exhibit weak property 
management 
1. Lower HCV landlord rents 
through demonstrating non-
compliance with "rent 
reasonableness" requirement. 
2. Monitor and support Sub-
Area FMR Demonstration. 
3. Advocate for "one unit for market" 
requirement. 
4. Pursue rental licensing for 
two- to four-unit buildings. 
C. Higher quality of life and 
stronger market demand 
for housing in Woodlawn 
1. Support public safety efforts, 
including landlords of two- to 
four-unit buildings. 
2. Promote 3-1-1 for 
requesting public services.  
3. Analyze performance 
metrics for neighborhood 
disparities. 
1. Pressure public agencies to improve 
quality/culture of customer service to 
the neighborhood through formal and 
informal means. 
 
D. More sources of funding 
for Small Building Initiative 
  1. Merge the Woodlawn and 
West Woodlawn TIF districts. 
     
III. Loan Fund 
and Financial 
Assistance 
 
Interested and 
current home 
owners in 
Woodlawn have 
adequate 
financial 
resources to 
A. More interest in and 
attainment of 
acquisition/rehab loans by 
owner-occupant purchases 
of two- to four-unit 
buildings in Woodlawn 
1. Establish relationships with 
local acquisition/rehab lenders 
and particular lenders of 203(k) 
loans. 
2. Educate homeowners about 
publicly-provided 
acquisition/rehab loans from 
NSP and IDHA. 
  
B. More interest in, 
availability of and 
attainment of down 
1. Leverage existing down-
payment and subordinate loan 
programs. 
2. Create new down-payment 
assistance targeting rehab of 
Woodlawn two- to four-unit buildings. 
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invest into two- 
to four-unit 
properties 
payment and subordinate 
loans for owner-occupant 
purchases of two- to four-
unit buildings in Woodlawn 
C. Greater access to 
renovation loans for two- 
to four-unit buildings in 
Woodlawn 
1. Expand TIF-NIP renovation 
lending in both TIF districts. 
2. Augment TIF-NIP renovation 
financing through joint loan loss 
guarantee. 
 
IV. Assistance 
and Counseling 
 
Interested and 
current home 
owners in 
Woodlawn have 
adequate 
technical 
assistance and 
counseling to 
invest into two- 
to four-unit 
properties 
A. Greater access to pre-
purchase and consumer 
credit counseling in 
Woodlawn 
1. Partner with NHS or other 
nearby pre-purchase assistance 
to advertise services in 
Woodlawn. 
2. Develop monthly series of pre-
purchase and credit counseling 
workshops to make marginal gains and 
introduce service-providers to 
residents. 
 
B. Greater access to 
technical assistance in the 
design and build process 
for two- to four-unit 
buildings 
1. Hire construction manager 
for start-up assistance to 
home-owners; 
2. Develop approved list of 
203(k) consultants, providing 
workshops to promote more 
capable consultants to become 
certified. 
3. Retain several 203(k) consultants to 
provide services to home buyers on a 
fee basis or revenue-sharing 
agreement. 
4. Hire construction manager 
to handle all construction 
advisory for two- to four-unit 
buildings. 
C. More participation of 
both owner-occupant and 
investor owners of two- to 
four-unit buildings in 
landlord management 
training and certification 
1. Perform outreach to two- to 
four-unit building landlords to 
get training. 
2. Require all purchases of two- 
to four-unit buildings affiliated 
with the Small Building 
Initiative to get landlord 
training certification. 
3. Sponsor landlord education 
seminars for landlords who join 
homeowner association or who sign 
code of conduct and register rental 
apartments with Small Building 
Initiative. 
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V. Responsible 
Development 
 
Current 
residents have 
pathways to 
build wealth 
through local 
economic 
development 
and pathways 
to 
homeownershi
p, while 
diverse rental 
products and 
necessary 
amenities 
attract newer 
(moderate 
income) 
residents. 
A. More steering of 
development jobs to 
residents and tenants 
1. Partner with a workforce 
development intermediary to 
develop workforce in 
Woodlawn to complement all 
Choice work.  
2. Establish relationships with 
Section 3 business concerns 
and promote hiring of 
Woodlawn residents. 
 3. Partner with other 
neighborhoods to use NMTC 
program to get construction 
loan to rehab two- to four-
unit properties for sale or 
rental. 
B. More rental housing for 
low-income households 
(60-80% AMI) that 
incorporate pathways to 
homeownership 
 1. Develop concentrated shallow-
subsidy scattered site rental housing 
using the LIHTC program and 203(k) 
loan program, offering as many as 
possible for sale (as limited equity co-
ops or pure sale) after 5-15 years. 
 
C. More financial capital for 
strong developers of rental 
two- to four-unit buildings 
 1. Joint participate in loans to non-
profit developers, for-profit developers 
and joint ventures for developing two- 
to four-unit buildings into rental 
housing (with eventual for sale). 
 
D. More retail amenities  1. Invest in commercial retail at 63rd 
and cottage including grocery store, 
coffee shop, dry cleaners, bakery and 
restaurants. 
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Appendix II: Description of Informants 
Research Alias Informant Background Date of 
Initial 
Interview 
Informant #1 Broker with a real estate firm that serves Woodlawn 1/9/13 
Informant #2 Real estate developer that serves Woodlawn 1/10/13 
Informant #3 Woodlawn resident and landlord 1/16/13 
Informant #4 Government official dealing with housing 1/17/13 
Informant #5 Government official dealing with housing 1/18/13 
Informant #6 Local developer with residential portfolio that includes two- to 
four-unit properties in Woodlawn 
1/18/13 
Informant #7 Local developer of multifamily properties on the South Side of 
Chicago  
1/22/13 
Informant #8 Government Official with an agency that deals with housing 1/22/13 
Informant #9 Developer that serves Woodlawn 1/22/13 
Informant #10 Representative of local institution active in Woodlawn 1/23/13 
Informant #11 & 
#12 
Two community organizers working on housing issues in 
Woodlawn and across the entire City of Chicago 
1/23/13 
Informant #13 Local developer of multifamily properties in Woodlawn 1/23/13 
Informant #14 Government official dealing with housing 1/24/13 
Informant #15 Non-profit representative in housing 1/25/13 
Informant #16 Mortgage broker for a national lender 1/25/13 
Informant #17 Non-profit representative in Woodlawn 1/25/13 
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